
Class JlA_LkZ 
Book T5 ^ 



Go»TigiitN'?_J_32^ 



COPYRIGHT DEPOSm 



ELEMENTS OF 
STRATEGY 



BY 

Colonel G. J. FIEBEGER 

Professor of Engineering 
UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY 

REVISED IN 1916 



NEW YORK 

JOHN WILEY & SONS, Inc. 

London: CHAPMAN & HALL, Limited 

1920 






Copyright, 1920, 
By G. J. FIEBEGER 



OCT -9 1220 



PRESS OF 

BRAUNWORTH & CO. 

300K MANUFACTURER' 

BROOKLYN. ."4. if- 



©CI.Ao97716 



^ v: 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTER I 

Strategy 

PAGE 

Defensive and offensive war — advantages and disadvantages of 
— theater of war and operations — base of operations — lines 
of retreat — strategic points * 1 

CHAPTER II 

Preparation for War 

Necessity for complete preparation — military forces — maps — 
study of boundaries, lines of communication, natural topo- 
graphical features, fortresses, etc 29 

CHAPTER III 

Mobilization 

Definition — Prussian system — German army in 1870 — American 
army in 1898 — separation of mobilization and concentration — 
Von.Moltke's plan for a war against France and Austria 50 

CHAPTER IV 

Conduct of Stragetic Operations 

Campaign — plan of campaign — Napoleon's maxims for conduct 
of campaigns with examples — Jomini's principles — Von 
Moltke's principles 75 

CHAPTER V 

Offensive and Defensive in Strategy 

Offensive, advantages and disadvantages of — passage of rivers 
— passage of the Rappahannock in Wilderness and Chancel- 
lorsville campaign — passage of mountain ranges — defensive, 
advantages and disadvantages of — defense of rivers — with 
examples— defense of mountains— diversions in defense 121 



ELEMENTS OF STRATEGY 



CHAPTER I 
STRATEGY 

Offensive and Defensive War. — War is a contest waged 
between two belligerents for the purpose of determining 
questions at issue which cannot be settled by ordinary 
diplomatic means. The contest is usually directed by the 
chief executive power of a state acting as the supreme con- 
troller of the national armies and navies. During the prog- 
ress of a great war all the powers of the nation should be 
centered in bringing the war to a speedy and successful 
termination by diplomacy, and by the utilization of the 
resources of the nation to raise its armed strength to a 
state commensurate with the task before it, and to main- 
tain this state throughout the contest. The contest itself 
is carried on by the armed strength of the belligerents 
directed by the commanders of the land and sea forces. 

A war is offensive on the part of the belligerent whose 
armed strength enables him to invade and maintain him- 
self in his adversary's territory; it is defensive on the part 
of the one who is unable to protect himself from such 
invasion. When the belligerents are approximately equal 
in armed strength, the war may become alternately offen- 
sive and defensive, or it may be offensive in one part of 
the territory and defensive in another. 



Objects of Offensive War. — The objects of an offensive 
war are to destroy the war strength of the defender and 
thus render him unable to prosecute the war; to conquer 
and occupy his territory so that no new force may be 
organized therein; to cause a change of sentiment in the 
authorities and the people of the nation attacked, so that 
they will desire peace on the invader's terms rather than 
a continuance of the struggle. The extent to which these 
objects must be carried out depends largely on the im- 
portance of the questions at issue. If these questions are 
not vital to the existence of the defender as an independ- 
ent power, a simple exhibition of superior war strength as 
showTi in a single successful battle may render the defender 
willing to accede to the demands of the invader; if, how- 
ever, the questions are vital to the defender as an inde- 
pendent power, he may be unwilling to make peace until 
his armies are annihilated and his territory completely 
conquered. 

The Austro-Prussian war of 1866 waged for the pur- 
pose of determining which of the belligerent states should 
be supreme in Germany was terminated shortly after the 
first decisive battle; the civil war in America and the 
British-Boer, in war which questions of independence were 
involved, were prosecuted until the lesser powers were 
absolutely exhausted. 

Objects of Defensive War. — The objects of a purely 
defensive war are to neutralize the armed strength of the 
invader and thus render him incapable of prosecuting the 
war offensively; to cause a change of sentiment in the 
authorities and the people of the invading nation so that 
they will accept peace terms acceptable to the defender; 
and to enlist the sympathies of neutral nations and cause 
them to secure peace through active participation or 
through diplomatic influence. 



To secure these objects, the war must be prolonged: 
the war strength of the defender preserved in a state of 
efficiency as long as possible; the invasion of the territory- 
resisted vigorously; and the war-like spirit of the people 
so aroused that they will be willing to make any sacrifice 
rather than accept peace on the terms of the invader. A 
defensive war does not preclude offensive operations; in 
well-conducted defensive war, the invader is attacked 
whenever this can be done without compromising the 
armed strength upon which the nation must rely for a 
continuance of the struggle. 

The decisive events of our Revolutionary war were the 
battle near Saratoga, October, 1777, and the siege of York- 
town, October, 1781, which resulted in the surrender of 
the armies of Burgoyne and Cornwallis; the treaty of 
1778, by which the French nation agreed to assist the colo- 
nies with her land and naval forces; and the overthrow of 
the North ministry in Great Britain, resulting from a 
change of sentiment of the people and Parliament on the 
advisability of continuing the war. To secure their inde- 
pendence the colonies carried on active war from 1775 to 
1781, and were obliged to be prepared for a renewal of 
hostilities until 1783. 

Advantages and Disadvantages of Offensive and Defen- 
sive Wars. — The principal advantages of an offensive war 
are: the entire resources of the home territory, and of so 
much of the hostile territory as has been conquered, may 
be utilized to prosecute the war; the civil government, 
upon which dependence must be placed to raise the funds 
and supplies to prosecute the war, is in full operation; 
and the citizens of the country are subject to none of the 
hardships incident to invasion. The principal disadvan- 
tages are that its prosecution ordinarily requires a much 
larger army than that required for a defensive war, and 



the army receives no assistance or reliable information 
from the inhabitants of the country in which it operates. 

Though these advantages and defects are self-evident, 
the difficulties of invading a really hostile country are not 
generally appreciated. Besides supporting a field army 
superior to that of the defender, the entire country be- 
tween the frontier and that army must be garrisoned by 
the invading troops to keep in check he hostile popula- 
tion and to protect the lines of communication by which 
the invading army receives its supplies. The greater the 
extent of this territory, the greater will be the force 
absorbed by these garrisons. 

At the close of the Franco-German war, although the 
German army was obliged to garrison only the country 
between Paris and the frontier, one-fourth of the invading 
army was absorbed by these garrisons. In the summer 
of 1864, there were but two Union army groups in actual 
contact with the enemy; the eastern group commanded 
by Grant was composed of the Army of the Potomac and 
the Army of the James, and the western group com- 
manded by Sherman was composed of the Army of the 
Cumberland, the Army of the Tennessee and the Army 
of the Ohio. The combined strength of the two groups 
was about 250,000 men. At this time, however, the avail- 
able strength of the entire Union force under arms was 
about 500,000 men; one-half of the total force present 
for duty was simply guarding the conquered territory. 

In Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812, of 400,000 
men that composed his main army, 240,000 were left 
between the Vistula and Dnieper rivers to protect his 
communications, and only 160,000 passed Smolensk; of 
these 40,000 were left in the rear for the same purpose 
before the army reached Moscow. Nearly three-fourths 
of his army was protecting his communications. 



5 

The principal advantages of a defensive war are: a 
smaller force is required since the operations are in a 
friendly territory, in which the lines of communication 
require no special protection; the operations of the army 
receive assistance from the fortified places which delay 
and embarrass the movements of the invader; and the 
inhabitants assist the army as guides, spies, etc. Fred- 
erick the Great said: 

''If glory were my only object, I would never make war 
except in my own country because of its manifold advan- 
tages; every man there acts as a spy; the enemy cannot 
stir a foot without being betrayed." 

Throughout the civil war, the Confederate force was 
much smaller than the Union force which it opposed. In 
the summer of 1864, it numbered only about 180,000 men, 
or a little more than one-third the strength of the Union 
armies, and yet was able to offer a substantial resistance. 

The principal disvantages of the defensive war are : the 
resources of the country not occupied by the invader can 
alone be counted on to prosecute the war; the civil gov- 
ernment becomes more or less disorganized; and the citi- 
zens of the territory covered by the operations of the 
armies suffer the hardships incident to this occupation. 
These hardships have been much mitigated in modern 
times, but that they cannot be wholly eliminated from 
warfare, has been shown in the most recent wars. 

Strategy. — Strategy in its most general sense may be 
defined to be the art of directing the employment of the 
armed strength of a nation to best secure the objects of 
war. It is not suflftcient to create military force by rais- 
ing, equipping, and training armies and navies, and con- 
structing fortresses, but it is necessary to direct properly 
the employment of this force, lest it be dissipated in 
useless operations or destroyed in unnecessarily hazard- 



6 

ous ones. Strategy deals with the problems of warfare 
involving combinations of force, space, and time. 

The elementary military forces are the tactical units 
of the three arms; the battaUon, squadron and battery; 
the stragetic units are combined units of combat, the divi- 
sion and the corps. Each unit has a definite numerical 
value represented by the strength present for duty, and a 
less determinate moral value due to its training, equip- 
ment, discipline, character of commander, amount of ser- 
vice, etc. The actual value of military forces can there- 
fore never be accurately known; in ordinary problems of 
strategy it is usual to deal with their numerical value only. 

The operations of war usually take place in an extended 
territory within which the units are moved and combined 
against the enemy like the pieces on a chess-board. The 
movments in war are, however, infinitely more compli- 
cated; the territory is covered by an irregular network of 
highways, waterways, and railways, along which all move- 
ments must take place; on highways, if transportation 
is not supphed, at a rate depending upon the physical 
condition of the troops, the character of the roads, and 
the weather ; on waterways and railways according to the 
available supply of transportation. These routes are 
intersected by rivers, marshes, mountains, forests, etc., 
which still further complicate the movements. The 
operations are conducted against an enemy whose strength 
and position is, at any time, only approximately known 
under the most favorable conditions. 

Time in warfare, as the number of moves in chess, 
limits the changes which can be made in the positions of 
the troops, and the new combinations which can be 
formed within a given time. An error in the estimation 
of the time in which a combination may be made may 
change probable success into certain failure. 



For the above reasons, strateg}^ has also been defined 
to be: 

"The art of planning military operations upon the 
map." — Jomini. 

In its relation to tactics — 

"Strategy fixes the point where, the time when, and 
the nmnerical force with which the battle is to be fought." 
— Clausewitz. 

Strategy is the intermediary between national policy 
which furnishes the means and determines the object of a 
war, and tactics, through whose decisive battles results 
are alone possible. 

Definitions of Elements of the Strategic Territory. — 
The theater of war, in its widest sense, is the entire terri- 
tory which may become the field of operations of the bel- 
ligerent forces; according to common usage it is that part 
of the theater of war n which the operations actually 
take place at any specified period. The term seat of war 
is also applied to this limited field. A theater of opera- 
tions is the part of the theater of war covered by the 
operations of any independent fraction of the belligerent 
armies. A zone of operations is the territory which hes 
between two hostile armies. The territorial base of opera- 
tions of an army is the entire territory from which it draws 
its recruits and supplies. The linear base of operations of 
an invading army is the line of obstacles or fortified places 
which limits the zone of ordinary counter attacks of the 
enemy. The term base of operations is applied to either 
the territorial or linear base. 

The//'on^ of operations, or strategic front, is the line along 
which an army may be said to be deployed. It is the line 
connecting the leading divisions of the different columns 
of an army on the march, or their cnmps when at rest. 



8 

The communications are the routes along which an army 
is suppUed. The objective of any mihtary operation is 
the object which it is desired to accomphsh; when this 
object is the possession of some definite position in the 
theater of war, it may be called a territorial object. Lines 
of operations are the highw^ays, waterways, or railways 
along which an army moves or operates; the term is usu- 
ally applied to the above routes connecting the objective 
with the linear base or the front of operations. A line 
of retreat is the line of operations followed by an army in 
making a retrograde movement; it is ordinarily the same 
as the line of communication. A strategic point is any 
position in the theater of war whose possession is 
of special value to the belligerents. 

Theater of War. — The theater of war in its widest 
sense comprises the land territories of the belligerents, 
the high sea, the navigable waters of the belligerents, and 
may also include the territories of weak neutrals. It is 
not usually applied to such an extended territory, but is 
limited to the area in which the armed forces of the two 
belligerents have actually come into contact during the 
progress of the war. Thus the theater of the civil war in 
America is usually understood to mean the entire terri- 
tory which at any period of the war was the scene of con- 
flict between the Union and Confederate troops. 

Theater of Operations. — The particular territories 
which are made the theaters of operations depend on the 
will of the belligerent who assumes the offensive. This 
is one of his principal advantages. If the nations have a 
common land frontier, the territory between the boun- 
dary and the capital usually forms the principal theater, 
as in the Franco-German war of 1870-71, the Austro- 
Prussian war of 1866, the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, 
etc. ; if the territory of the defender is small and the pos- 



9 

session of the capital prize for which both beUigerents are 
fighting, it may be the only territory thus included. If 
however, the common boundary is an extended one, sev- 
eral distinct regions may be made theaters of operations. 
In the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, there was one 
region between the Black and Caspian seas, and another 
in the Balkan Peninsula west of the Black sea, covered 
by simultaneous operations ; in the wars between Austria 
and France from 1792 to 1809, there was one theater of 
operations in Italy in the valley of the Po, and another in 
Germany in the valley of the Danube, in which distinct 
and independent operations were conducted. 

If the territories of the belligerent states are accessible 
from the sea, the one with decisive sea-power may have 
considerable latitude in selecting the theaters of operations. 

In the Mexican war, the first American army of inva- 
sion crossed the Rio Grande at Matamoras and advanced 
as far as Saltillo via Monterey. It was then decided to 
shift the main theater of operations and advance on the 
City of Mexico via Vera Cruz. This transfer was possi- 
ble because Mexico had no navy. 

In the Spanish-American war, the theaters of operations 
of the opposing armies were the colonial possessions of 
Spain: Cuba, Porto Rico and the PhiHppine Islands. 
The Spanish navy was unable to prevent the American 
forces from landing in her island possessions. 

As each theater of operations should be the field of oper- 
ations of a single commander, theaters should be limited 
by natural obstacles not easily traversed, or by unoc- 
cupied zones of such extent that there may be no con- 
fusion between armies occupying adjacent theaters. In 
our civil war, the theater of war covered by active opera- 
tions was naturally divided into three theaters of opera- 
tions: one between the Atlantic ocean and the Appala- 



10 

lachian mountain system, one between the Appalachian 
system and the Mississippi river, and one west of the Mis- 
sissippi. This natural division was not always followed; 
in Virginia in 1861 there were two independent Union 
armies, and in 1862 as many as five. The operations of 
both years ended disastrously for the Union troops. In 
the territory between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi 
there was sometimes a single army, and sometimes two 
independent armies on the part of both the Union and the 
Confederate authorities. There was more reason for a 
division of this theater, since, until the fall of Vicksburg, 
these armies had two distinct lines of operation, one along 
the Tennessee and Mississippi rivers, and the other along 
the Nashville-Chattanooga railroad. 

Territorial Base of Operations. — The territory which 
may be relied upon to furnish an army with recruits and 
supplies is that portion of the territory of each belligerent 
and his allies which is not occupied by hostile forces. A 
base, with a large population and rich in supplies, is essen- 
tial to the maintenance of a prolonged war. Since the 
territorial base of the defender is gradually reduced, as the 
front of operations of the invader is advanced, it is advan- 
tageous to have this territorial base of considerable extent 
so that it will require the occupation of an immense tract 
of country to injure materially the defender by reducing 
his resources in recruits and supphes. The great extent 
of the Russian base prevented the success [of Napoleon's 
plan of invasion in 1812; he reached Moscow too weak in 
men and facilities for transportation to venture further. 

Sea-power enables a belligerent to obtain supplies from 
distant colonies and from neutrals, and to restrict the 
supplies which his adversary can receive by sea. In the 
civil war, the blockade of the southern ports by the 
navy, and the occupation of the coast by Union troops 



11 

materially decreased the resources of the Confederate 
armies. 

In the European war of 1914-1917, the territorial base 
of the central powers was too small to supply adequately 
the armies and the non-combatants; and the superior 
sea-power of Great Britain prevented the central powers 
from procuring supplies from the neutral nations of the 
Western hemisphere. 

Linear Base of Operations. — The hnear base of opera- 
tions is usually a wide river, chain of mountains, or a line 
of fortresses, on or close to the frontier, which enables a 
small force to protect the country from invasion by raid- 
ing parties, while the field army is operating in the enemy's 
country. Natural lines of obstacles are usually strength- 
ened by fortifications constructed in time of peace, or at 
the outbreak of war. 

Before the construction of railways, when armies were 
obliged to rely upon ordinary wagon transportation for 
their supplies, it was necessary either to establish large 
depots of supplies along the linear base before beginning 
a campaign, or to live by requisitions on the country. 
The former was the custom of armies in the time of Fred- 
erick the Great, and the latter in the time of Napoleon. 
The method of subsisting by requisition was usually sup- 
plemented by depots. When Napoleon was about to 
enter upon his Russian campaign, he realized that his sys- 
tem of requisitions would fail as the theater of operations 
was an unproductive country, so he spent nearly an entire 
year in filling depots. His principal base was the Vistula 
river, where he established great depots at Danzig, Elbing, 
Thorn, and Modhn, and smaller ones at Marienburg, 
Marienwerder, Block, and Warsaw; all these were forti- 
fied towns. As this base was in the country of a doubtful 
ally, he provided for contingencies by converting the 



12 

Oder and Elbe rivers into provisional bases, to which he 
could retire in case of disaster, by establishing depots at 
Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau on the former, and at Madge- 
burg on the latter. Behind the Elbe was the primary 
base of the Rhine. 

During the wars waged between France and the powers 
of central Europe, the Rhine river was usually the linear 
base of one of the belhgerent powers, and the possession 
of the fortified cities and bridges on this river was always 
one of the points contested in every war, and in every 
peace negotiation. The Potomac and the Ohio rivers 
formed the linear base of the Union armies east of the 
Mississippi river, and were early strengthened by the for- 
tifications at Washington, Harpers Ferry, Covington, 
Louisville, Smithland, and Paducah, where the natural 
lines of invasion intersected these rivers. The Alps, sep- 
arating Italy from the neighboring powers, would be the 
base of operations in a war in which Italy was involved; 
all the principal mountain passes are fortified by the states 
whose boundaries are formed by this range. 

The linear base of operations is in the line along which 
the strategic concentration of the army usually takes 
place at the beginning of the war, and along which the 
army rallies in case of defeat in the enemy's territory. 

If both belligerents have a seacoast frontier, the one 
with the greater sea-power may secure a base on its adver- 
sary's coast. In the Peninsular war. Great Britain formed 
a base on the peninsula between the Tagus river and the 
Atlantic ocean south of Torres Vedras, Portugal. In the 
civil war, bases were formed by the Union armies at sev- 
eral points on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, as Port Royal, 
Hatteras, New Orleans, etc.; in the Spanish-American 
war bases were secured in Cuba, Porto Rico, and in the 
Philippine Islands. Bases on the enemj^'s seacoast must 



13 

ordinarily be well fortified in order to protect the supply 
of an army and its withdrawal, should it be unable to 
maintain itself in the enemy's country. Saloniki, the 
base of the alhed armies in the Balkan States in 1916- 
1917, was thus fortified. 

The principal linear base of the defender is not so dis- 
tinctly marked as that of the invader; it may be roughly 
described as the line connecting the principal garrisoned 
and fortified cities in the rear of the army. Minor opera- 
tions of defense may be based on any fortified place, or on 
any river whose crossings are in the possession of the 
defender, and which flows across, or in the vicinity of, the 
invader's lines of operations. 

Extent of Base. — A base of considerable extent is more 
favorable to offensive strategic warfare than one of 
limited extent, since there will be more fines of opera- 
tion leading from the base to the point in the enemy's 
territory which may be selected as a temporary objec- 
tive. The invader has the choice of operating by one 
fine, or by several fines of operation, simultaneously, and 
has a certain amount of latitude in the selection of his 
theater of operations, and his lines of supply. As he may 
utilize several fines of supply, he is thus less dependent 
upon any one of them than he would be upon a single line, 
and is in less danger of seeing his operations paralyzed by 
a sudden raid on his rear. He has also greater freedom 
in his forward movements, for if he finds his advance 
along one line checked by an impassable barrier, as an 
intrenched army or fortified place, he may shift his line of 
operations and turn the flank of the position without 
sacrificing the safety of his communications. Should he 
be defeated and pushed from his principal line of supply, 
he may always seek safety from utter destruction by 
retreating along one of the adjacent lines. 



14 

In the wars waged between France and Austria during 
the French Repubhc, Consulate and Empire, the hnear 
base of the French operations was the Rhine river, north 
of the Swiss Alps, and the Alps from Switzerland to the 
Mediterranean sea. This extended base gave numerous 
lines of operations along which movements could be made 
into the enemy's territory. The most northern line of 
operations leading into the valley of the Danube crossed 
the Rhine river at the bridges of Cologne and Coblenz, 
the Main river between Frankfort and Bamberg, and 
reached the Danube in the vicinity of Ratisbon; this was 
the route followed by Jourdan in 1796. A second route 
crossed the Rhine between Mainz and Strassburg, the 
Neckar between Heilbrun and Stuttgart, and reached the 
Danube between Ulm and Donauwerth; this was the 
route followed by Moreau in 1796, and by Napoleon in 
1805. A third route followed the valley of the upper 
Rhine from Basle, and crossed the divide between 
that river and the Danube near Lake Constance; 
this was the route followed by Moreau in 1800. Auxili- 
ary routes also led through the Black Forest from 
Strassburg and from Freiburg to the head-waters of the 
Danube. 

The valley of the Po in Italy could be reached from the 
north, by crossing the Alps via the Splugen, Saint Goth- 
ard, Simplon, and Great Saint Bernard passes; these 
were the routes followed by Napoleon and McDonald in 
in 1800; the valley could be reached from the west by 
crossing the Alps at the Little Saint Bernard, Mt. Cenis, 
Genevre, and Argentine passes; the first of these was 
probably used by Hannibal in his invasion of Rome. 
These routes were not utilized as principal lines of opera- 
tions in the campaigns of 1796-1800 because they were 
well defended by forts on the Italian side ; as soon as they 



15 

fell into the hands of the French, however, they became 
Unes of supply. From the south, the Po could be reached 
by the Corniche road, running eastward from Nice along 
the seacoast, thence through one or more of the passes 
through the Apennine mountains. This was the prin- 
cipal route followed by the armies of the first French 
Republic in their Italian campaigns; it was utiHzed by 
Napoleon in 1796. 

If the base is an extended one, the defender cannot, at 
the outbreak of hostilities, be certain which of the various 
lines will be selected by the invader; he is therefore com- 
pelled to divide his force so as to protect each principal 
Hne of possible invasion; this enables the invader to fall 
upon one or more of these separated bodies with a united 
and overwhehning force. 

In the winter of 1861-1862, the main base of the Union 
armies in the west was the Ohio river. Advanced posts 
were in central and eastern Kentucky. Being threatened 
all along the line, the Confederate army was deployed in 
groups along a wide front extending from Columbus on 
the Mississippi to Mill Springs on the upper Cumberland, 
via Fort Henry on the Tennessee, Fort Donelson on the 
Cumberland, and Bowling Green on the Louisville-Nash- 
ville railroad. This enabled Grant to pierce the line at 
Henry and Donelson before the Confederate army could 
be concentrated. 

In the civil war the linear base of the Union armies 
operating in Virginia was the Potomac river from Wil- 
liamsport to its mouth, and Chesapeake Bay from the 
mouth of the Potomac to Fort Monroe, Va. This ex- 
tended base offered to the Union armies several routes 
into Virginia. 

The Shenandoah route from Williamsport and Harpers 
Ferry was the hne of operations of Patterson in 1861, of 



16 

Banks in 1862, and of Sigel, Hunter and Sheridan in 1864. 
The Orange-Alexandria raih'oad route was the hne of 
operations of McDowell in 1861, of Pope in 1862, and of 
Meade in 1863. The route of the Fredericksburg-Rich- 
mond railroad was selected as a line of operations by 
Burnside in 1862 and by Hooker in 1863, although neither 
got beyond the Rappahannock river. The route up the 
peninsula between the York and James rivers was that 
utilized by McClellan in 1862. In 1864, Grant started 
by using the Orange-Alexandria railroad as his line of 
supply and then used in succession the Fredericksburg- 
Richmond railroad and the Rappahannock, York and 
James rivers as his campaign progressed. 

An extended base on the part of the invader also offers 
some advantages to the defender. Being ordinarily 
weaker than his opponent the defender can hardly hope 
successfully to resist~ invasion by remaining directly on 
the invader's line of operations, if the latter concentrates 
his whole force. By operating along some parallel route, 
however, he may compel the invader to retreat b}^ defeat- 
ing the small fraction left on this route and by threaten- 
ing the rear of the main column. The Confederate offen- 
sive operations in Virginia were usually made northward 
along the Shenandoah valley, while the Union armies 
were advancing southward east of the Blue Ridge moun- 
tains. 

In May, 1862, AlcClellan had reached the eastern sub- 
urbs of Richmond and was awaiting the arrival of rein- 
forcements overland from McDowell at Fredericksburg, 
before making the final assault. To prevent the rein- 
forcement of McClellan and to destroy the Union forces 
operating in and around the Shenandoah valley, Jackson, 
with the consent of Lee, made an offensive movement in 
the valley. In this operation he defeated Milroy and 



17 

Schenck near the village of McDowell, west of Staunton, 
and drove them into the mountains of West Virginia; he 
then attacked and defeated Banks' forces at Front Ro}^^] 
and Winchester and drove him across the Potomac. This 
offensive movement had the effect desired by the Con- 
federate commanders; McClellan received no reinforce- 
ments from McDowell as the latter was ordered to guard 
Washington and capture Jackson. 

In 1863, after the battle of Chancellorsville, Hooker was 
encamped on the north bank of the Rappahannock river 
opposite Fredericksburg. Lee decided to compel him to 
withdraw from the State of Virginia by making an offen- 
sive movement across the Potomac river into the Union 
territory. He moved his army around the west flank of 
his adversary into the Shenandoah valley and thence into 
the Cumberland valley of Pennsylvania and Maryland. 
This compelled Hooker to make a retrograde movement, 
cross the Potomac river, and place himself between Lee 
and the cities of Baltimore and Washington, which the 
Union army was compelled to protect. 

Secondary Bases. — Secondary bases or depots of supply 
are established by an army as it moves forward in an 
enemy's country, to form a connecting link between the 
main base and the field army. While the Ohio and the 
Potomac rivers constituted the main bases of the Union 
armies in the civil war, secondary bases were established 
at many points ; some of the principal of these were City 
Point on the James river, Whitehouse on the Pamunkey, 
Nashville and Chattanooga on the Louisville-Atlanta rail- 
road, Memphis, Vicksburg, and New Orleans, on the Mis- 
sissippi river. When Napoleon moved from the Vistula 
on his Russian campaign, he established great depots on 
the main road to jNIoscow at Konigsberg, Kovno on the 
Niemen, Wilna, Minsk and Smolensk. Between the great 



18 

depots, at a few days' interval, were smaller depots ; thus 
between Smolensk and Moscow, separated from each other 
by a ten days' march, there were three intermediate depots 
The network of railroads that now covers each of the im- 
portant countries and the introduction of motor trucks 
makes the distance between depots greater than formerly. 
In expeditions by sea, the landing harbor is always a very 
important secondary base. 

Communications. — Large bodies of troops moving 
slowly in a hostile country at a distance from their linear 
base can be subsisted only in the vicinity of railways and 
navigable rivers. The Count de Paris in his History of 
the Civil War deduces the conclusion that an American 
army of 100,000 men equipped with 4000 ordinary army 
wagons, utilizing three or four common country roads^ 
cannot be subsisted in a barren country at a distance 
exceeding twenUj-fwe to thirty miles from some point on a 
railway or navigable river. For a greater distance the 
ratio of the number of wagons to the number of miles is a 
rapidly increasing one. By the employment of motor 
trucks, the distance above given can be greatly increased, 
especially if the roads are good. 

Railways are the lines of supply employed by modern 
armies, whenever practicable, because of their great carry- 
ing capacity. A railway freight car has from ten to fif- 
teen times the capacity of the army wagon and travels as 
many miles in an hour as the army wagon travels in a day. 
The trunk lines which connect the hostile territories are 
the main arteries of supply, the branch hues which pene- 
trate into every province of the base of operations are 
their feeders, the branch lines which radiate over the ter- 
ritory occupied by the army are their distributors. 
Whenever possible each army should have one or more 
distinct arteries with branch lines connecting the territory 



19 

occupied by its corps in time of peace with the army 
front. 

Navigable rivers possess certain advantages over rail- 
ways as arteries of supply; the carrying capacity of large 
steamers is much greater than that of trains, and the water- 
way, unlike the railway, is not liable to be rendered use- 
less through accidents or through interference by an 
enemy's raiders. An enemy in possession of a bridge or 
tunnel for a few hours may wreck a railway so that it can- 
not be used for days or even weeks. 

As communications are usually the lines along which 
the invader must retreat in case of defeat, movements in 
force against the communications of an invading army 
almost invariably lead to the retreat of the invading army 
to protect these lines. Unless the invader has anticipated 
such a movement by opening new communications, the 
secure possession by the defender of any point on these 
lines in rear of an invading army will lead to its surrender 
or to a disastrous retreat over unprepared lines. To 
secure the safety of his communications is usually the first 
thought of the commander of an invading army. Wlien- 
ever there is any choice in the selection of the lines over 
which an army is supplied, short lines are preferred to lo7ig 
ones, multiple lines to single ones, central lines to those in 
rear of the flanks of the army. 

In preparing the plan of the Virginia campaign of 1864, 
Grant, encamped about Culpeper Court House, Virginia, 
was compelled to weigh the advantages resulting from 
movements around the east and west flanks of his adver- 
sary, who was encamped along the south bank of the Rapi- 
dan astride of the Orange & Alexandria railroad. A move- 
ment about the west flank would bring the Union army 
into the open country between the railway and the Blue 
Ridge mountains favorable for offensive and unfavorable 



20 

for defensive tactical operations; a movement about the 
east flank would bring the Union army into the tidewater 
region of Virginia, overgrown with thick woods and cut 
up by streams, unfavorable for offensive and favorable 
for defensive tactical operations. On the other hand, 
the former movement would prolong Grant's communica- 
tions and expose them to the raiding operations both from 
the country along the Fredericksburg-Richmond railroad, 
and from the Shenandoah valley; the latter would allow 
him to utilize in succession, the Fredericksburg-Rich- 
mond railroad and the navigable rivers which penetrate 
deep into Virginia, as lines of supply, and make his. com- 
munications short and absolutely safe. For the latter 
reason Grant decided to abandon the open country and 
plunge into the woods and swamps of eastern Virginia. 
The resulting campaign brought into prominence the ad- 
vantages and defects of the theater of operations he 
selected. The enemy was able to make a stubborn de- 
fense, but was unable to check the advance movement by 
operations on the communications as he had done in the 
previous campaigns. 

If the line of communications is a long one and is ex- 
posed to the enemy's raiding operations, the extent of the 
injury to which it may be subjected is much decreased by 
the construction of fortified depots at intervals along the 
line. Napoleon recommended that such depots should be 
constructed at the end of every five or six days' march in 
a hostile country. These fortified depots become the 
bases of operations of the forces detailed to protect the 
communications and to furnish the detachments assigned 
to the protection of railway bridges, tunnels, etc. If the 
communications are of great length, additional bases of 
operation are located on the flanks, distant from the com- 
munications, to intercept raiding parties before they 



21 

reach the hnes. In the British-Boer war, the British 
constructed block-houses at short intervals all along the 
railroads to be protected, and connected them by barbed 
wire fences. The railroads were patrolled by armored 
trains. 

Objective. — The destruction of the armed strength of 
an adversary is the primary objective of every war; there- 
fore any separate body of troops from a patrol to an army 
may be the objective of a military operation. Any per- 
manent or temporary fortified place which obstructs the 
movements of the invader or protects the operations of 
the defender, his troops, or supplies, and any military 
position favorable for the operations of either belligerent, 
as a river crossing. or mountain pass, may become an 
objective. 

The importance of the objective will ordinarily determine 
the effort made for its capture. As the capture of the 
capital of a country is always an important indication to 
the world of the superiority of the invader, it is usually 
one of the principal objectives of a war. Its capture may 
not terminate the war, but if it can be held by the invader 
it is certain to have an important moral effect upon the 
defender's powers of resistance, for it will deter foreign 
governments from lending aid to a cause presumably des- 
perate. 

Lines of Operations. — At the outbreak of a war, any 
route which penetrates into the defender's country and 
along which an army can be moved and supplied is a pos- 
sible line of operations. If an army moves as a unit along 
a single route it is said to have a single line of operations; 
if subdivided into two separate commands each having 
its own line of operations it is said to be operating on 
double lines; if subdivided into more than two separate 
commands it operates on multiple lines. An army sub- 



22 

divided into two or more separate commands may operate 
on converging, parallel, or diverging lines, depending upon 
the direction of the different hnes of operations. Lines 
of operations are interior when they he between the hnes 
of operation of enemy; they are exterior when they are 
separated by those of the enemy. An army may also 
operate from any front of operations on hnes as described 
above. Lines of operations are usually, but not neces- 
sarily, selected with a view to their use as lines of supply. 

In Sherman's march from Atlanta to Savannah, Ga., 
in 1864, he abandoned and destroyed the railroad in his 
rear and subsisted his army on the country through which 
he passed. The movement was really a change of base 
from the Ohio river to the seacoast. In Grant's cam- 
paign in Virginia in 1864, his general line of operations 
was perpendicular to his lines of supply at their points of 
intersection. 

A single line of operations does not mean a single road; 
it simply means that the different columns of the army 
are not separated by impassable obstacles or by such great 
distances as to render cooperation impossible. The dis- 
tance between the roads is usually decreased as the posi- 
tion of the enemy is approached. In his campaign of 
1805, Napoleon moved his army from the Rhine and Main 
rivers to the Danube, by utihzing every main highway 
between and including those of Strassburg-Stuttgart- 
Donauwerth, and Wurzburg-Ingolstadt, without violating 
the principle of employing but a single line of operations. 
The advantage of operating by a single line lies in the fact 
that the entire strength of the army is under the control 
of the commander on the day of the decisive battle. 

An army which operates by double or 7mdtiple lines has 
its different columns so widely separated or separated by 
such impassable obstacles that they must, temporarily at 



23 

least, act independently. The advantage of operating by 
such lines is that the separate commands can be more 
easily marched and supplied than if united; the disad- 
vantages are that the separate commands are liable to be 
attacked and defeated in detail by a united enemy. 

Operations by double lines were undertaken by invad- 
ing forces in two campaigns of the war 1914-1917. 

In August, 1914, the Russian army under Rennencamp 
invaded East Prussia from the east while that of Samsa- 
now invaded it from the south and southwest. The two 
armies were separated by the Masurian Lakes. By de- 
taching a force to check the advance of Rennencamp and 
concentrating his remaining force to attack Samsanow, 
Hindenherg succeeded in destroying the army of the latter 
in the battle of Tannenherg. He then concentrated on 
Rennencamp and compelled him to retire to the protec- 
tion of the Niemen river in Russia. 

In the latter part of 1916, the armies of the central 
powers invaded Rumania on double lines. Mackensen 
moved northward into Rumania from Bulgaria while 
Falkenhayn moved southward into Rumania from Tran- 
sylvania. The two armies were separated not only by 
Rumania but also by the Danube river. They were suc- 
cessful, however, in uniting their armies near the Rumanian 
capital, Bucharest. 

Operations by triple lines were undertaken in the 
Austro-Prussian war, the British-Boer war and the 
Russo-Japanese war. 

At the outbreak of the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, 
the Prussian army corps, which had been mobilized for 
some time, were concentrated along the Sazon-Bohemian 
frontier in three groups. The Third Army was near 
Torgau, the First near Gorlitz, the Second in Silesia near 
Neisse and Glaiz. The moblization and concentration of 



24 

the Austrian army had not been completed. To have 
concentrated the entire Prussian force at a single point 
of the frontier would have required considerable time and 
would have lost the advantage of its prompt mobilization. 
Moltke therefore decided to advance the three armies by 
different but converging lines and unite his armies in the 
enemy's territory. 

The Third Army therefore moved up the left bank of 
the Elbe to Dresden, crossed the river above that city, 
and moved to the Isar river. The First Army reached 
the same stream by moving due south from Gorlitz 
through the Bohemian mountains. The united armies 
then moved southeastwardly towards Koniggratz on the 
Elbe, where they were joined by the Second Army which 
moved westward from Silesia. The Second Army joined 
the First and Third while they were engaged in the de- 
cisive battle of Sadmva or Koniggratz. The battle was 
begun at 7 a. m., July 3; the Second Army reached the 
battlefield after noon, but in time to change a possible 
defeat into victory. This movement of the Prussian 
armies on different lines of operations facilitated the task 
of debouching from the mountain ranges which separate 
Prussia and Bohemia, and lightened the difficulties of 
camping, marching, and supplying the troops. 

In the British-Boer war the sieges of Ladysmith and 
Kimherley by the Boers caused three divisions of the army 
corps sent under Buller to be landed at Durban, East 
London, and Capetown, instead of at Capetown as 
originally planned. This division of the forces led to the 
defeat of the Durban column at the Tugela river, the defeat 
of the East London column at Stromburg, and that of 
the Cape-town column at Magersfontein near the Modder 
river, all during the same week. 

In the Russo-Japanese war the First Japanese army 



25 

moved on Liaoyang from Wiju on the Yalu river; the 
Second Army moved north along the railroad after land- 
ing at Pitsewo, the Fourth Army landed at Takushan 
and united with the Second at Haitschon south of liao- 
yang. As in the Austro-Prussian war the two wings met 
only on the decisive battle-field at Liaoyang, and as in 
that war, victory hung in the balance for some time. 

Armies may be said to be operating on interior lines 
whenever they can unite the separate groups into which 
the armies may be divided more quickly than their adver- 
saries. This may be due to the fact that the hnes of 
operation of the separate groups are nearer to each other, 
or are connected by better lines of communication than 
those of their adversary. 

A classic example of successful operations conducted 
from a central position by interior lines against an enemy 
who was operating bj^ double or triple lines, is the Italian 
campaign of Napoleon in 1796 in Italy in which he first 
drove the Austrian armies out of northern Italy and then 
held the Italian quadrilateral against four successive 
Austrian armies sent against him. 

Lee made a successful campaign in 1862, by utilizing 
interior lines and a central position. In early August, 
1862, the Union forces in the State of Virginia were divided 
into two armies, McClellan's Army of the Potomac, 
numbering 90,000 men, and Pope's Army of Virginia, 
numbering 60,000 men. The former was concentrated 
on the James river, near Harrison's Landing, where it 
had retreated after the seven days' battles at the end of 
June; and the latter was in northern Virginia, covering 
Washington, and operating on the line of the Orange and 
Alexandria railroad between the Rappahannock and Rapi- 
dan rivers. As the Army of Virginia had a large territory 
to occupy, its actual field strength was about 40,000 men. 



26 

The two armies were wholly separated from each other 
by Lee's Army of Northern Virginia which occupied Rich- 
mond, its intrenched capital, with about 70,000 men. 
The disposition of the Union armies was a very faulty 
one; neither alone was strong enough to attack the in- 
trenched position of Richmond, and they were unable to 
cooperate in a joint movement. 

After a long delay it was finally decided to withdraw 
McClellan's army from the James and unite it with that 
of Pope in northern Virginia. As soon as all danger from 
McClellan was removed by his withdrawal toward Fort 
Monroe, Lee, with 54,000 men, moved against Pope, 
defeated him in the battle of Manassas, and compelled 
him to retreat across the Potomac before he could be sat- 
isfactorily reinforced by McClellan. 

In the war of 1914-1917, the Central Powers had the 
advantage of waging war from a central position against 
the Allied Powers whose forces were deployed on several 
disconnected fronts. 

Lines of Retreat. — Lines of retreat may be as varied as 
the lines of operation. A single line of retreat is that ordi- 
narily followed by a united armj^ either from necessity, 
or because the army can thus be held together for future 
resistance. The difficulty of execution depends on the 
size of the army, the number and character of the roads, 
and the condition of the weather. Even Napoleon was 
unable to withdraw his army, under unfavorable condi- 
tions, from Moscow to his base on the Vistula. 

Double or multiple lines favor rapid retreat of an army 
under one commander but separate the columns; if, how- 
ever, they can afterwards be united by means of conver- 
gent routes, or by rapid transverse communications, as 
railways, this defect of multiple lines is neutrahzed. Two 
or more armies acting on different lines of operation may 



27 

retreat on convergent, or divergent lines. Convergent 
lines bring the columns nearer together so that they 
may operate as a unit and are favorable for the defense. 

The allied British and French armies in their retreat 
from the frontier to the Marne in 1914 were following 
lines which were more or less convergent and brought the 
different armies into closer contact. 

Divergent lines separate the several armies more and 
more, and are usually considered unfavorable for defense. 
The only circumstance in which they are considered 
advantageous is when an army has been so decisively 
defeated that no further hope of resistance can be enter- 
tained. Then the separate groups may scatter through- 
out the territory to become the nuclei of new armies, or 
to undertake guerrilla warfare. 

The line of retreat is usually the most direct line to the 
linear base of the defeated army as the army wishes to 
reach a place of safety as soon as possible for the purpose 
of reorganizing. A retreat at right angles to this direction 
may at times be more effective than a direct retreat in 
stopping the advance of the invader. In 1758, Fred- 
erick the Great was besieging the Austrian fortress of 
Olmutz with his line of supply running to Troppau on the 
Bohemian-Silesian frontier. A large Prussian convoy 
having been captured on this road by the Austrian irreg- 
ular cavalry, the king was compelled to raise the siege of 
Olmutz and retreat. Instead of retreating directly on 
Troppau, as the Austrians imagined he would be com- 
pelled to do, he retreated on Koniggratz and then through 
the mountains. In this way he stole a march on his 
opponents, kept the field of operations in the enemy's 
country, and secured to himself a safe line of retreat. 
His opponent, Daun, who expected to attack the king on 
his retreat to Troppau and to follow him into Silesia, was 



. 28 

thus deceived and compelled to remain in Bohemia for 
its protection. 

Strategic Points. — The strategic points in a theater of 
war owe their importance to their effect on the opera- 
tions of the contending armies. Some points are strategic 
because they lie on the routes which the invader is obliged 
to follow, and are favorable for defense. Mountain passes, 
like those mentioned in the Alps and Apennine moun- 
tains, belong to this class. Some points are strategic 
because they lie on the routes which the invader must 
employ as lines of supply; such are the fortified or easily 
defended points on an important trunk railway, as Nash- 
ville, Chattanooga, and Atlanta, in our civil war. The 
army may mask them in passing, but it must capture 
them before it can open its lines of supply. Some points 
are strategic simply because they are occupied by a force 
which cannot be neglected; Plevna was such a point in the 
Russo-Turkish war. Its value was all due to the fact 
that it was occupied by a strong Turkish army which 
threatened the communications of the Russian army 
should it cross the Balkan mountains without first cap- 
turing Plevna. 

There are political as well as military strategic points: 
the capital of a country is a political strategic point since 
its capture will probably have a material effect upon the 
national policy with respect to the war; if not upon that 
of the invaded country, at least upon the policy of its 
possible allies. The capital of a province is a political 
strategic point, as the administration of the province is 
directed from this center. 



CHAPTER II 
PREPARATION FOR WAR 

Preparation for war includes the steps taken to create, 
maintain, and strengthen the mihtary powers of a nation 
and to study the mihtary systemsof possible adversaries; 
to study the theater of war; to devise a plan of war; to 
mobilize the troops and to concentrate them on the fron- 
tier for offense and defense in accordance with this plan. 

Necessity for Complete Preparation. — The wars which 
have been waged since our own civil war have shown very 
clearly the disadvantages and disasters which result from 
a lack of suitable preparation at the beginning of a war, 
and the short time which a nation is liable to have for a 
preparation after the outbreak of hostilities. 

The Austro-Prussian war of 1866 had been pending for 
some time and both armies were preparing for the issue. 
The Prussian army was the first to finish mobilization, 
and profited by this advantage to attack her opponent 
before the latter was ready. The first actual declaration 
of hostilities was the notification sent to the Austrian out- 
posts the day before the Prussian army crossed the fron- 
tier. The decisive battle of the war was fought at Konig^ 
gratz ten days later. 

The Franco-German war of 1870 was declared on July 
19, 1870 On August 4, the German armies crossed the 
frontier before the French mobilization was finished; the 
two decisive battles of the war were Gravelotte-St. Private 
fought on August 18, and Sedan, fought on September 1. 
In the former the Army of the Rhine was defeated and 

29 



30 

imprisoned in the fortress of Metz and in the latter the 
Army of Chalons was defeated and surrendered. These 
two armies constituted practically the entire regular 
trained force of France. 

The Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78 was declared by 
Russia, April 24, 1877; she had, however, been preparing 
for it during the preceding six months by mobilizing along 
the Rumanian frontier all the troops she considered neces- 
sary for the invasion and the capture of the Turkish capi- 
tal. The army began crossing the Danube on June 26 
and the operations were progressing favorably when the 
decisive defeat at Plevna on the 30th of July brought the 
Russian advance to a standstill. 

''All idea of carrying out the original plan of cam- 
paign with the troops actually in hand was out of the ques- 
tion. . . . The terrible error of underestimating the 
enemy and beginning war with an inadequate force was 
apparent to everyone and fully acknowledged." * 

The Russians were compelled to beg assistance of the 
Rumanians, to mobilize additional corps and divisions of 
a strength of 120,000 men, and to call out the first con- 
tingent of the militia to replace the losses suffered by the 
field army. Had the Turks been able to assume the offen- 
sive promptly after the repulse of the Russians at Plevna, 
the latter might have been compelled to recross the 
Danube. 

When war was first declared between Great Britain 
and the Boer RepubHcs, October 11, 1899, the British 
were unprepared for it; they had less than 20,000 regulars 
and a small body of volunteers in South Africa to guard 
their extensive territory. The Boers, on the contrary, 
were ready to take the field with 30,000 to 35,000 men. 
The Boers therefore assumed the offensive, crossed the 

* Russo-Turkish War, by Lieutenant F. V. Greene, U. S. Army. 



31 

frontier on October 11 and 12, and the scattered British 
troops found it necessary either to abandon their fron- 
tier towns and retire toward the coast, or to protect them 
by subjecting themselves to investment in Lady smith, 
Kimberley, and Mafeking. They chose the latter course. 
The first relief sent to the British force in South Africa 
was the army corps of three divisions which was mobilized 
for the war. It numbered about 40,000 men, and was 
commanded by Buller. When it reached South Africa in 
November, the necessity of relieving Ladysmith and Kim- 
berley and defending the railways leading into Cape 
Colony led to a breaking up of this corps. 

Four railway lines connect the Boer territory with 
harbors on the coast. On the east is the line from Durban 
via Ladysmith to Johannesburg and Pretoria. In the 
center are the lines running from East London and Port 
Ehzabeth to Springfontein, and thence in a single line to 
Pretoria; the lines from Port Elizabeth and East London 
are separated by a distance of from 75 to 100 miles and 
are 240 miles west of the Durban line. The western line 
runs from Capetown to Kimberley and Mafeking; at its 
nearest point it is about 60 miles west of the Port Ehza- 
beth hne, and is connected with it by a transverse hne. 
The distance from the coast to the frontier on the four 
hues is respectively 203, 311, 386, and 570 miles. From 
the frontier to Pretoria, the capital of the South African 
Repubhc, is 110 miles on the Ladysmith hne, and 400 
miles on the others. 

It was manifestly impossible for a corps of 40,000 men 
to advance on the outer lines to relieve Ladysmith and 
Kimberley, and at the same time to guard the two interior 
ones and the lines of supply. In its effort to do so, there 
resulted the repulse of the eastern column December 15, 
in the first battle on the Tugela, south of Ladysmith, the 



32 

repulse of the central column December 10, at Stormherg, 
and the repulse of the western column December 11 at 
Magersfontein near the Modder river south of Kimberley. 
As in the Russo-Turkish war the operations were then 
brought to a standstill until further reinforcements could 
be brought from England. It was discovered that a force 
of at least 200,000 men would be required to prosecute 
the war properly. 

The first successful offensive movement was made only 
about the middle of February, 1900, after the army had 
been reinforced by the 5th, 6th and 7th divisions and a 
large number of unassigned troops. On December 1, 
1900, the original force of 20,000 men had been increased 
by reinforcements to 267,000, of whom 183,000 were regu- 
lar troops. 

Had the original force sent by our own country to the 
Philippine Islands in 1898 been one of trained regulars, 
the length and cost of that war would undoubtedly have 
been greatly decreased. The troops sent out were State 
volunteers whom it was necessary to replace in the midst 
of hostilities because their time of enlistment had expired. 
Even the national volunteers sent to replace them did not 
remain until the insurrection was completely subdued, but 
were in time replaced by regulars, when the regular army 
was increased. 

The Military Forces. — In preparing for possible war, it 
would appear from the above that the most essential re- 
quisites for its rapid and successful prosecution are a just 
estimation of the power of the enemy, and the organiza- 
tion of a trained force of sufficient superiority to over- 
come that power. 

Every nation can make a very accurate estimate of the 
military power of every other nation, if it creates a bureau 
of mihtary intelligence, and this bureau performs its duties 



33 

thoroughly. Through its military attaches, the military 
journals, etc., this bureau should be able to tell very 
accurately the armed strength of any nation, the distri- 
bution of its troops, and their equipment and training. 
It is even possible sometimes from a study of the distri- 
bution of troops and the theater of war to foretell their 
probable concentration on the frontier at the outbreak of 
the war. This will appear in the plan of concentration 
prepared by Moltke before the outbreak of the Franco- 
German war which will be found in the next chapter. 

It will not be in the power of every nation to carry out 
the second requisite, since the maximum force which can 
be created must bear a definite ratio to the population of 
the country. It is probable that the limit of strength of 
a standing army which a nation is able to support was 
reached by the great nations of Europe at the close of the 
nineteenth century; the armies of the five principal Con- 
tinental powers numbered from 0.9 per cent to 1.3 per 
cent of their population. In time of war these armies 
could be increased to four or five times their peace strength 
by calling in all reserves. If the population of a country 
will not admit of her placing in the field as large a force as 
her adversary, or one sufficiently strong to make success 
possible, she may be able to increase her force by the aid 
of diplomacy. When Prussia felt that a war with Austria 
and her allies for supremacy in Germany was inevitable, 
she made an offensive and defensive alliance with Italy. 
This compelled Austria at the outbreak of the war of 1866 
to place three of her army corps on the Italian frontier, 
and increased the probabilities of success of the Prussian 
armies. The offensive and defensive alHances of the great 
states of to-day must be considered in the mihtary plans 
of their adversaries. 

During the continuance of the war of 1914-1917, Ger- 



34 

many and Austria were reinforced by Turkey and Bul- 
garia, and Great Britain, Belgium, France, Russia and 
Serbia by Italy, Portugal and Rumania. 

If the position of a state is such that she must exert her 
maximum effort at the outbreak of a war, she must adopt 
the Prussian system of recruiting by conscription and 
make her army a training school for recruits; in no other 
way can she give thorough military training to the great- 
est ratio of her male population. This conclusion has been 
accepted by most of the military powers which must 
depend either wholly or principally on their land forces 
for protection in time of war. The Prussian system has 
extended to Japan in the east, Turkey in the south, Portu- 
gal in the west and Norway and Sweden in the north. 
Under present conditions, the voluntary system of recruit- 
ing is practicable only in the countries that are protected 
from rapid invasion by sea-power. 

Numbers alone, however, do not constitute the strength 
of armies, as the history of warfare has often shown. 
Organization, training, equipment, 7noralc, and leader- 
ship are very important factors. If a nation is unable to 
raise an army numerically equal or superior to that of her 
adversary, it is on these factors she must rely for offensive 
success, and upon them in connection with fortification 
for her defense. 

Organization and training together give an army mobil- 
ity on the march, and cohesion on the battlefield. With- 
out them, numbers may be really an element of weakness, 
since the difficulties of maneuver and supply increase in a 
more rapid ratio than the increase in numerical strength. 
Even under such a leader as Napoleon an army may be- 
come unmanageable. The heterogeneous army of half a 
million men with which he invaded Russia was greatly 
inferior to the army of Aiisterlitz and Jena, which had 



35 

only half its strength, but had been carefully organized 
and trained in camps of instruction. The Turks in the 
Russo-Turkish war, and the Boers in the South African 
war, were unable to undertake any decisive offensive 
movements on account of lack of organization and train- 
ing. The former had to content themselves with the pass- 
ive defense entirely, while the offensive operations of the 
latter were confined to the unsuccessful sieges of Lady- 
smith, Kimherley, and Mafeking, the unimportant inva- 
sion of the territory of Cape Colony along the frontier, 
and raiding operations. On the other hand, the well- 
organized and trained army of Frederick the Great was 
able to successfully assume the offensive agaixist the com- 
bined armies of Austria, France and Russia, whose organi- 
zations were inferior to that of its own. To the superior 
tactical organization of the French armies was due much 
of their success in the early Napoleonic battles. 

Better equipment for battle and for the march may also 
turn the scale in favor of an army which is superior to its 
opponent in these particulars. Military authorities attrib- 
ute the success of the Prussians over the Austrians in the 
battle of Koniggratz largely to the superiority of the 
breech-loading needle gun of the former over the muzzle- 
loading rifle of the latter. An army not thoroughly 
equipped for the march is tied to its lines of supply, which 
in these days are railways or rivers. Without a very per- 
fect organization of their wagon trains. Grant and Sher- 
man would have been unable to move so freely away from 
their lines of supply to turn the flanks of Lee and 
Johnston and Roberts would have been unable to turn 
the flank of the Boer position on the Modder river by 
moving away from the Kimberley railway towards Bloem- 
fontein. 

The morale at the outbreak of the war will be with the 



36 

army which feels itself better organized, trained, equipped, 
and led. Thereafter success will increase and defeat will 
decrease it. 

MiHtary history clearly shows the great effect of super- 
ior leadership in military operations. Without Wash- 
ington, the American Revolution would certainly have 
failed ; the morale of the Army of the Potomac was never 
higher nor its numerical strength greater than under 
McClellan, and yet he could not lead it to decisive suc- 
cess; L^e had but 62,000 men when Hooker had 125,000 
men, and yet the lines of operation led towards Harris- 
burg, Pa., instead of Richmond, Va. The Union armies 
in 1862 and 1863 were as well organized as, and better 
equipped than the Confederates. 

Had Napoleon's career been closed before the Russian 
campaign the military world might fairly have assumed 
that leadership alone is the decisive element in warfare. 
Since, however. Napoleon lost campaigns and battles, it 
is evident that leadership, although a very important 
factor, is not the only requisite for military success, and 
the other factors above mentioned cannot be neglected. 
The war of 1914-1917 has again demonstrated the fact 
that the value of a general for supreme command can be 
determined only by actual experience. No nation can 
therefore count on having a better leader than its adver- 
sary, if both are still untried; it may, however, lessen the 
danger resulting from the selection of a weak commander 
by maintaining an army, active and reserve, of a size 
sufficient to meet all requirements, and by giving the army 
the best possible organization, training, and equipment. 

Map of the Theater of War. — The possible and prob- 
able operations of any war are largely influenced by the 
military geography of the theater of war, its boundaries, 
lines of communication, topographical features, fortresses, 



37 

political, commercial, and manufacturing centers. This 
becomes evident if we examine the details of any two 
campaigns which have had the same theater of operations. 

When, in 1756, Frederick the Great began the Seven 
Years' war, he first sought to deal with the allied powers 
of Saxony and Austria. He invaded the hostile territory 
in four columns, the First from Magdeburg, via Leipsic 
to Pirna; the Second from T organ to Dresden; the 
Third from Gorlitz via Reichenberg into Bohemia; the 
Fourth from Glaiz, Silesia, through the mountains via 
Nachod. One hundred and ten years later the Prussians 
were again at war with Saxony and Austria. This time 
they crossed in three columns, following practically the 
routes of the Second, Third, and Fourth columns of Fred- 
erick the Great. In each campaign the object was to 
dispose of the Saxons first so that they would not inter- 
fere with the communications of the army. The opera- 
tions of the Saxon army in its retreat differed in the two 
campaigns, which led to a divergence in the succeeding 
operations. In the century that intervened between the 
wars there had been vast changes in the organization, 
equipment, tactics, and strength of armies, and railways 
had replaced highways as the principal routes of travel. 
The configuration and topography of the boundary, how- 
ever, remained unchanged; the same range of mountains, 
with the same passes^ separated the territories of Prussia 
from Saxony and Austria and led to similar offensive 
operations, under a strategist superior probably to Fred- 
erick the Great. 

According to Jomini, strategy is the art of planning 
military operations upon the map; an accurate map is 
therefore essential to the proper study and execution of 
all military movements in an extended territory. Gen- 
eral Sherman wrote in 1844, 



38 

''Every day I feel more and more the need of an atlas, 
as a knowledge of geography in its minutest details is 
essential to a true military education. I wish you would 
therefore get me the best geograph}^ and atlas extant." 

The value of maps for military operations has been so 
universally appreciated, that the duty of map making 
has always been associated with the military profession. 
To-day the execution of the topographical surveys and 
the construction of maps is under the supervision of the 
military authorities of every country except our own. It 
is one of the duties either of the general staff, or of the 
engineers. The present military map of France was con- 
ceived by Napoleon, that of Germany by Moltke. 

In every country officers are constantly exercised in the 
reading of militar}^ maps of their own and other coun- 
tries. The standard military map of European powers is 
one which shows all topograhical features of military value 
on a scale sufficiently large to be clearly shown, but on a 
scale small enough to allow the readers to get a compre- 
hensive idea of a considerable territory. The scales of 
these maps vary between 1/63,360 and 1/126,000; the 
former is that of the map of Great Britain and the latter 
that of Russia in Europe. The smaller the area of the 
country to be shown the larger may be the scale. 

The information delineated on a modern military map 
is so great that a very careful study of its topographical 
signs is necessary before an officer can read one quickly. 
On some of them twelve characters are employed to in- 
dicate the various kinds of bridges, ferries, and fords over 
rivers; nine to indicate varieties of roads and trails; and 
twenty-three to indicate the details of villages, etc. The 
map indicates the gauge and number of tracks of a rail- 
way, its embankments and excavations, its tunnels and 
bridges, and the grade at which it is intersected by the 



39 

highways and railways of the country. Elevations are 
ordinarily indicated by contours except in very mountain- 
ous countries, where the system of hachures is employed. 
Colors are employed to emphasize the rivers, woods, con- 
tours, etc. 

The only map in our country which approximates to 
these is the map of the Geological Survey, which has been 
only partially completed. Two scales are employed; the 
more detailed is on a scale of 1/62,500, and the other 
1/125,000. Upon the former fifteen minutes of latitude 
and fifteen minutes of longitude are shown on each sheet, 
upon the latter thirty minutes in each direction. 

Maps on a larger scale than the standard are prepared 
of the surroundings of fortifications and other strategic 
points of the theater of war, and also for military maneu- 
vers. Maps on a smaller scale are employed when it is 
desired only to show some special feature, as the railways, 
distribution of troops, etc. 

Boundary. — The common boundary line of two coun- 
tries cannot be ignored in considering probable military 
operations, as it is the general line along which the armies 
of the belligerents make their preliminary concentrations. 
The most striking of the boundary lines of the states of 
Europe is the great bastion line which separates the Ger- 
man and Austro-Hungarian empires from that of Russia. 

An examination of a map of Russia will show that 
Poland, with the exception of the small province of Su- 
valki, lies wholly within a line connecting the sahents of 
the bastion of East Prussia cf Germany and Galicia of 
Austria. The area of the territory thus enclosed is about 
43,000 square miles, or nearly that of the State of Penn- 
sylvania; and its general shape is a square. A little to 
the east of the center is Warsaw, the capital of Poland, 
the third city of the empire, with a population of 750,000. 



40 

In its rear is the great Pinsk marsh with few lines of com- 
munication. The pecuhar shape of the frontier and the 
importance of the outlying province of Poland will make 
the defense and attack of that province the first operation 
of any war between Russia and the allied powers on her 
west. 

Against a combined movement of the allied powers 
Russia would almost be compelled to concentrate her 
forces in three groups or armies; one in Poland about 
Warsaw, and two in echelon in rear of its flanks and pro- 
tecting its communications. The northern army would 
occupy the provinces of Kovno and Wilna in front of the 
Prussian bastion; the southern, the provinces of Volhynia 
and Podolia in front of the Austrian bastion. Were the 
war with either power alone, she might reduce the force 
in front of the other bastion. The central Russian army 
could not advance westward until its flanks were made 
secure by the occupation of East Prussia and Galicia to 
the Vistula river. Since the possession of the territory 
about Warsaw will naturally be the objective of the first 
campaign against Russia, and as it lies close to the frontier, 
Russia is obliged to keep a large force in garrison there, 
as she cannot rely on transporting to that point the acces- 
sory force to hold it after the outbreak of war. The shape 
of the frontier gives the allied powers the choice of numer- 
ous lines of operations all leading to Warsaw, and makes 
it difficult for the Russians to determine in advance from 
which point to expect the principal attack. 

In the campaigns of 1914, Russia sought to advance 
simultaneously through East Prussia and through Galicia. 
The invasion of East Prussia was defeated by the battle 
of Tannenherg, but the invasion of Galicia was successful 
and the Russians advanced almost to Cracow and held the 
crests of the Carpathian mountains. Twice the Germans 



41 

attempted to force their center at Warsaw but were un- 
successful. 

In the campaigns of 1915, the Austro-German armies 
penetrated the Russian line along the Dunajec river east 
of Cracow, Galicia, and compelled the Russian armies to 
evacuate nearly the whole of Galicia. This was followed 
by a thrust from East Prussia which penetrated the Rus- 
sian line along the Niemen and Narew rivers and com- 
pelled the Russians to evacuate Warsaw and the line of 
the Vistula river. 

Lines of Communication. — In modern warfare, the rail- 
ways are the all-important lines of communication. By 
means of them the tactical units are united into combined 
units and transported to the frontier; the supplies are 
collected from all over the territorial base and shipped to 
the strategic front ; the reinforcements required to replace 
the losses made by actual service are transported to the 
front, and the wounded, invalids, and prisoners brought 
to the rear; and large bodies of troops are occasionally 
transported from one point of the theater of war to an- 
other, to carry into effect some strategic plan. 

Railways perpendicular to the frontier in front of an 
army are the natural lines of invasion, those in rear are 
the lines of supply; the connecting lines are the lines of 
concentration and maneuver. 

Railways first began to assume an important position in 
the conduct of military operations during our civil war. 
In this war the armies could not be supplied by ordinary 
wagon transportation because the theater of war was one 
of great extent, and the highways therein were only com- 
mon earthen roads, many of them practically impassable 
in winter, and difficult at all seasons after prolonged rains. 
The railways throughout the North which brought the 
supplies to the Potomac river in the east, and to Nash- 



42 

ville in the west, were operated wholly by civil corpora- 
tions; but the lines extending from these points into the 
enemy's country were operated by the military authori- 
ties under the supervision of a general officer appointed 
Director and General Manager of the Military Railroads 
of the United States. During the year 1864, 280 miles in 
the east and 819 miles in the west were thus operated. 
During the month of June, 1864, 6650 men were em- 
ployed in the operation and construction of railways in the 
division of the Mississippi alone. 

Sherman testifies to his dependence on railway trans- 
portation in his Memoirs as follows : 

"The Atlanta campaign would simply have been im- 
possible without the use of the following railroads: from 
Louisville to Nashville, 185 miles; from Nashville to 
Chattanooga, 151 miles; from Chattanooga to Atlanta, 
137 miles. . . . This single stem of railroad 473 
miles long supplied an army of 100,000 men and 35,000 
animals for the period of 196 days, viz., from May 1 to 
November 12, 1864. To have delivered regularly that 
amount of food and forage would have required 36,800 
wagons of six mules each, allowing • each wagon to have 
hauled two tons twenty miles each day, a simple impos- 
sibility on roads such as existed in that region of country." 

During the civil war the railways were employed almost 
wholly in bringing up reinforcements and supplies from 
the territorial base to the front of operations, and in carry- 
ing to the rear the sick and wounded of the army and the 
prisoners captured from the enemy. On two occasions, 
however, they were employed strategically to transfer 
army corps from one theater of operations to another. In 
the fall of 1863, after the battle of Chickamauga, Rose- 
crans found himself invested in Chattanooga by the Con- 
federate army under Bragg, and was obliged to call for 
assistance. In this emergency, Hooker was sent with the 



43 

XI and XII corps of the Army of the Potomac, 23,000 
men, from Virginia to Chattanooga, a distance of eleven 
hundred and ninety-two miles. This movement was made 
in seven days. In January, 1865, after the battle of 
Nashville, Schofield's corps of 15,000 men, en route for 
North Carolina, was transported from the valley of the 
Tennessee by water and rail to Washington, in eleven 
days. 

The great utility of the railways in the civil war at- 
tracted the attention of the military authorities in Europe, 
and particularly of Moltke, chief of staff of the Prussian 
army. He saw in them the means of gaining a decided 
strategic advantage by placing the Prussian army on the 
frontier before any possible adversary, thus to overwhelm 
him before he was ready to meet the attack. After years 
of study and with the experience gained in the Austro- 
Pruscian war of 1866 he was able to make the marvelous 
concentration of 1870 which has commanded the wonder 
and admiration of every military student. Between the 
23d of July and the 9th of August 456,000 officers and men, 
135,000 horses and 14,000 guns and other carriages were 
transported from the different provinces of the North 
German Confederation to and beyond the Rhine river, 
and in such a thorough state of preparation that hostili- 
ties were begun by invading the enemy's territory even 
before the last contingent had arrived. Only six trunk 
lines were employed in this movement, which required 
twelve hundred and five trains; most of the lines were 
only single-track roads. 

The difficulties involved in perfecting a plan for this 
movement become even more evident, when it is remem- 
bered that at the outbreak of the Franco-German war, 
the railways of North Germany numbered ninety-five inde- 
Dendent lines controlled by eighteen independent states 



44 

and forty-five private corporations. Without wholly 
stopping their civil business, it was necessary to unite 
them in a plan by which nearly half a million of men, with 
supplies, should be transported without unnecessary 
fatigue or privation, from every railway station of the 
North German Confederation to the French frontier. It 
is self-evident that such a plan required not only the most 
thorough study of the maps and resources of every road, 
but also the most hearty co-operation of the military 
and railway authorities. As in the civil war, the railways 
captured from the enemy were operated by the military 
authorities and served to supply the army in its campaign 
in France. The reinforcements afterwards sent to this 
army to replace losses, etc., numbered 244,000 officers and 
men, 22,000 horses, and 116 field guns. The prisoners 
sent to rear numbered 384,000 and the sick and wounded 
240,000. 

Since the Franco-German war the military authorities 
of every European country have devoted much time to the 
study of the railway transportation problem in war. Mil- 
itary railways have been constructed to supplement the 
civil fines where these do not suffice for the prompt move- 
ment of troops. The German problem is much simpler 
than it was in 1870. Sixteen through lines connect the 
German territory with the Rhine and cross that stream on 
iron bridges. Double-track railways follow both banks of 
the stream. Eight lines penetrate Lorraine and are united 
into five lines at the frontier. Seven fines lead from the 
Rhine to the Vosges mountains in the province of Alsace. 
Practically all the railways are owned and operated by the 
state. In 1870 France found her lines defective from the 
fact that they all passed through Paris; now she has prac- 
tically an independent through line from each army corps 
district to the frontier. 



45 

In August, 1914, both France and Germany in three 
weeks mobiUzed and moved to the French-Belgian-Ger- 
man frontier nearly three times as many men as Germany 
did in 1870. 

Besides the study of the railwa3^s of the home territory 
for the purpose of transport, it is also essential that they 
be studied with a view to prevent invasion. This in- 
volves questions of military engineering as well as strategy. 
Certain points on the line must be fortified so that they 
ma}"" be held to the last extremity ; others, such as bridges 
and tunnels, must be selected for rapid demolition. 

In the study of the railway system of the possible 
theater of operations in the enemy's territory, the same 
general problems arise. It is necessary first to study 
their probable effect on the time and manner in which the 
enemy will concentrate his armies on the frontier, for it is 
essential if possible to forestall him in this movement; 
second to study his lines with a view of determining the 
manner in which he will render them useless should he 
find himself unable to resist invasion, and the best manner 
of restoring them as soon as possible. It is said that 
before the Franco-German war a Prussian engineer 
officer in disguise surveyed the route for the railway 
constructed by the Germans in 1870 from Remilly to 
Pont-a-Mousson on the Moselle, to carry their railway 
communications around the fortress to Metz. 

Highways. — While railways are the important lines of 
concentration and supply, the ordinary highways of the 
field of operations must remain the actual marching routes 
of an army. Once in the vicinity of the enemy, the troops 
must be ever ready for attack and defense; they must 
therefore move in a deployed formation on the roads of 
the country. As the different corps and divisions must 
if possible move on separate roads, a careful study of the 



46 

road map is essential to determine the route which is to 
be followed by each, so that the different columns may be 
within the necessary supporting distance of each other and 
yet not cross each other's routes. The arrangements 
made by Napoleon for the march of his army in 1805 from 
Paris and Boulogne to the Rhine and thence to the Dan- 
ube, is an excellent study for planning such marches. 

A detailed examination of the terrain in the vicinity of 
the roads is essential when in the vicinity of the enemy, 
for the army has reached a zone in which every minor 
topographical feature of the ground, hill, valley, stream, 
v/oods, embankment and excavation, is liable to play an 
important part in the further operations. All these de- 
tails may not appear on the general map upon which the 
operations are planned, but must be developed by recon- 
noissances. One of the difficulties with which all the gen- 
erals in our civil war had to contend was the want of good 
road maps; the Confederate generals went astray even 
within a few miles of their own capital. 

Natural Topographic Features. — The natural topo- 
graphic features of a theater of war which have the great- 
est effect on military operations are its rivers and moun- 
tains. Both sometimes facilitate and sometimes obstruct 
military movements. Any great river which penetrates 
the defender's country may be employed as a line of in- 
vasion, or a line of supply, and secondary bases may be 
established on its banks. In our civil war, the Mississippi, 
the Tennessee, the Cumberland, the York, and the James 
rivers were all thus employed and contributed largely to 
the success of the Union military operations. Any great 
river valley which has the general direction in which the 
army desires to move will be utilized as a line of opera- 
tions since in it will be found the best railways and roads 
for the supply or movement of the army and the most 



47 

fertile regions for its support. The east and west military- 
invasions of Europe have followed the Danube or Po to 
Vienna, the tributaries of the Seine which center near 
Paris, to that capital, the route of the Main or Lahn and 
Saale to Berlin. 

The rivers which flow parallel to the frontier are em- 
ployed as linear bases or lines of defense. In our civil 
war, the Potomac river formed part of the linear base of 
the Union armies in the east, and their advance on Rich- 
mond was opposed at Bull Run creek by the Confederate 
forces under Beauregard and Johnston; at the Rappa- 
hannock, the Rapidan, and the North Anna by the army 
under Lee. The Boer forces stopped the first British 
relief corps on the M odder and the Tugela rivers. The 
minor rivers and streams of a country are the Unes along 
which an army frequently deploys for battle. The insig- 
nificant Nebel creek marked the line of development at 
the decisive battle of Blenheim: the Goldbach, that at 
Austerlitz; the Mance, that of Gravelotte; Antietam Creek, 
that of Antietam. The important points on an unfordable 
river are the permanent bridges, the possession of which 
gives access to and the control of both banks; second 
only to these in importance are positions which are 
favorable for the construction and defense of military 
bridges. 

Ranges of mountains which are parallel to the frontier 
and intersect the fines of operation of an invading army 
may, like rivers, be utilized either as linear bases or lines 
of defense. As high mountain ranges can be passed by 
armies only at the passes, which are usually widely sepa- 
rated, the defense of mountain ranges is less difficult than 
that of rivers. Mountain ranges which are paraUel to the 
lines of operation afford a support to one of the flanks of a 
marching army and if the passes are guarded the move- 



48 

ment may be concealed from an enemy who is beyond 
them. 

In 1862 Jackson employed the Bull Run mountains as 
a protection for his right flank and as a screen for his 
movements, when he marched from his position in front 
front of Pope on the Rappahannock river, north to the 
Manassas Gap railroad and thence through Thoroughfare 
Gap, and captured the Union line of supply near Manas- 
sas Junction. Numerous illustrations of the effect of 
rivers and mountains upon military operations will be met 
by the student of military campaigns. 

Great forests, marshes, and deserts in a theater of war 
also limit the possible military movements by interposing 
obstacles to free combination of the different columns of 
a command. Forests and marshes can be traversed only 
along defiles, and deserts by small columns. 

*' In a country like Holland where at every step one 
finds advantageous and impregnable positions, the de- 
fensive can be advantageously sustained with inferior 
troops because everywhere protection may be secured 
through the employment of unfordable canals, marshes, 
and inundations." — Napoleon. 

Location of Fortresses, Depots, Manufacturing Cen- 
ters, etc. — Before a campaign is begun it is essential to 
know as accurately as possible the position and strength 
of every permanent fortress which is liable to be en- 
countered, so that in the plan of campaign provision may 
be made for its reduction, or its masking by a corps of 
observation. An idea of the task involved in the reduc- 
tion of a fortification in the Franco-German war may be 
obtained from the statement that in the reduction of the 
old fortress of Strassburg in 1870, the weight of the shot 
fired was about three times that of the shot fired by the 
entire field artillery in the war. The entire weight of the 



49 

artillery material used in that siege was about 4000 tons. 
It is essential to know also the location of the depots and 
manufactories of arms and munitions of war of all kinds, 
so that if possible they may be captured and destroyed, 
and thus diminish the resources of the enemy to carry on 
the struggle. 



CHAPTER III 
MOBILIZATION 

Mobilization is the transformation of the military estab- 
lishment from its status of peace to that of war. It com- 
prises the formation of the field army recruited to full 
strength, armed, equipped, and provided with transporta- 
tion for field service ; the formation of reserves to reinforce 
it; the formation of depots of recruits to replace its losses; 
the formaton of garrison troops to occupy the stations 
vacated by it; and the organization of all the auxihary 
service necessary to maintain the combatant part of the 
force in a high state of efficiency. 

In order that the mobilization may be effected without 
unnecessary loss of time, a plan of mobilization must be 
prepared in advance. This plan indicates the strength 
and organization of the field army, depot, reserve, and 
garrison troops ; the order and manner in which each is to 
be recruited, clothed, equipped, and armed; the method 
by which horses and transportation are to be provided for 
the mobilized troops; and the use which is to be made of 
the railways during the period of mobilization. 

The mobilization of one of the great Continental 
armies means the incorporation into the military estab- 
lishment of a large percentage of the male population; or 
in the words of Goltz, it means the ''Nation in Arms." 
To accomplish this without confusion or delay, the plan 
must be so devised that the duties of every citizen con- 
cerned in the mobilization, whether in the active army, its 
reserves, its railway or its civil service, are laid down with 

50 



51 

great precision and clearness. This is the aim of the 
scheme of mobihzation originated in the Prussian service, 
and since copied in its essential details by all services 
based on the system of recruiting by universal conscrip- 
tion. 

Prussian System. — The general plan of mobilization is 
drawn up and corrected annually by the general staff, and 
is based on the principle of decentralization; each corps, 
division, brigade, and regiment must complete its own 
mobilization. Each army corps commander has per- 
sonal charge of the mobilization of his corps, and is assisted 
by the highest civil authorities in his territorial depart- 
ment. To localize his work the country is divided into as 
many territorial departments as there are corps less one; 
each corps except the guard corps is recruited from its 
own department; the guard is recruited from the entire 
Kingdom of Prussia. 

Each corps commander being informed of the required 
strength of field corps, depot, reserve, and garrison troops 
upon a war footing prepares a scheme for their mobiliza- 
tion, based upon the needs of his corps, the resources of 
his department, and the instructions given him of the use 
which he may make of the railways. This scheme is 
based upon the mobilization in order, of the active army, 
depot troops, reserves, and garrison troops. It indicates 
the particular branch to which every officer is to be de- 
tailed, and the particular branch to which every annual 
class of the active army, reserves, and landwehr is to be 
assigned. As a rule the youngest men who have com- 
pleted a full term of service are assigned to the field army, 
the next classes to the reserves, and the oldest to the gar- 
rison troops. Depot troops are formed of the partially 
trained recruits and young men of the ersatz reserve. The 
officers in charge of divisions, brigades, and regiments of 



52 

infantry, of brigades of artillery, of battalions of rifles and 
train, of the corps of engineers, of the corps of intendence, 
of artillery depots, etc., are required to prepare plans of 
mobilization of their respective units and branches. 

Each territorial department is as a rule divided into 
Jour brigade districts, and these are subdivided into four 
landwehr battalion districts of two landwehr company dis- 
tricts each. The commander of a landwehr battalion dis- 
trict is an officer on the retired list whose duty it is to keep 
full and accurate lists of the men in his district who are of 
furlough from the regular army, or belong to the reserves 
or landwehr. The annual class, place of residence, and 
organization in which he served, are inserted after the 
name of each man of the standing army, reserve, and land- 
wehr, and the service for which he is specially fitted by 
trade or occupation after the name of each man in the er- 
satz reserve. To assist in preparing these lists the com- 
mander is allowed a small staff. It is his duty also to 
notify the individual men when the order for mobiliza- 
tion is issued and inform them when and where to report. 

In order that this notification can be given in the shortest 
possible time, he must plan the routes to be followed by the 
orderlies and others in summoning the men; he must also 
plan the routes to be followed by the men in reaching the 
rendezvous fixed in advance, where they are to be received 
by officers and noncommissioned officers of the active 
army, reserves, and landwehr, sent to receive them. In 
notifying the men, the landwehr district commander is 
assisted by the civil authorities.' The responsibility of 
the district commander ceases when the men have been 
received at the general rendezvous of the district. In 
marching to the rendezvous the men are usually collected 
in small squads, and led by a squad leader appointed by 
the district commander. 



53 

Upon the arrival of the men at their regimental head- 
quarters, they are clothed, equipped and armed from the 
regimental stores collected for the purpose in time of 
peace, and are then as far as possible assigned to the com- 
panies in which they served their tour of active duty. 

While the field army is being thus mobilized, its depot 
troops are being formed. The mobilization of the reserve 
and garrison troops takes place immediately after that of 
the field army. In order that the mobilization may take 
place without confusion, the first day of mobilization in 
each army corps district is fixed by telegram from the war 
ministry. Each officer concerned in the operation must 
prepare in time of peace a journal giving in order his pro- 
posed actions on each day of the mobilization period, and 
these journals, after approval by his superiors, must be 
strictly followed. 

To secure the necessary horses, the country is divided 
into horse districts. In each district the horses are an- 
nually examined and their value appraised. At the out- 
break of war, every owner of a horse must present it at a 
certain rendezvous for inspection and possible acceptance 
by the government at the price fixed. 

Mobilization of the German Army in 1870. — At the 
opening of the Franco-German war, the army of the 
North German Confederation numbered about 304,000 
men. The plan of mobilization called for a field army of 
578,000 men, 159,000 horses, and 1284 guns; a depot 
force of 194,000 men, 23,000 horses, and 246 guns; a re- 
serve garrison force of 209,000 men, 17,000 horses, and 162 
field guns. The order for mobilization was telegraphed 
from Berlin on the night of July 15, and the 16th, three 
days before the declaration of war, was appointed for the 
first day of mobilization. 

On the first and second days the calls were issued for the 



54 

reserves, men on furlough, and the owners of horses, and 
the regiments began sending details to bring back their 
quotas. In the infantry, on the third day arms and am- 
munition were drawn from the artillery depots, and car- 
riages and harness were made ready for the horses. On 
the fourth day the horses arrived, and the infantry field 
trains were organized. On the fifth day the men on fur- 
lough returned and were equipped. On the sixth and 
seventh days the reserves appeared and were armed, 
clothed and equipped ; each man had been allowed twenty- 
four hours' delay to arrange his affairs. On the eighth day 
the regiment was reported ready for field service. Cavalry 
and field artillery required a day or two longer than in- 
fantry, and the organization of the siege, engineer and 
general supply trains, a few days more than the mounted 
services. However, by the evening of the eighth day, the 
mobilization of the field army was so nearly complete 
that its transportation to the front was begun the next 
day, July 24. 

While the field army was being mobilized, the depot 
troops were being formed. Each infantry regiment 
formed a depot battalion, each cavalry regiment a depot 
squadron, and each regiment of artillery a depot battalion; 
the other services also organized their depot units. The 
depot troops were, as a rule, composed of partially in- 
structed recruits and ersatz reserve men. The reserve 
and garrison troops were formed of the extra reserve and 
landwehr men; the youngest classes were assigned to re- 
serve battalions, and the oldest to the garrison troops. 
The number of extra men of the reserve and first contin- 
gent of the landwehr furnished about two battalions of 
reserve troops for every regiment of the field army. 

Raising the Army for the Spanish-American War. — 
The operation of preparing the United States army for 



55 

war is a far more difficult task, as is illustrated by the 
Spanish-American war. The regular army of the United 
States at the outbreak of the war numbered 28,183, and 
was practically recruited to its authorized strength. It 
could not be increased without an act of Congress. This 
act was passed on April 26, five days after the outbreak of 
the war, and the authorized war strength of the regular 
army was fixed at about 60,000 men. In round numbers, 
this increase was effected by voluntary enlistment to 44,- 
000 May 31, 52,000 June 30, 56,000 July 31, 58,000 
August 31. The principal engagements of the regular 
army during the war, which were those of San Juan and 
Caney, at Santiago, Cuba, were fought July 1 by the regi- 
ments before they had been recruited to war strength. 

The line troops of the volunteer army were furnished 
by the governors of the different States; the staff by direct 
presidential appointment. The first call was issued April 
23, two days after the declaration of war, and was for 
125,000 men. The telegrams to the governors stated 
that — 

''The regiments of the National Guard or state militia 
shall be used, as far as their numbers will permit, for the 
reason that they are armed, equipped and drilled." 

A second call was issued May 25 for 75,000 additional 
volunteers; Congress also authorized the raising of 10,000 
infantry, 3000 cavalry, and 3000 engineers from the entire 
country. A total of 216,000 volunteer troops were author- 
ized. 

The mustering of the volunteers into the United States 
service took place as rapidly as possible in the different 
State rendezvous, but was not quite as rapid as was anti<^i- 
pated. At the end of May the volunteer army numbered 
125,000, at end of June 160,000, at the end of July 212,000, 
and only at the end of August 216,000. 



56 

The equipment of the National Guard was found to be 
very incomplete, in fact these organizations were obliged 
to depend almost wholly upon the United States authori- 
ties for clothing, camp, and garrison equipage. As there 
were no accumulated depots of supplies for this purpose, 
the equipments were manufactured after the outbreak of 
the war. The equipment of the volunteer army required 
many months and we find that '^even as late as October, 
troops in camp and in the field were lacking in some 
articles of clothing, camp, and garrison equipage."* 
When mustered in, the regiments of the National Guard 
were found to be either deficient in drill or wholly un- 
trained, owing to the necessity of enlisting a large percent- 
age of recruits to fill the organizations to the required 
strength. 

As soon as possible the organizations were ordered into 
great camps of instruction similar to those established in the 
civil war where they were formed into brigades, divisions 
and corps, and instructed in their military duties. The 
I and III corps were at Camp Thomas, Chickamauga, 
and together had a maximum strength of 56,500 men. 
The II corps was at Camp Alger, Va., and had a maximum 
strength of 22,600 men. The IV corps was at Mobile, 
and had a maximum strength of 20,000 men. The V 
corps was concentrated at Tampa before it moved on to 
Santiago, Cuba; it was composed principally of Regulars 
and had a maximum strength of 18,500; the VI corps was 
never formed; the VII corps was at Tampa, Florida, and 
had a maximum strength of 27,800; the VIII corps was 
in the Philippines and had a maximum strength of 15,600 
during the period given. 

The assembling of large bodies of partially equipped 

* Report of Commission appointed to investigate conduct of War 
Department in the war with Spain. 



57 

troops in a few camps greatly increased the difficulty of 
supplying and equipping them, but doubtless had some 
compensating advantages. At the close of the period 
considered, August 31, the volunteer regiments were as a 
rule clothed, equipped, drilled in company, battalion, 
and regimental maneuvers, and had learned many of the 
minor duties pertaining to a soldier's life. Only a portion 
of the higher units, brigades, divisions, and corps, were as 
well organized and equipped as were the similar organiza- 
tions of the Army of the Potomac in the spring of 1862; 
that army had then been in camps of instruction at least 
six months. 

The army corps of the Spanish- American war were usu- 
ally deficient in cavalry, artillery and engineers. An idea of 
the difficulties which arise in thus creating an army, may 
be gathered from the fact that in the telegraph division 
of the Adjutant General's office, during July and August, 
twenty operators, five clerks and seven messengers were 
required. The Adjutant General's office had charge of 
the mustering in of the volunteer army in addition to its 
ordinary duties relating to the regular army. 

Raising the Annies for the World War. — A state of 
war between the United States and the Imperial Govern- 
ment of Germany was declared April 6, 1917. 

As in previous wars, the government found itself with- 
out the laws necessary to raise the forces that would be 
required for such a war, beyond the recruiting of the Reg- 
ular Army and the National Guard to maximum strength 
as provided in the National Defense Act of June 3, 1916. 

Profiting by the experiences of the Civil War and the 
Spanish War, after considerable discussion. Congress 
passed the Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917, intro- 
ducing compulsory service. Some of the main features of 
this Act are as follows: 



58 

'That the enHsted men required to raise and maintain 
the organization of the Regular Army and to complete and 
maintain the organization embodying the members of the 
National Guard drafted into the service of the United 
States, at a maximum legal strength as by this Act provided, 
shall be raised by voluntary enlistment, or if and whenever 
the President decides that they cannot effectually be so 
raised and maintained then by selective draft; and all 
other forces hereby authorized . . . shall be raised and 
maintained by selective draft exclusively; but this pro- 
vision shall not prevent the transfer to any force of train- 
ing cadres from other forces. Such draft as herein pro- 
vided shall be based upon liability to military service of 
all male citizens or male persons not alien enemies who 
have declared their intention to become citizens, between 
the ages of twenty-one and thirty years, both inclusive, 
and shall take place and be maintained under such regu- 
lations as the President may prescribe not inconsistent 
with terms of this Act. Quotas for the several States, 
Territories, and the District of Columbia or subdivisions 
thereof, shall be determined in proportion to the popula- 
tion thereof, and credit shall be given ... for the num- 
ber of men who were in the service of the United States as 
members of the National Guard on April first, or who 
have since that date entered the military service of the 
United States ... as members of the Regular Army or 
the National Guard. . . . Organizations of the forces 
herein provided for, except the Regular Army . . . shall 
as far as the interests of the service permit, be composed 
of men who come, and of officers who are appointed from, 
the same State or locality. 

''No bounty shall be paid to induce any person to enlist 
in the military service of the United States ; and no person 
liable to military service shall hereafter be permitted or 
allowed to furnish a substitute for such service; nor shall 
any substitute be received, enlisted, or enrolled in the ser- 
vice of the United States; and no such person shall be 
permitted to escape such service or to be discharged there- 
from prior to the expiration of his term of service by the 
payment of money or any other valuable thing whatso- 
ever as consideration for his release from military service 
or hability thereto." 



59 



Under this Act, the President directed all persons liable 
to draft and not already in the service to appear for en- 
rollment before local boards appointed for the purpose on 
June 5, 1917. Between nine and ten million registered 
that day. 

These were arranged in numerical order in over 4500 
districts and on July 20, corresponding numbers were 
drawn from a bowl in Washington which determined the 
men who were to report to the selective service boards to 
determine their liability for service under a classification 
previously adopted. 

A second registration took place June 5, 1918, of the men 
who had attained the age of 21 since the first registration. 

A third registration September 12, 1918, extended the 
age limits to 18 and 45. 

The following table gives the number of men registered 
and inducted into the service: 

MEN REGISTERED AND INDUCTED 



Registration 


Age Limits 


Registered 


Inducted 


Per Cent 
Inducted 


First and second 

Third 

Alaska, Hawaii, Porto 
Rico 


21 to 31 

/ 18 to 20 1 
1 32 to 45 j 

18 to 45 


10,679,814 
13,228,762 

325,445 


2,666,867 
120,157 

23,272 


25 

1 

7 


Total 


IS to 45 


24,234,021 


2,810,296 


12 



Under the system of recruiting adopted for this war, 
the men were furnished more rapidly than they could be 
accepted due to time necessary to prepare the training 
encampments and furnish the necessary equipments. 



60 

Eventually 32 divisional training camps were prepared in 
which most of the 42 divisions, that were sent abroad 
before the close of the war, were trained. Other divi- 
sions were being organized in the United States at that 
time. 

Strategic Concentration. — After the j&eld army is mobil- 
ized the next operation is the concentration of the field 
army on or near the frontier for offense or defense. This 
is an operation which requires the most careful prepara- 
tion to avoid confusion, as it requires the utilization of 
the railway systems of the country to their utmost capac- 
ity, and usually takes place simultaneously with the last 
operations of the mobilization. In his 'Tranco-German 
War,'' Moltke says of the mobilization and concentration 
of the German army : 

''The means of mobilizing the North German army had 
been reviewed year by year in view of any changes in the 
military and political situation, by the staff, in conjunc- 
tion with the Minister of War. Every branch of adminis- 
tration throughout the country had been kept informed 
of all it ought to know of these matters. ... it was 
decided that the best way of protecting south Germany 
would be by an incursion into Alsace across the central 
part of the Rhine, which could be made by assembling 
the main force at that point. ... as soon as this was 
decided the other preparations were made. The orders 
for marching or traveling by rail or boat were worked out 
for each unit of the army, together with the most minute 
directions as to the different starting points, day and hour 
of departure, duration of journey, refreshment at stations, 
and place of destination. At the point of concentration, 
stores and magazines were established and thus when war 
was declared it needed only the royal signature to set the 
entire apparatus in motion with undisturbed precision.'' 

Separation of Mobilization and Concentration. — If pos- 
sible the mobilization should be fully completed before the 



61 

transport to the frontier begins; otherwise the units are 
hable to arrive on the frontier only partially recruited and 
equipped, and confusion is almost certain to exist on the 
railways due to the effort to carry on the two distinct 
operations simultaneously. Undei* exceptional circum- 
stances, the order of the operations may be reversed as in 
our civil war. To preserve peace along the border and 
to protect the capital, which was in hostile territory, the 
Northern regiments were rushed to the frontier as soon as 
raised, and there organized into brigades, divisions, corps, 
and armies in camps of instruction. A similar system was 
also employed by the Confederates. This was practicable 
because both belligerents were wholly unprepared and 
were unable to begin active operations at the outbreak of 
the war; in a war with a well-organized belligerent such a 
system w^ould be fatal. The French made this mistake in 
the Franco-German war. 

The nominal strength of the French army was 525,000 
men, of whom 350,000 were in the active army and 175,- 
000 in the reserves. As the French desired to take the 
offensive, the active army, organized into eight corps, was 
at once pushed to the frontier, without waiting for re- 
serves, or complete field equipment; these were to be sent 
to the corps when they reached their destination. As a 
result the army was not only unable to take the offensive, 
but when the German army crossed the frontier it found 
the French army corps scattered from Thionville on the 
north to Belfort on the south, and with a total strength of 
only 275,000 men. After the hostilities opened, the move- 
ments followed each other so rapidly that the French 
were never able to complete their mobihzation. 

Protection of Concentration. — Since the different units 
of an army arrive on the front of concentration in succes- 
sion, some provision must be made to protect the troops 



62 

which first arrive from being overwhehned by a sudden 
attack of the enemy. For this purpose covering troops are 
provided and the concentration, if practicable, takes place 
behind some natural obstacle which is not easily traversed 
by the enemy, as a river or mountain chain. 

In the mobilization and concentration of 1914, the first 
step was to mobilize and concentrate on the frontier the 
army corps which were designed in the general plan simply 
to protect the territory during the period of mobilization 
and concentration. This required but a short time since 
the peace and war strength of these corps differed but 
slightly. 

In the Franco-German war, the German armies were 
concentrated along the Moselle, between Trier and Cob- 
lenz, and along the Rhine from Mainz to Carlsruhe. In 
the civil war the Union armies were concentrated along 
the Potomac and Ohio rivers. The possession of the 
bridge-heads of a great river near the frontier is an im- 
portant strategic acquisition, as it not only protects the 
concentration, but enables the possessor to assume the 
offensive. The possession of the great bridge-heads of 
the Rhine was always a subject of contention between the 
powers east and west of that river because of the advan- 
tages the river afforded as a line of concentration. 

The Italian, Swiss and Austrian Alps, the Saxon and 
Bohemian mountains separating Austria from North Ger- 
many, and the Black Forest of Baden, Germany, have aU 
been utilized at different times to cover the concentration 
of armies. 

If there is no natural screen of sufficient strength in the 
vicinity of the frontier, it is customar}^ to organize an arti- 
ficial one by the construction of fortified places. 

In 1914 the concentration of the French armies was 
protected by the two eastern fortified curtains — Verdun- 



63 

Toul and Epinal-Belfort. That of the German armies in 
Alsace-Lorraine by the fortresses of Strassburg and Metz 
and a number of smaller fortified positions between them. 

The concentration of the German armies in the east was 
protected by the frontier fortresses of Konigsherg, Fort 
Boyen, Thorn and Posen. That of the Russian armies 
was protected by the Niemen river with its fortresses of 
Kovno, Olita and Grodno, by the Narew river with its 
fortresses of Osowiec, Lomza, Ostrolenka, Rozhan, Pultusk 
and Sierok; by the Vistula river with its three great fort- 
resses of Novo-Georgievsk, Warsaw and Ivangorod; and by 
the triangle of fortified places, L^izk, Duhno and Rovno. 
That of the Austrian armies in Gahcia by the San river, 
its bridge-head at Jaraslau and the fortress of Przemysl. 

Plan of Concentration. — The plan of concentration is 
the project drawn up in time of peace to govern the gen- 
eral character of the operations at the outbreak of a war. 
The plan determines whether the war shall be offensive or 
defensive, the particular territory which is to be made the 
seat of war, the particular line along which the strategic 
concentration is to be made, the means employed to pro- 
tect the lines of invasion not covered by the field army. 
The scope of a plan of concentration can be more easily 
understood by taking an actual example. The one se- 
lected is the plan drawn up by Moltke in 1868-69, on the 
supposition of war between the North German Confedera- 
tion and the allied powers of France, Austria, and perhaps 
Denmark. It was the result of several years of careful 
study. It was prepared shortly after Prussia had annexed 
the provinces of Schleswig-Holstein, claimed by Denmark, 
and had fought a successful war with Austria. Both states 
were therefore considered as possibly hostile. 



64 



STRATEGIC CONCENTRATION OF THE ARMY 

Should Austria take part in a war declared by France 
against Prussia the division of our forces into two equal 
parts would give us a preponderance of force neither on 
our western nor on our southern frontier. The first ques- 
tion to be decided is, therefore, against which army shall 
we assume the defensive at the outset with a weak force, 
so that we may be able to assume the offensive against the 
other with a strong one. 

The Rhine and its fortresses make a much stronger 
defensive hne against France than any we can organize 
along the Austrian frontier; should we adopt the defensive 
against France we can count with certainty that the Rhine, 
held by 100,000 men, can check any French advance for 
six or eight weeks. To offset this, a passive defense of the 
Rhine would cause the south German states to remain 
neutral or take up arms against us. The French could also 
turn the left flank of our Rhine front by operating on Ber- 
lin via Worms and Franconia; while our offensive army 
in Austria, even if successful, might in the meantime be 
brought to a standstill before the fortress of Olmutz or at 
the Danube river. It is not improbable that the Austrians 
would abstain from undertaking operations in Bohemia 
or Moravia, and await the arrival of their allies, in the 
fortified camp of Olmutz or behind the Danube. 

Should we assume the ogensive against France, we 
should probably have six or eight weeks in which we could 
operate with a free hand before Austria would be in a con- 
dition to interfere'; she is now in financial straits and has 
a weak skeleton army organization which would require 
a much longer time to mobilize than our own. Should we 
invade French soil, the French will be too proud to wait 
for assistance from Austria, and we shall be attacked at 
once. Here we are sure to find an opponent. The size 
of the armies, the narrowness of the front of operations, 
and the difficulty of subsisting troops, wull compel each 
side to seek a prompt decision, and it is almost certain 
that inside the first week a battle must take place. If we 
are successful in this battle Austria will almost be com- 



65 

pelled to sheath her half-clrawn sword. If in the mean- 
time should Austria invade Silesia and even the Mark 
provinces, so long as our fortresses hold out and our defen- 
sive army retires without being beaten, nothing is defi- 
nitely lost. It is probable that in France, after the first 
lost battle, a change of dynasty will result; as we desire 
nothing from France, the new powers would probably be 
willing to make peace. 

For all these reasons, I hold that ten army corps should 
be concentrated for the offensive in the Palatinate, and 
three for the defensive be detached to operate against 
Austria. To reinforce the latter and to guard the coast, 
mobile landwehr divisions should be formed and the 17th 
division retained to observe Denmark; its place in the 
IX corps can be taken by the Hessian division. It is 
understood that all our armed force is to be employed 
against France should we engage that power alone, or for 
a considerable length of time. 

DEFENSE AGAINST AUSTRIA 

It is difficult to say in advance what numerical su- 
periority Austria can utilize against us; it is certain that 
this superiority will be delayed by her lack of preparation. 
In 1866 in four months Austria placed 340,000 men in the 
field; there is no ground for assuming that she can do 
better now, as to numbers or time. Her internal condi- 
tions will hardly permit her to denude all her provinces of 
troops, and Russia and Bavaria will require her to post 
armies of observation on their frontiers. She would 
hardly feel wihing to give Russia a free hand in the Danube 
principalities and in Gahcia, while she concentrated her 
whole force against us. Outside of her Caucasian army, 
her forces in Bessarabia and on the eastern frontiers of 
Gahcia, Russia can in a short time unite eighteen infantry 
and two cavalry divisions around Czenstochova which 
would threaten the rear of any Austrian force which in- 
vaded Siles'a. 

In all probability, Austria will be compelled to place an 
army of observation aroimd Olmutz and another on the 
line of the Inn, and will be able to move against us with 



66 

only a fraction of her armed force. Even if at the begin- 
ning of the campaign Russia does not take an active part, 
the Austrian operations in Silesia will be more and more 
compromised by the position of the Russians as she ad- 
vances further north. All circumstances therefore point 
to an advance of the Austrians from Bohemia directly on 
Berhn, and this along the right bank of the Elbe, since 
otherwise they would be obliged to cross that river between 
our fortresses and in the face of our organized defense. It 
is against operations along this line therefore that we 
must prepare. 

With a view to the most rapid and simultaneous con- 
centration of all the North German army corps, it is as- 
visable that the I and II corps (the East Prussian and 
Pomeranian) be employed on this line, for the defense 
against Austria, and that these troops be reinforced to 
83,000 men by the 1st and 3d mobile landwehr divisions. 
An active defense of the seacoast must under these cir- 
cumstances be left to the troops permanently detailed for 
that purpose; this is possible since, under the conditions 
given, there is but little probability of a descent upon our 
coasts. In addition, the VI corps, which numbers 30,000 
men, will be employed to defend Silesia. We therefore 
have for defense 113,000 men. 

It would not be advisable to concentrate all these troops 
at a central point, such as Gorlitz, since Silesia should 
not at once be denuded of all troops, and the XII 
(Saxon) army corps should not be withdrawn from 
Dresden, without replacing it by at least one Prussian 
division. 

The Silesian army corps (VI) can be best concentrated 
on the line Neisse-Frankenstein to guard the frontier and 
to threaten the main Austrian railway at Wildenschwert 
via Glatz. Should the Austrians advance through Silesia, 
it will be with the army which is assembled near Olmutz 
to observe the Russians; being thus hampered, its opera- 
tions can be harassed by a small force. The VI corps is 
not strong enough to prevent an Austrian advance on 
Breslau, but it can flank this line of operations by retiring 
on Schweidnitz. Should the Austrians show any indica- 
tion of uniting their entire force against Lusatia, the move- 



67 

ment of the VI corps to Gorlitz would be protected by the 
Bohemian mountains and expedited by two hnes of rail- 
way. 

Our main body will also be too weak to attack the 
enemy at once. Should it fall back directly on BerHn the 
enemy will naturally follow and we should be compelled to 
fight" a decisive battle on the plains outside the city. A 
better course would be to undertake flanking operations, 
based either on the Oder or the Elbe river. 

If the Oder is the base, the army must be concentrated 
at Gorlitz where the VI corps can unite with it; the re- 
treat will then bring the army nearer the Russians. This 
base has its defects as the assistance of the Russians is 
only an eventuality, and furthermore to unite our army 
with a stronger ally is always undesirable, as it will bring 
it under his orders. 

The Elbe forms a better base since the enemy's line of 
operations to Berhn is flanked at a shorter range, and on 
this river our defensive army remains in communication 
with our army on the Rhine, can be reinforced by it, and 
has a secure place of retreat in the intrenched camp of 
Magdeburg. The Elbe guarded by its fortifications of 
Dresden, Torgau, Wittenberg and Magdeburg, offers as 
great advantages as one can wish to operate on the flank 
of an enemy of superior numerical strength. Every ad- 
vance from one of its bridge-heads compels the enemy to 
change front, and to make every efl"ort to protect his 
flank. 

In case of our defeat, a safe refuge may be found behind 
the river, while the pursuit leads the enemy further from 
Berlin. Under these circumstances an Austrian advance 
will not necessarily succeed; the particular steps to be 
taken to prevent it will become apparent when the adver- 
sary decides to march past us. Berlin must, however, be 
protected from raiding parties by a detachment posted on 
the direct road. The enemy will be compelled also to 
weaken his main body in order to protect his communica- 
tions by investing Dresden, Torgau and Wittenberg, espec- 
ially on the right bank of the Elbe. It is not improbable 
that this will so reduce the strength of the enemy's army 
that before he reaches our capital, his natural objective, 



68 

wc may meet and fight a decisive battle by operating from 
Magdeburg. 

These flanking operations will be more effective, the 
further up-stream they begin, therefore Dresden must be 
the point of strategic concentration of the 1st, 2d, 3d, 
and 4th infantry divisions (I and II corps), the 1st and 3d 
landwehr divisions and the 2d cavalry division; the 1st 
cavalry division will remain at Gorlitz to keep communica- 
t'on open with the VI corps. Should our main body just 
before the outbreak of actual hostilities move from Dres- 
den to the strong position of Stolpen with its right flank 
protected by the sandstone hills in this vicinity, and the 
Gorlitz detachment advance to Bautzen, it will be possi- 
ble at the very beginning to attack the enemy with full 
strength as he debouches from the Bohemian mountains. 
This will at least compel the enemy to follow us in the di- 
rection of Dresden. Further events fall in the province 
of active operations which can be here outlined only so 
far as the strategic concentration indicates. 

From the South German states we can expect only that 
which is in the interest of all to execute. In a war waged 
with France alone, the union of the Bavarian army with 
the North German forces on the middle Rhine will be the 
most certain protection against an invasion of Bavarian 
soil by a French force, and if the Munich authorities see 
the situation in its true hght they will carry out this plan. 
Such a union cannot be expected if Bavaria must protect 
her frontier against Austria. We may expect in this latter 
condition of affairs, that Bavaria will make heroic efforts 
and concentrate 60,000 men on the Inn. This concentra- 
tion is all we can expect of Bavaria. 

Threatening the rear of the Austrian concentration in 
Bohemia and Moravia, and even Vienna itself, that 
country will be obliged to detach an equal and probal.ily a 
larger force to engage the Bavarians. Against such a 
force, the best plan would be for Bavaria not to hold 
Munich, but to attempt to check the advance of the Aus- 
trians in a decisive battle in front of Ingolstadt. We 
must not expect the Baviirians to take up a position at 
Ingolstadt at once; they will certainly exchange shots 
with Austria on the frontier before so doing. 



69 

Wiirtemberg and Baden, being threatened more by 
France than by Austria, we may expect to unite in our 
offensive movement. 

Should we have an early decisive battle in France, then 
if in the meantime Austria has advanced into Silesia or 
the Mark provinces, our line of operations against her will 
be via Wiirtemberg and Bavaria. 

Everything therefore depends on conducting a rapid 
and overwhelming campaign against France. 

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST FRANCE 

Less complicated than the defense against Austria is 
the offense against France. The principal object is to 
seek the main force of the enemy and attack it. The dif- 
ficulty lies in executing this simple plan with the great 
masses of troops. 

The active French Army is composed of 330,000 men, 
of whom 35,000 are in Algeria and 5000 in Rome. A por- 
tion of the line troops will necessarily be detached to garri- 
son the principal cities and fortrefsses as soon as we assume 
the offensive; we may safely deduct 50,000 for this pur- 
pose. Even if corps of observation are not essential along 
the Pyrenees and the straits of Dover, hardly 250,000 
men can be brought against us at the beginning of hostili- 
ties, while our ten North German corps number 330,000 
men. The French have in addition 93,000 reserves who 
would be available for increasing the battalions of its 
active army from 800 to 1000 men. This does not seem 
to be contemplated, however, but they are to be organized 
into new units; this is another reason for rapid advance 
on our part. 

We too have besides the guard and. other organized 
landwehr divisions, a reserve of 26,000 men whom we may 
utilize. If we can count on our nunforcement by 30,000 
men of the Baden and Wurtem})erg divisions, the relative 
strength of the offensive forces will ])e 360,000 to 250,000 
at the outbreak of hostilities, and 386,000 to 343,000 at a 
later period. This shows how important it is to take 
advantage of our numerical superiority at the outbreak 
of hostilities. 



70 

This superiority will be still further increased at the 
decisive points, if the French should attempt an expedition 
to our coast, or to south Germany. We can make prep- 
arations to resist the first without decreasing the strength 
of the field army, the second cannot be dangerous to us. 
It is essential to so concentrate our numerical superiority 
that at the critical moment it can be at once utilized, and 
thus the question arises, where can we expect to find the 
enemy? 

The neutrality of Belgium, Holland and Switzerland 
confines the theater of war to the space between Luxem- 
burg and Basle. Should France violate the neutrality of 
Belgium to approach the Prussian Rhine, outside of pos- 
sible complications with England, she would be obliged to 
detach 80,000 to 100,000 men to observe the Belgian army 
at Antwerp and Brussels. The further advance of the 
French army along the Meuse we could attack to better 
advantage from the Moselle than from the Rhine. 

Our Rhine front is so strong that immediate reinforce- 
ment is unnecessary, and besides, the distance from Brus- 
sels to Cologne is greater than that from. Mainz, Trier, 
and Kaiseralautern to Cologne. Our attack from the south 
would compel our anatagonist to face southward, to meet 
a flank attack. The primary concentration of our forces 
south of the Moselle will fully enable us to meet the danger 
of an invasion on the left bank of the Rhine, as well as to 
frustrate it by an offensive movement on French soil. 
As the violation of the neutrality of Belgium would also 
lead to political complications with England, it is im- 
probable that France would resort to it, in view of the 
slight advantages resulting from it. 

France would meet with no less serious difficulties 
should she attempt to unite with Austria by operating 
through Switzerland. More than 100,000 men would be 
required for a long period of time to conquer and occupy 
this mountainous country. Besides the interest of the 
two alUed powers does not lead to immediate combined 
action, as they must pursue different objectives in separate 
theaters of war in. order to accomplish the ultimate object- 
tive — the destruction of the Prussian war power. 

We may therefore take it for granted that France will 



71 

effect the first concentration on tne line Metz-Strassburg, 
in order to turn our strong Rhine front by way of the 
Main, to separate north and south Germany, to make 
terms with the latter, and to use it a a base for a move- 
ment towards the Elbe. Here too a concentration in the 
Bavarian Palatinate south of the Moselle of all available 
forces of north and south Germany is the simplest means 
of meeting such a plan. With a view of securing prompt 
results, the French may move with a portion of their 
forces from Strassburg into south Germany. 

An operation up the Rhine on the flank of this move- 
ment would prevent its progress beyond the Black Forest 
and compel the enemy to protect his northern flank. If 
the Baden-Wiirtemberg corps has attached itself to our 
left wing, we can so increase it from our camp in the Palat- 
inate, that a decisive battle may be sought in the vicinity 
of Rastadt whose fortunate outcome would destroy the 
enemy. In order to effect this object we can afford to 
detach troops from our main body, since the enemy in 
our front is weakened by the size of the detachment he 
sends to operate on the Rhine. 

Should the south German authorities insist on a direct 
defense of their territories by taking up a position behind 
the Black Forest, or in the vicinity of Ulm, we would be 
deprived of their immediate assistance. We must then 
let them manage their affairs independently since the 
march of a French army via Stuttgart and Munich be- 
comes effective on our strategic flank, only when the de- 
cisive battles fought with our weakened foe in front are 
lost. 

Should the French utilize their railway systems to form 
a quick concentration, they are compelled to detrain in 
two principal groups near Strassburg and Metz, separated 
by the Vosges mountains. Should the probably smaller 
group at the outset not move against south Germany, its 
union with the principal force on the upper Moselle can 
only be effected by regular marches. 

In the Palatinate, we occupy interior lines of operation 
between these hostile groups. We can move against 
either one of them or if we are strong enough against both 
at once. The concentration of all our forces in the 



72 

Palatinate protects the lower as well as the upper Rhine and 
favors an offensive movement into the enemj^'s country; 
the last executed at the proper time will probably fore- 
stall any invasion of the German territory. The question 
is can we, without danger of being disturbed, effect our 
concentration beyond the Rhine in the Palatinate close to 
the French frontier? This question I unhesitatingly 
answer in the affirmative. 

Our mobilization is ready to the smallest detail. Six 
through railways are available for transport to the terri- 
tory between the Moselle and Rhine. The time-tables 
are prepared upon which are shown the day and hour 
when every unit starts and arrives. On the twelfth* day, 
the first troops can detrain near the French frontier; on 
the fifteenth day, the combatants of the two army corps 
are there; on the twentieth day, the numbers have in- 
creased to 300,000 men; on the twenty-fourth day, the 
armies are supplied with their trains. 

We have no reason to believe that the concentration of 
the French army, for whose mobilization no data exist, 
can be made more rapidly. Since Napoleon I, France 
has only effected partial mobihzations, by which the units 
of the part of the army which took the field were increased 
from those which remained in garrison. 

On account of the effectiveness of their railway systems, 
and the ample supply of roUing stock, the French can, by 
emptying the garrisons and camps in their northwest ter- 
ritory, and without waiting for the incorporation of re- 
serves, unite on the frontier in a very short time an army 
of 150,000 men. This carrying out of a rash initiative is 
in accordance with the national character, and has been 
discussed in military circles. Assuming that such an ini- 
provised army well provided with cavalry and artillery is 
decided upon, it would be united at Metz on the fifth day 
and on the eighth day might cross the frontier at Sarre- 
louis. We should still have it in our power to stop our 
railway transport, and detrain our troops on the Rhine. 
To that line the invasion would still require six marches, 

* In the revision of this project for 1870 the numbers of days were 
changed to 10th, 13th, 18th and 20th. 



73 

and would be brought to a standstill by an equal force on 
the fourteenth day. Having control of the river crossing, 
we could in a few days assume the offensive with an army 
of double the numerical strength of the French army. 
The dangers of such a proceeding on the French side, in 
its further development, are so clear that one can easily 
foresee the result ; apart from that, it could not take place 
if we assumed the initiative. 

If the concentration of our forces in the Palatinate is 
deemed feasible, the apparent weakening of our Rhine 
front is no sufficient argument against its adoption. It 
has already been shown that this front is protected by the 
neutrality of the Belgians, and if this is violated, by dis- 
tance, by its own inherent strength, and by active mili- 
tary operations. 

Such a force as we shall raise against France can operate 
only when divided into several armies. The strength of 
each must be determined by its objective and its composi- 
tion by the necessity of preparing it in the shortest possible 
time for field service. According to these considerations 
the following assignment cannot be changed : 
First army— VII and VIII corps— right wing— 60,000 

men at Wittlich. 
Second army— III, IV, X, and Guard corps— center— 

131,000 men at Neuenkirchen-Homburg. 
Third army— V, XI, Baden-Wiirtemberg corps, and a 

Bavarian brigade— left wing— 99,000 men at Landau 

and Rastadt. 
Fourth army— IX and XII corps— reserve— 63,000 men 

in front of Mainz. 

In case we should have war with France alone, 31,000 
men could be added to the above as the I and II Bavarian 
corps would at once join the Third army; this would in- 
crease its strength to 130,000 men and the total force to 
384,000 men. At the end of twenty days, after the rail- 
ways had completed the concentration of the troops above 
mentioned, the I, II and VI corps could be forwarded; 
this would increase our total force to 485,000. 

The plan continues by giving details governing the con- 
centration of each particular army and prescribes the dis- 



74 



tribution of the landwehr divisions for coast duty. These 
details may be found in Clarke's translation of the Ger- 
man official account of the war. Vol. I, pages 54-56. 

The plan was executed, substantially as given, in July 
and August, 1870; the second and fourth armies were 
united into one, and the three armies crossed the frontier 
before they were joined by the I, II, and VI corps, which 
were afterwards distributed among them. 



PEACE HEADQUARTERS OF ARMY CORPS 



I Konigsberg 
II Stettin 

III Berlin 

IV Magdeburg 
V Posen 

VI Breslau 
VII Munster 
VIII Coblenz 
IX Hamburg 
X Hanover 
XI Cassel 
XII Dresden 

Guard Corps Berlin 



I Bavarian Munich 
II Bavarian Wiirzburg 

Each corps is composed of two 
divisions numbered 1 and 2, 
for I corps; 3 and 4 for II; etc. 



CHAPTER IV 
THE CONDUCT OF STRATEGIC OPERATIONS 

The term campaign was formerly applied to the resume 
of all movements and combats of an army during a calen- 
dar year. Most of Napoleon's campaigns are still thus 
designated; as the Campaigns of 1796,1800,1805,1812, 
etc. It is now more generally apphed tp such movements 
and combats as are connected with some important or 
decisive event in the conduct of the war; thus in our civil 
war we have the Campaign of Gettysburg and the Cam- 
paign of Vicksburg, to designate the movements of the 
armies and the minor combats connected with the battle 
of Gettysburg, and the capture of Vicksburg. The term 
operations is employed to designate the minor subdivisions 
of a campaign; thus we employ the expression The Opera- 
tions of the Cavalry in the Gettysburg Campaign, to desig- 
nate the part that special arm took in this campaign, and 
The Operations along the Yazoo in the Vicksburg Campaign, 
to designate so much of the campaign as took place in the 
designated part of the theater of operations. A war is 
therefore made up of campaigns, a campaign of operations. 

Plan of Campaign. — Before a commander engages in 
any offensive movement he makes a prehminary study of 
the mihtary situation and decides upon his plan of action. 
This plan, sometimes called the plan of campaign, some- 
times the plan of operations, is based upon the strength 
and position of his own forces, and upon the strength and 
position of the forces and fortified places of the enemy, 

75 



76 

and upon the available bases, lines of operation and com- 
munication, theaters of operation, and objectives. 

''Plans of campaign are susceptible of infinite modifica- 
tion, depending upon circumstances, the character of the 
troops, the genius of the commander, and the topography 
of the country." — Napoleon. 

On the defensive, the plan of campaign determines the 
action of the commander under various assumptions as to 
the movements of the invader, fixes the point where the 
first defensive battle is to be offered, and the position in 
rear to which the army will retire if defeated. 

A plan .of campaign may be either a formal written 
document in which all the proposed movements are given 
in detail, or it may exist simply as a purpose in the mind 
of the general in command of the forces. Wlien the chief 
executive or the commander-in-chief of the armies does 
not accompan}^ the army into the field, either may require 
the general, actually in command, to submit to him for 
approval his proposed plan of campaign. Until Grant 
assumed command of the armies, the commander of the 
Army of the Potomac was alwaj^s required to submit to 
the President his plan of an offensive campaign. This, 
although unfortunate, was natural, since the Army of the 
Potomac was looked upon as the sole protection of the 
national capital, for the safety of which the President felt 
himself responsible. Halleck, who succeeded McClellan 
and preceded Grant as the commander-in-chief of the 
armies, did not take the field himself, but remained in 
Washington as the President's military adviser, and passed 
upon these plans. The commanders of the western 
armies, being further from the capital, were not subject to 
the same rigid supervision. 

When the chief executive is also the field commander 



77 

of the armies, as were Napoleon and Frederick the Great, 
he need not reveal his plans to anyone, and can thus in- 
sure that secrecy which is a great factor in the success of 
military operations. His plan of campaign is revealed 
only in his correspondence with, or in his orders issued to 
his subordinate commanders. In these communications 
he may express as much or as little of his designs as he 
considers advisable. It is impossible for such a plan to 
become known to the enemy through the medium of spies 
and newspapers. 

• A plan of campaign can definitely regulate the move- 
ments of an army only during the preliminary stages of 
the operations before the two armies are within striking 
distance of each other. When the influence of the enemy's 
presence is felt, then all operations must be conducted 
with reference to his movements so far as they can be 
learned. Although the main idea of the original plan of 
campaign is not forgotten and is steadily adhered to, the 
means of carrying out that idea must be changed with 
every modification of the military situation. The strate- 
gist who plans the campaign should therefore accompany 
the army into the field to study the ever changing mili- 
tary status, and prescribe the means by which each new 
condition of affairs may be met. For this reason, the 
preparation of a plan of campaign, its modification, and 
execution should, as far as possible, be left wholly to 
the commander of the army which is to make the cam- 
paign. 

The essential requisites of a good plan of campaign are 
that it should be simple, be based on a correct estimate of 
the military situation, and on correct military principles. 

''All complicated combinations should be avoided. 
Simplicity is the primary condition of aU good maneuvers." 

— Napoleon. 



78 

This is particularly true of the movements of a large 
army, composed of many units. Such an army covers a 
large territory in which its position at any instant can be 
only approximately known to its commander, and all 
messages and orders can reach their destination only long 
after they are sent. Comphcated operations therefore 
are liable to fail, because some column fails to reach its 
destination at a fixed time, or because some subordinate 
commander has either failed to receive his order or has 
received it too late to carry out his part of the combined 
plan. These facts will not be known to the commander- 
in-chief, and he will therefore be unable to modify his 
plan to suit the real conditions. 

Military Information. — The miUtary situation is learned 
by studying the organization of the enemy's armies and 
the theater of war in time of peace, and by supplementing 
the information thus obtained by that derived from 
patrols, scouts, prisoners, spies, deserters, newspapers, etc., 
after the outbreak of the war. Information concerning 
the front of the hostile army may be derived from scouts, 
patrols, prisoners, and deserters; information concerning 
movements behind the hostile screen, from spies, news- 
papers, and intercepted private or public communica- 
tions. • The information obtained from scouts and patrols 
is of two kinds; that derived from their own observation, 
and that derived from the testimony of others, as the in- 
habitants of the country. The value of the first varies 
with the experience, training, and intelligence of the indi- 
vidual; that of the second, with the ability of the ques- 
tioner to examine, and with the character of, and circum- 
stances surrounding, the individual questioned. 

If the patrol or scout is operating in a hostile country, 
the information derived from the inhabitants will ordi- 
narily be intentionall}^ misleading and cannot be relied 



79 

upon; in a friendly country, the inhabitants will endeavor 
to give correct information and will fail only because of 
the failure of the ordinary individual to observe accurately, 
and because of his desire to convey the idea that he knows 
more than he really does. Important prisoners and de- 
serters, although questioned by the scouts and patrols, 
are sent for examination to the intelligence department of 
the headquarters of some general officer. 

Prisoners are naturally loath to give any information 
concerning the dispositions of their own armies, and try 
to mislead questioners. Napoleon says : 

''All information obtained from prisoners should be re- 
ceived with caution and estimated at its real value. A 
soldier seldom sees anything beyond his own company 
and an officer can furnish information only of the position 
and movements of the division to which his regiment be- 
longs. On this account the general of an army should 
never depend upon the information derived from prison- 
ers, unless it agrees with the reports received from the ad- 
vance guard, in reference to the positions, etc., of the 
enemy." 

The only rehable information that may be derived from 
a prisoner is that conveyed by his uniform; usually this 
indicates the organization to which he belongs. Mar- 
mont placed a higher value on the information derived 
from prisoners; for he says: 

''More information can be gotten from prisoners than 
from the best of spies." 

The information given by a deserter must be estimated 
in accordance with his rank and duty in the hostile army, 
and the causes which led him to take the step. There 
will ordinarily be a temptation for him to exaggerate his 
importance by drawing upon his imagination for his 
alleged facts. 



80 

All military commanders have made use of spies to 
learn of the movements and dispositions of the troops in the 
enemy's country, perhaps no one more so than Napoleon. 
Sometimes the information obtained has been of immeasur- 
able value and at other times it has been worse than value- 
less, for it has given the commanders an erroneous con- 
ception of the military situation. 

When Lee made his invasion of Pennsylvania in 1863, 
Stuart with his cavalry maneuvered in such a manner as 
to place the Union army between himself and Lee. He 
therefore deprived his chief of the means of getting infor- 
mation of the movements of the Union army through his 
own cavalry. From the time Lee crossed the Potomac, 
he was ignorant of Hooker's movements until a few days 
before the battle of Gettysburg. The concentration of 
the Confederate army at that point was based on the in- 
formation of a single spy who was employed by Longstreet 
to enter the Union lines; this spy followed the Union 
movement to Washington and Frederick, and there left 
the Union army to rejoin Longstreet. 

McClellan's secret service department was worse than 
useless. In a report of March 8, 1862, the Chief stated: 

"The summary of the general estimates shows the forces 
of the rebel Army of the Potomac to be 150,000 as claimed 
by its officers and sanctioned by the pubUc behef , and that 
over 80,000 were stationed at Centreville, Manassas, and 
vicinity, the remainder being within supporting distance/' 

The returns of that army at the end of February show 
that its aggregate strength present for duty was only 
56,000, and its paper strength 84,000. In the Peninsula 
campaign the numbers given by the chief of the secret 
service were at least twice the strength of the Confederate 
army. It is impossible to state to what extent McClellan 
was influenced by these statements; as he uses them m 



81 

his official reports, and was timid in his offensive move- 
ments, he probably placed faith in them. Before the 
opening of the Atlanta campaign, Sherman was very ac- 
curately informed of the strength of Johnston's Confed- 
erate army through some spies employed by Thomas. 
Thomas was careful to employ two spies who were un- 
known to each other. 

Newspapers also giv3 an insight into the movements of 
the troops in the enemy's country. On September 7, 
1805, Napoleon wrote to his chief of staff, Berthier: 

' 'Please inform me whether you have directed anyone 
to follow the marches of the Austrian army and to classify 
them in the box I have specially prepared for the purpose. 
The name of each regiment should be written on a card 
and the cards changed in the case whenever a regiment 
changes station . . . Let the person charged with this 
work subscribe for the German gazettes published in 
Vienna, Munich, Salzburg, Dresden, Ratisbon, and 
Berne." 

The employment of war correspondents by all the prin- 
cipal newspapers, and the rivalry between them, has 
largely added to the value of newspapers as sources of 
reliable information. During the Spanish-American war, 
a careful reader of our newspapers was fully informed of 
the progress of recruiting, equipment, and training of the 
army, the commanders of the combined units, and prac- 
tically all the preparations made before the V corps sailed 
for Cuba or the VIII corps for the Philippines. In the 
Franco-German war, the organization of the French army 
became known to the Germans through the French press, 
and in the progress of the war, the important movement 
of MacMahon from Chalons towards Metz was communi- 
cated to the German officials through a telegram to the 
London papers, before it was discovered by the German 
cavalry. 



82 

In the Russo-Japanese war and in subsequent wars, 
the information sent out by correspondents has been 
closely censored and is less valuable than heretofore. 

Napoleon had no scruples, when it was a question of 
getting information for political or military purposes, and 
did not hesitate to tamper with private letters, transmitted 
through the mails. This source of information has also 
been utihzed by other commanders. In the war of 1914- 
1917, Great Britain seized and opened all mail carried by 
neutral vessels through the Channel or the North Sea. 

No information derived from any of the above sources 
should be considered absolutely trustworthy, until it is 
confirmed by one or more independent sources of informa- 
tion. 

In the war of 1914-1917 new and invaluable means of 
securing military information were first employed on a 
large scale. These were the various types of air-craft 
which flew over the enemy's lines and sometimes pene- 
trated far in rear of them. 

By means of air-craft it is now possible to map an 
enemy's position with considerable accuracy and also to 
discover any large movement of troops along his lines. 
It has made it necessary to mask as far as practicable all 
military positions and to move troops under the observa- 
tion of air-craft only at night. 

Military Principles. — Correct nailitary principles are 
learned from a study of the important campaigns of his- 
tory, and from comments and criticisms of those cam- 
paigns by their participants, or by able mihtary students. 
Military principles are to the art of war what the princi- 
ples of mechanics are to the art of engineering. By 
means of a knowledge of the principles of mechanics an 
engineer may make a correct design of a bridge, but the 
practical knowledge of the workshop and the field, and a 



83 

well-organized force of workers are essential to the execu- 
tion of the design, and the erection of the bridge in place; 
so in war, by means of a knowledge of the principles of the 
art, a commander maj^ correctly plan a campaign, but 
practical experience in the field and a well-organized force 
are essential to its execution. A well-designed bridge 
may fail through bad workmanship, and a badly designed 
one may stand because of good workmanship or a large 
factor of safety; so also may a well-planned campaign fail 
through bad execution or through inferiority of the troops, 
and a badly planned one succeed, because of the excellence 
of the execution or the superiority of the troops. 

From the commentaries of Napoleon we have the follow- 
ing observations, maxims, and principles, for the planning 
and execution of military campaigns. 

I. ^^ In forming a plan of campaign, it is requisite to fore- 
see everything the enemy may do, and to he prepared with the 
necessary means to prevent it.^^ 

Moltke's plan of concentration given in the last chapter 
illustrates the meaning of this maxim. Every probable 
movement of the French and Austrian armies is consid- 
ered and provided for. A campaign planned without 
giving due consideration to the possible and probable 
operations of the army was that of Bull Run in July, 
1861. 

In the early part of July, 1861, the Union and Confed- 
erate forces in northern Virginia were distributed as 
follows: McDowell with an army corps of 36,000 men 
was on the south bank of the Potomac opposite Washing- 
ton; Patterson with a division of 13,000 was in the Shen- 
andoah valley at Martinsburg; Beauregard, with a corps 
of about 22,000 men, was in the vicinity of Manassas 
Junction, with his main body occupying a defensive line 
along the south bank of the Bull Run; J. E. Johnston 



84 

with a division of about 11,000 men was in the Shenan- 
doah valley at Winchester. 

From a study of the situation, it is evident that Johnston 
and Beauregard, being only forty miles apart and having 
the use of the Manassas Gap railroad, could readily unite 
either at Winchester or at Manassas, and that neither the 
force of McDowell nor that of Patterson could safely 
attack the combined Confederate forces. Notwithstand- 
ing these conditions, the plan of the Union authorities 
contemplated independent movements by McDowell and 
Patterson against the Confederate forces in their front. 
As McDowell's movement was the more aggressive and 
the more threatening, Johnston left the valley and united 
his forces with those of Beauregard at Bull Run. 

Having left 6000 men to protect his communications, 
McDowell's force was no stronger than the combined 
Confederate forces, and as the latter had the advantage of 
a good position in which to receive his attack, the Union 
corps met with a disastrous defeat. Had Patterson's 
force been united with that of McDowell for a joint move- 
ment from Washington, the Unioin army would have been 
numerically stronger than the Confederate, and the prob- 
ability of success would have been in its favor. 

However skillful the commander of an army may be, he 
will always be more or less uncertain as to the probable 
action of his adversary unless he can deprive him of the 
power of the initiative. This may be done by assuming 
the offensive and executing it with vigor and rapidity. 
The adversary is thus reduced to the passive defense of 
warding off the blows struck by the assailant. This was 
the mode of warfare pursued by Frederick the Great, 
Napoleon, and Moltke, who gave their enemies little time 
to formulate plans of campaign or defense. A vigorously 
sustained offensive campaign, however, requires a well- 



85 

trained field army and a well-organized supply train, as 
well as a good military system for reinforcing the army 
with recrmts and reserves. The defective training of 
the volunteer armies of our civil war made rapid and per- 
sistent offensive movements even under such commanders 
as Grant and Sherman impossible, and gave to the Con- 
federates time to plan and execute the bold offensive 
measures which so often defeated the plans of the Union 
commanders. 

II. ^'Nothing is so important in war as undivided com- 
mand. Two independe7it armies should never be in the same 
theater of operations. ^^ 

It is self-evident that the entire military resources of a 
state can be utilized to their full effect only when they are 
controlled by a single will and when all the countless 
subdivisions into which that force is divided are working 
in unison towards a single end. Division of command 
was a characteristic of the Union system of organization 
until Grant took command in 1864; finding the country 
divided into nineteen separate territorial departments, 
he at once consolidated the departments into three terri- 
torial divisions so that there should be but one commander 
in each natural division of the theater of war. First 
Banks, then Canby, commanded the troops west of the 
Mississippi, Sherman those between the Mississippi and 
the Alleghany mountains, and Grant personally took 
command of those east of the Alleghanies, He outlined 
to the commanders of the separate armies the duty he 
expected each to perform so that all operations would tend 
to the destruction of the Confederate armed force, but 
left to each commander the details of the plans of cam- 
paign of his own army. 

The advantages of undivided command and the dis- 
advantages of separate commands in the same theater of 



86 

operations have no better illustration than the operations 
in Virginia in 1862. 

In February, the States of Maryland, and Virginia 
north of Richmond, formed the Union Department of the 
Potomac, under McClellan and contained a force of 185,- 
000 men present for duty; this force was concentrated 
along the Potomac river. The country about Fort Mon- 
roe, Va., formed the Union Department of Virginia under 
Wool, and had a force of about 10,000 men present for 
duty. The State of Virginia north of Richmond formed 
the Confederate Department of Northern Virginia under 
Joseph E. Johnston and had a force of 48,000 concentrated 
along Bull Run, the Occoquan, and at Winchester in 
the Shenandoah valley; the peninsula between the York 
and James rivers formed the Confederate Department of 
the Peninsula under Magruder and had a force of 13,000; 
the country between Chesapeake and Albemarle sounds 
formed the Confederate Department of Norfolk under 
Huger and had a force of 12,000. The entire Union force 
in this theater of operations was 195,000 men, the Con- 
federate force 73,000 men. 

McClellan's plan of campaign w^as to leave about 
34,000 men in the defenses of Washington, and with the 
remainder of his army to move on Richmond via the 
Peninsula between the York and James rivers, using Fort 
Monroe as a secondary base. The authorities approved 
his plan but insisted on his leaving a force of 55,000 
men, so that they might hold Manassas Junction as well as 
Washington. 

At the beginning of the movement one of McClellan's 
five corps under Banks was in the Shenandoah valley; 
this he proposed to move to Manassas Junction, leaving 
only a small force to watch the valley. An offensive 
movement by Jackson in the valley having prevented this 



87 

corps from carrying out its part of the plan, the authorities 
insisted on detaching from McClellan's army another 
corps, McDowell's, to occupy Manassas Junction. At 
the same time the authorities detached a division of 
10,000 men from the army of the Potomac to report to 
Fremont in West Virginia. Besides these changes, which 
reduced his army from fourteen divisions to eight, both 
McDowell and Banks were made independent com- 
manders. Thus the original Army of the Potomac was 
divided among four independent commanders all operat- 
ing in the same territory and against the same army. 

While these changes were being effected in the Union 
army and McClellan was moving from Fort Monroe, 
Johnston, leaving a small force along the Rappahannock 
and in the valley of the Shenandoah, fell back and united 
his main force with Magruder on the Peninsula; a little 
later, in front of Richmond, they were joined by Eager, 
and thus the Confederate army was united under a single 
commander. 

The subsequent operations proved the correctness of 
Napoleon's maxim. Under the able leadership of Lee, 
who succeeded Johnston, Jackson, who commnaded a 
detached force in the Shenandoah valley, attacked and 
defeated two detached brigades of Fremont under Milroy 
and Schenck, near Staunton, and drove Banks beyond the 
Potomac; he then united with Lee at Richmond and the 
latter, with the united Confederate army, attacked and 
defeated McClellan, and forced him to retire to the James 
river. 

The Union authorities tried to repair their error by 
uniting the forces of Fremont, Banks, and McDowell 
into a single army under Pope. As was shown in a pre- 
vious chapter this did not remedy the situation, and the 
authorities were finally compelled to withdraw McClellan 



88 

from the James river to reunite the original Army of the 
Potomac once more near Washington. Had McClellan 
retained the command of all the forces in the State of 
Virginia, it is difficult to see how he could have been de- 
feated even by a superior commander. 

III. "At the commencement of a campaign, to advance or 
not to adva7ice, is a matter for grave consideration, hut when 
once the offensive is assumed it must he sustained to the last 
extremity. However skillful the 77ianeuver, a retreat will 
always weaken the morale of a7i ar7ny." 

In order to sustain the offensive it is essential that the 
numerical superiority at the point of contact be sustained, 
and that provision be made promptly to restore the losses 
caused by battle and disease, and to guard the lengthening 
communications as the army advances. As has been 
previously shown, Moltke began the Franco-German 
war with a great numerical superiority; to prosecute the 
war with vigor, however, he found it necessary to rein- 
force it with nearly 250,000 men in the course of six 
months. The excellent organization of the depot troops, 
reserves and landwehr enabled him to do this without 
difficulty. 

In 1862 McClellan reached the suburbs of Richmond 
with an army which had suffered little loss in the previous 
engagements, but yet was too weak to make him feel con- 
fident of carrying the city by assault against the intrenched 
army of Lee, He called for reinforcements, but there 
were none to send him ; the authorities had not foreseen 
such a contingency, and had closed all the recruiting 
offices before the campaign was begun, and had no organ- 
ized reserves. As a result the excellent secondary base on 
the James river had to be abandoned and McClellan's 
army withdrawn to Washington to begin a new campaign. 
In 1864 Grant reached the same position only after the 



battles of the Wilderness, Spottsylvaniay and Cold Harbor, 
in which the losses in killed, wounded and missing were 
60,000 men. However, he was able to continue the offen- 
sive because the army was being constantly recruited 
under the calls for volunteers issued by the President 
in February, March, April, July, and December, 1864. 

During the civil war, Lee twice invaded the Northern 
States for the purpose of compelling the withdrawal of 
the Union armies from Virginia. He succeeded in this 
purpose, but not having sufficient strength to sustain the 
offensive through at least one decisive battle, the tempor- 
ary advantage thus gained was soon lost through his com- 
pulsory retreat. 

IV. '' An army should have hut one line of operations;'' 
and as corollaries to the above, "it is contrary to all true 
principles to make corps which have no communications 
act separately against a central force whose communications 
are open''; and "an army should always keep its columns so 
united as to prevent an enemy passing between them with 
impunity.'^ 

This principle is in a certain degree a corollary to the 
second, since any division of the army leads to a division 
of the command. 

When he enunciated this principle Napoleon was dis- 
cussing the four campaigns made in 1796 and 1797 by the 
Austrian generals, Wurmser and Alvinzi, for the relief of the 
fortress of Mantua in northeastern Italy which was being 
besieged by a part of the French army under Napoleon. 
The greater part of Napoleon's army acted as a covering 
force in the area between Mantua and the line Legnago- 
Verona-RivoH-Salo. 

To reach the territory occupied by the French covering 
army the Austrians could advance from Trent either down 
the valley of the Chiese west of Lake Garda or down the 



90 

valley of the Adige east of that lake. They could also 
advance from the east and force the Adige river at 
Verona, at Legnago, or at some point between those places. 

In each of the four campaigns the Austrians advanced in 
two or more columns by these various roads and in each 
campaign they were defeated by Napoleon with an inferior 
force acting from his central position against the sepa- 
rated columns before they could be united. 

A similar situation occurred in Virginia in July and 
August, 1862, when it was planned that McClellan should 
advance from his new base at Harrisons Landing on the 
James river against Richmond, and Pope should advance 
against the same place from the north. From his central 
position between the two Union armies, Lee easily defeated 
this plan. 

A hke situation occurred in May and June, 1864, when 
Grant advanced from the north and Butler from the 
south against Richmond. 

In the latter part of August, 1914, two Russian armies 
invaded east Prussia: the Wilna army came from the east 
and the Narew army from the south. The two armies 
were separated by the great lakes in southeastern East 
Prussia. This separation enabled Hindenberg with a 
much inferior force to defeat the Russian plan. Holding 
the Wilna army in check with a small force, he attacked 
and destroyed the Narew army with his main force in 
the battle of Tannenherg. This compelled the Wilna 
army to retire across the frontier to its fortified base on 
the Niemen river. 

V. ^'When the conquest of a country is undertaken by two 
or three armies, each of which has a separate line of opera- 
tions until they arrive at a point fixed upon for their concen- 
tration j it should he laid down as a principle, that the junction 
should never take place near the enemy, because the enemy by 



91 

uniting his forces, may not only prevent the union of the 
armies but may defeat them in detailJ'' 

In 1864 Grant, not wishing to abandon any of the Con- 
federate territory in Virginia then occupied by the Union 
troops, decided to operate in the following manner. Sigel, 
commanding the department of West Virginia, was directed 
to move up the valleys of the Shenandoah and Kanawha 
on Lynchburg; Meade with the Army of the Potomac 
from Culpeper Court House on Richmond; and Butler 
with the Army of the James from Fort Monroe via water 
to the junction of the James and Appomattox rivers and 
thence by the south bank of the James to Richmond. 

Operating from his central position in front of Rich- 
mond, the confederate commander, Lee, was able to inter- 
pose a force between Meade and Sigel and to defeat Sigel 
and his successor. Hunter, and thus prevent the union of 
the right column with either of the others. He was also 
able to check the advance of the left column under Butler, 
and render its operations futile until the Army of the 
Potomac crossed the James river and united with it. 

The Prussian invasion of Austria in 1866, as hereto- 
fore described, violated this maxim and some writers aid 
not hesitate to criticise Moltke for concentrating the 
Second Army so far away from the First and Third. His 
answer was that the Second Army was concentrated in 
the province of Silesia for the protection of that rich 
province; that the union of the Prussian armies at the 
right moment was never claimed by the Prussian general 
staff to be a brilliant or a very learned combination. It 
was only a sensible, well-considered and energetically 
executed remedy, for a primary concentration which was 
unfavorable, but at the same time necessary. 

The Second Army, it will be remembered, arrived at a 
very opportune moment on the day of the battle. He 



claims some advantages for a double concentration, in 
that a great force is more easily supplied and marched 
when it is divided into two or more groups than if kept in 
one. In a previous study of the same problem, he had 
united the whole army on the Saxon frontier and left only 
the VI corps in Silesia. 

A similar situation occurred at the beginning of the 
Russo-Japanese war. It was essential for Japan to secure 
a foothold in Corea to serve as a base for further opera- 
tions and prevent its falling into the possession of the 
Russians. For this purpose the First Army under Kuroki 
was sent there at the very outbreak of the war and ad- 
vanced to the Yalu river, which separates Corea from Man- 
churia. The next most important operation was the 
investment of the fortress of Port Arthur and the cap- 
ture of its fleet. For this purpose the Second Army under 
Oku was landed at Pitsewo and moved south to secure a 
base of operations in the harbor of Dalny. Here the Third 
Army was organized to attack Port Arthur. These 
preliminary operations having been successfully accom- 
plished, it became necessary to move the First and Second 
armies against the Russian Army of Manchuria, whose 
headquarters were at Liaoyang. 

In order to attack the Russian army before it could be 
strongly reinforced from Russia, it was decided by the 
Japanese military authorities to move the First and Second 
armies by the shortest lines to Liaoyang. Precaution was 
taken to connect them by the Fourth Army under Nodzu, 
which was landed at Takushan. This concentric move- 
ment was a dehcate and dangerous one but was rendered 
necessary by the preliminary concentration. It was 
successfully carried out and the Japanese won the battle 
of Liaoyang because of the superiority of their arm as a 
fighting and maneuvering force. 



93 

With modern facilities of communication such move- 
ments are less hazardous than in the time of Napoleon, 
but are always dangerous, especially if the adversary is 
active. 

A meeting of two Union armies on the battlefield took 
place in our civil war. In March, 1862, Grant, who was on 
the Tennessee river near Fort Henry, and Buell, who was 
at Nashville, were ordered to unite their forces near Sa- 
vannah on the Tennessee river for a joint movement on 
Corinth, Miss. Grant moving by water was first to reach 
the rendezvous and encamped most of his army at Shiloh 
or Pittsburg Landing, on the west bank of the Tennessee 
river near the Alabama line. Beauregard, who, under 
Albert S. Johnston, was in command of the Confederate 
forces at Corinth, about twenty miles distant, advised the 
latter to attack Grant before Buell could reach him. As a 
result there was fought on April 6, 1862, the first battle of 
Shiloh between the forces of Grant and A. S. Johnston, 
in which the former was surprised and defeated though 
not decisively. In the evening and night Buell reached 
the field, and on April 7 was fought the second battle of 
Shiloh in which the exhausted Confederates were obliged 
to confront a new army, and in which they were decisively 
defeated and compelled to retreat. 

The above examples show the danger attending the use 
of separate lines of operation uniting near or in the enemy's 
territory; had the Second Army reached Koniggratz, or 
Buell Shiloh, a half day later, the result might have been 
disastrous to the army first engaged by the enemy. 

VI. "The lines of operation should be preserved with care 
and never abandoned save in the last extremity; but it is one 
of the most skillful maneuvers in war to change it when cir- 
cumstances authorize it, or render it necessary.^' 

In announcing this principle, Napoleon had in mind an 



94 

army moving along a single route which was also its line 
of supply and retreat. If the army is forced to abandon 
this line, its further movements become seriously embar- 
rassed by the difficult}^ of subsisting the troops. An army 
may be forced from its line of operations by a flank attack, 
and it may lose its line by operations conducted in its 
rear. 

If two opposing armies of equal strength are operating 
along the same route, it would be difficult for one to operate 
against the flank of the other without exposing its own line. 
If, however, they are of unequal strength, the stronger may 
overlap the weaker and make a flank attack. If they are 
operating on parallel lines, each threatens the flank of the 
other, and the advantage is with the army which is the 
superior, through leadership or other causes. If an army 
can support one or both flanks on an impassable obstacle, 
as a wide river or range of mountains, its flanks are thus 
rendered secure against flank attacks. If the lines of 
operation of two opposing armies intersect and make a 
considerable angle with each other, each army is safe 
against flank attack until it approaches the point of inter- 
section, and each is liable to have its communications 
severed if it passes that point. 

The operations in rear of an army are usually executed 
by raiding parties of light troops whose object is to destroy 
the depots, and if the line is a railway line, to render it 
useless for a considerable length of time. The cavalry in 
the civil war became exceedingly expert in such operations, 
and the protection of the Louisville-Nashvifle-Chatta- 
nooga-Atlanta railway against the raids of Forrest and 
Morgan, as well as against the hostile inhabitants, was 
one of the chief cares of the Union commanders. When 
Sherman in 1864 began his Atlanta campaign, this railway 
was protected by block-houses and field-works at every 



95 

bridge and tunnel, and a large railway department was 
organized for rapid repair. For its protection by the 
troops he issued the following order: 

'' Army commanders will give great attention to their 
lines of communication. A small force in a block-house, 
disencumbered of baggage and stores not needed, can hold 
their ground and protect their point until relief comes. 
They should be instructed to fight with despei-ation to the 
last, as they thereby save the time necessary for concen- 
tration. Small reserves capable of being shifted to a way- 
point by a train of cars should be placed judiciously and 
instructed. The main reserves will be at Nashville, 
Murfreesboro, Columbia, Decatur, and Stevenson, from 
which places they can be rapidly transported to the point 
of danger. ... On notice of danger the command- 
ing general of the reserves at Nashville will promptly 
provide for the emergency, and see that damages, if done, 
are quickly repaired, but all officers are cautioned against 
the mischievous and criminal practice of reporting mere 
rumors, often sent into our fines by the enemy for his own 
purposes. Actual facts should be reported to -the head- 
quarters at Nashville and in the field, that they may be 
judged in connection with other known facts. An army of 
a miUion men could not guard against the fabulous stories 
that are sent to headquarters. Officers must scrutinize 
and see with their own eyes, or those of some cool, experi- 
enced staff officer, before making reports that may cafi off 
troops from another quarter, where there may be more 
need of them. When troops are intrenched or well 
covered by block-houses, a surrender wifi entail disgrace, 
for we have aU seen examples when a few determined men 
have held thousands in check until relief came or the 
necessities of the enemy forced him to withdraw." 

The means employed by the British in South Africa to 
protect their railways have already been described. 

The comments made by Napoleon on changing the fine 
of operations had reference to the maneuvers of Frederick 
the Great in the battle of Leuthen. In order to make a 



96 . 

flank attack on the enemy he abandoned the line of com- 
munication running from Breslau to Liegnitz along which 
he approached the battlefield, and opened a new line to 
Schweidnitz. This enabled him to make a flank attack 
with his new line of supply and retreat in his rear. 

Napoleon made a similar change before the battle of 
Austerlitz. He reached this field by coming from the south 
from the Austrian capital, Vienna. As his adversaries, 
the allied Russians and Austrians, would naturally 
approach from the east on the direct road from Russia to 
Vienna, to better preserve his communications, Napoleon 
opened a new line of communications, perpendicular to 
his first line, from Brunn through Bohemia to Ratisbon. 
The Allied army, unaware of this change, planned an 
offensive operation, having for its object the capture of 
Napoleon's line of retreat between Austerlitz and Vienna. 
The false premise upon which their plan was based led to 
their disastrous defeat. 

In our civil war, there were several examples of skillful 
changes of lines of supply and retreat. When McClellan 
was in front of Richmond in 1862, his position extended 
from Mechanicsville via Fair Oaks and Seven Pines to 
White Oak Swamp; his line of communications was the 
railway running eastward to the secondary bases he had 
estabhshed on the Pamunkey river at White House, and 
on the York river at West Point. By making a success- 
ful flank attack on the Union right wing, north of the 
Chickahominy river, Lee severed McClellan's connection 
with White House. McClellan had fortunately foreseen 
this contingency and had directed his engineers to explore 
and open the roads southward to Harrisons Landing on 
the James river to which he successfully withdrew his 
army. 

Grant in his Virginia campaign began his operations at 



97 

Culpeper north of the Rapidan river, supplying his 
army by the Orange and Alexandria railroad; he moved 
around the east side of Richmond and south side of Peters- 
burg, using in succession the Richmond and Potomac 
railroad, the York and the James rivers as lines of supply, 
and successively changed the direction of his line of opera- 
tions through an arc of over one hundred and eighty 
degrees. 

Roberts executed this maneuver in the South African 
war. When organizing his field army at Belmont for the 
relief of Kimberley, his line of supply was the Capetown- 
Kimberley railway, which was securely held in his front 
behind the Modder river by the Boer general, Cronje. 
The Bloemfontein line was held at the Orange river by a 
second Boer force. Roberts abandoned his line of supply, 
and moved eastward around Crojije's left flank towards 
the Bloemfontein railway north of the Orange river. By 
this means he threatened the communications of both 
Boer forces and compelled them to retreat. In this 
retreat Cronje's force was surrounded and captured at 
Paardeherg. After destroying this force, Roberts moved 
to the Bloemfontein railway and opened it as a new line of 
communications from which to operate against the other 
retreating Boer forces. 

To know how and when temporarily to abandon a line 
of operations is also a mark of military genius. When, in 
1864, Sherman reached the position of Atlanta, he found 
the Confederate army in an immense intrenched camp. 
To dislodge it from this position it was necessary to take 
possession of the railways to the south of the city, which 
were the Confederate lines of supply. He could do this 
only by temporarily abandoning his own line of communi- 
cations. Leaving one corps intrenched on the Chatta- 
hoochie river at the end of the Chattanooga- Atlanta 



railroad, he mai'ched the remainder of his army entirely 
around the Confederate position, captured its lines of 
supply and compelled the Confederate army to abandon 
Atlanta. This enabled him to reestablish his own com- 
munications. 

VII. "An army should be ready every day, every night, 
and at all times of the day and night, to oppose all the resist- 
ance of which it is capable." 

Napoleon adds: 

''With this in view, the soldier should invariably be 
complete in arms and ammunition; the infantry should 
never be without its artillery, its cavalry, its generals; 
and the different divisions of the army should be con- 
stantly in a state of support and to be supported. The 
troops whether halted or encamped, or on the march should 
be always in favorable positions, possessing the essentials 
required for a field of battle; for example, the flanks 
should be well covered, and aU the artillery so placed as 
to have free range and to maneuver to the greatest advan- 
tage. When an army is in column of march, it should have 
advance guards and flanking parties, to examine well the 
country in front, to the right and to the left, and always at 
such distance as to enable the main body to deploy into 
position." 

Since a commander is often deceived in war as to the 
position and force of the enemy, the information derived 
from spies, prisoners, and scouts, being more or less 
unreliable, he should always be ready to attack or to meet 
the attack of an enemy whom he may unexpectedly 
encounter. 

VIII. "A commander-in-chief should ask himself fre- 
quently in the day, what should I do if the enemy* s army 
should now appear in my front, on my right, or 07i my left? 
If he have any difficulty in answering these questions, he is 
badly posted, and should seek to correct his disposition." 

In the Shiloh campaign, while the Armj^ of the Ten- 



99 

nessee under Grant was awaiting the arrival of the Army 
of the Ohio under Buell it was encamped on the west bank 
of the Tennessee river. Five divisions or 33,000 men 
were at Pittsburg Landing and one division was at Crump 
Landing five miles below. Sherman's division formed 
the front line of the camp at Pittsburg Landing facing 
southward ; Grant had his headquarters at Savannah, nine 
miles to the north. Both Grant and Sherman were so 
convinced that the Confederates would remain on the 
defensive that no special precautions were taken to guard 
the camp from surprise. 

This confidence enabled the Confederate Army of Mis- 
sissippi to move up from Corinth twenty miles southwest, 
form line of battle, and approach to within one and a half 
miles of Sherman's division before its presence was dis- 
covered. 

The Union army was saved from destruction by the 
tactical errors of the Confederate commanders, the indi- 
vidual bravery of the officers and men of the Union army 
and by the timely arrival of the Army of the Ohio. The 
two Union commanders, who later became masters of 
the art of war, never forgot this lesson. The following are 
Napoleon's maxims on the establishment of such camps. 

IX. "The art of encamping in a position is the same as 
the art of deploying in order of battle in the position. 
To this end, the artillery should he advantageously placed. 
Ground should he selected which is not commanded nor liahle 
to he turned, and, as far as possible, the guns should cover 
and command the surrounding country. 

X. "Never lose sight of this maxim, that you should estab- 
lish your cantonments at the most distant and best protected 
point from the enemy, especially where a surprise is possible. 
By this means you will have time to unite all your forces 
before he can attack you.'^ 



100 

On the subject of concentration before a probable battle 
Napoleon says: 

XI. ''The first principle of ivar is that a battle should he 
fought only with all the troops that can he assembled on the 
field,'' and as corollaries: First, "When you have resolved 
to fight a battle collect your whole force. Dispense with 
nothing, a single battalion sometimes decides the day." 
Second, "When you are determined to risk a battle, reserve 
to yourself every possible chance of success, particularly if 
you have to deal with an adversary of superior talent." 
Third, "No force should be detached on the eve of battle 
because affairs may change during the night, either by the 
retreat of the enemy or by the arrival of large reinforcements 
which will enable him to assume the offensive and counteract 
your previous dispositions." 

Out of thirty-eight principal battles fought by Frederick 
the Great and Napoleon with various adversaries, twenty- 
five were won by the contestant having the greater and 
thirteen by the one having the lesser numerical strength. 
In battles personally conducted by either of these great 
tacticians the chances of victory and defeat were about 
even if the odds against them did not exceed five to three. 
They occasionally lost with less odds, and occasionally 
won with greater odds against them. In our civil war, 
the only important battles won with the numerical odds 
against the victor, were Pea Ridge, Franklin, Second Bull 
Run, Fredericksburg, Chancellor sville, Spottsylvania and 
Cold Harbor. Of these, the last five were won by Lee, who 
was, however, unable to overcome the odds against him 
at Malvern Hill, Antietam, and Gettysburg. 

Napoleon himself almost lost the decisive battle of 
Marengo in 1800, by detaching Desaix with one of his 
divisions to go to another part of the theater of operations 
on the day before the battle. He was saved by the 



101 

opportune return of Desaix towards the close of the day, 
after the Austrians had concluded that the battle was 
definitely over and Napoleon was decisively defeated. 

XII. ^^It is an approved maxim in war, never to do what 
the enemy wishes you to do, for this reason alone, that he 
desires it. A field of battle, therefore, which he has previously 
studied and reconnoitered, should he avoided, and double 
care should be taken where he has had time to fortify or in- 
trench. One consequence deduciblefrom this principle is, never 
attack a position in front which you can gain by turning." 

When the defender finds himself threatened by a serious 
attack in one part of the theater of war, he may attempt to 
ward it off by making a demonstration in another part. 
The invader must not let such a movement divert him 
from his original plan or main objective. In McClellan's 
Peninsula campaign, it will be remembered that he reached 
Fort Monroe with but eight of his fourteen original divi- 
sions; another was sent to him at Yorktown; so he reached 
the front of Richmond with nine divisions. McDowell, 
who was at Fredericksburg with four divisions, was about 
to advance along the Fredericksburg-Richmond railway 
to join him. This movement was stopped by orders from 
Washington, and despite the protests of McClellan and 
McDowell, the latter's force was directed against Jackson, 
who was making a demonstration in the Shenandoah valley 
for the very purpose of preventing McClellan from being 
reinforced. Had McDowell's advance on Richmond 
been vigorously pushed, while Jackson was in the valley, 
McClellan would have had at least 35,000 more men and 
Lee 20,000 less, in the battles which closed the campaign. 

The history of warfare, particularly since the invention 
of rifled firearms, is full of examples of unsuccessful frontal 
assaults on fortified positions, and with each new improve- 
ment of firearms they became more difficult. It must be 



102 

remembered, however, that turning an army out of posi- 
tion is only delaying the day of battle, and it is this battle 
which must ultimately decide the fate of the campaign. 

In the spring of 1863, while the Army of the Cumber- 
land under Rosecrans was at Murfreesboro in Tennessee, 
the Confederate Army of Tennessee of Bragg occupied a 
strongly intrenched line in his front extending from Shelby- 
ville to Fairfield across the Nashville and Chattanooga 
railroad. By threatening the left of Bragg^s line and at 
the same time concentrating his force and turning its right, 
Rosecrans was able to compel Bragg to retreat to Chatta- 
nooga without fighting a battle. 

In the autumn, Rosecrans decided to maneuver him out 
of Chattanooga in the same manner, by threatening 
Bragg's right and front, and then turning his left by mov- 
ing his troops over Lookout mountain into the valley of 
Chickamauga creek south of Chattanooga. In making 
this movement, he violated the principle of keeping his 
army united, and his separate columns crossed the moun- 
tains through widely separate passes and debouched 
from them almost in the face of Bragg^s united army, 
which had quietly retreated from Chattanooga to Lafay- 
ette, Ga. 

Had Bragg properly seized the advantages of his posi- 
tion he might have destroyed one or more of Rosecrans* 
columns; as it was he gave Rosecrans time to concentrate, 
and only partially defeated him in the battle of Chicka- 
mauga. Rosecrans, however, was compelled to seek 
refuge in Chattanooga to reorganize his army, and was 
invested by Bragg until reheved by reinforcements sent 
from the Arm}^ of the Potomac and the Army of the Ten- 
nessee. 

Sherman's Atlanta campaign is a good model for the 
conduct of such turning movements. Without ever expos- 



J 



103 

ing his communications, or his separate corps to be de- 
stroyed in detail, and without making more than one front 
attack on entrenched Hues, Kenesaw Mountain, he suc- 
ceeded in compelhng Johnston to evacuate one intrenched 
position after another until he was forced back from 
Dalton to Atlanta, Georgia. 

XIII. "The strength of an army, like power in me- 
chanics, is estimated by multiplying the mass by the rapidity; 
a rapid march augments the morale of an army, and increases 
all the chances of victory. ^^ 

Jackson of the Confederate army was particularly 
noted during the civil war for his rapid marches. 

In 1862, in the operations in the Shenandoah valley, 
by rapidly marching and combining his small army of 
less than 20,000 men, he defeated in succession the Union 
commanders Milroy, Schenck and Banks, and prevented a 
reinforcement of 40,000 men under McDowell from being 
sent to McClellan to assist him in his operations against 
Richmond. He thus paralyzed the offensive movements 
of the entire Union army of nearly 200,000 men. 

In 1863 by a rapid march he passed the front of the 
Union army under Hooker at Chancellor svillcj Va., and 
attacked it in flank and rear. Although his corps num- 
bered but 22,000 men, this attack was the primary cause 
which led to the retreat of the entire Union army of 
124,000 men to the north bank of the Rappahannock 
river. 

Napoleon's campaigns of 1796-97 are also brilliant 
examples of rapidly executed maneuvers and combina- 
tions which disconcerted and defeated the more dehberate 
Austrian commanders. On the night of January 13, 1797, 
preceding the first day's battle of Rivoli, Massena's division 
marched from Verona to the battlefield, a distance of 
fifteen inik^s; it fought most of the following day with the 



104 

right wing of the Austrian army, and in the evening when 
that was defeated, began a march for Mantua, thirty 
miles distant; Mantua was reached early in the morning 
of the 16th in time to take part in the battle of La Favorita, 
in which the left wing of the Austrian army was destroyed. 
Frederick the Great, in his brilUant operations in the 
autumn of 1757, with an army of 20,000 men decisively 
defeated a French force of 40,000 men on the field of 
Rosshach, near Halle, Germany, November 5, and then 
quickly marching to Silesia with an army of 40,000 attack- 
ed and decisively defeated an Austrian force of 70,000 
men at Leuthen near Breslau on December 5. The two 
battle-fields are 225 miles apart in an air fine. 

XIV. "7n a war of march and maneuver, if you would 
avoid a battle with a superior army, it is necessary to intrench 
every night, and occupy a good defensive position. Those 
natural positioiis which are ordinarily met with are not 
sufficient to protect an army against superior numbers with- 
out recourse to art^ 

It was by this means that Lee in 1864 and 1865, although 
greatly outnumbered, was able to resist the vigorous 
offensive tactics of Grant, until the Confederate communi- 
cations were finally captured. The Turkish commander, 
Osman Pasha, in the Russo-Turkish war, and the Boer 
commanders in the South African war resorted to the 
same means to neutralize the effect of the numerical 
superiority of their antagonists. 

XV. ''A general of ordinary talent occupying a bad 
position and surprised by a general with a superior force, 
seeks safety in retreat; but a great captain supplies all defi- 
ciences by his courage, and marches boldly to meet the attack. 
By this means he disconcerts his adversary, and if this last 
shows any irresolution in his movements, a skillful leader 
profiting by his indecision, may even hope for victory, or at 



4 



105 

veast employ the day in maneuvering. At night he intrenches 
himself or falls back to a better position.^ ^ 

The most famous commanders of the civil war acted in 
accordance with this maxim. Grant, although surprised 
by a superior force at Shiloh, boldly met the attack and 
offered such a resistance that he was able to hold his ground 
until reinforced by Buell. At Chickamauga in the second 
day's battle, Thomas was almost surrounded by the Con- 
federate troops and entirely separated from his com- 
mander, Rosecrans, who had been swept off the field. 
He continued his stubborn resistance during the day, and 
at night was able to withdraw his troops to Chattanooga. 

Lee was thus surprised on two occasions. In 1863, while 
he was encamped on the heights of Fredericksburg, 
Hooker succeeded in crossing the Rappahannock and 
Rapidan rivers above Fredericksburg by stratagem, and 
reached Chancellor sville, where he threatened Lee^s flank 
and line of retreat. Instead of retreating, Lee decided on 
a counter-surprise and directed Jackson to march with 
his corps around the Union army to attack it in flank and 
rear. This bold maneuver was successful and caused 
Hooker's retreat. In 1864, while Lee was intrenched 
along the upper Rapidan, Grant succeeded in crossing the 
Rapidan below him and thus again threatened his line of 
retreat. He met this movement by marching rapidly to 
attack Grant in the hope that he might reach him before 
aU the Union troops were across the river; this movement 
resulted in the battle of the Wilderness. 

XVI ^'Nothing is so rash or contrary to principle as to 
make a flank march before an army, especially when this 
army occupies heights at the foot of which you are forced to 
defile.'' 

A flank march is one made in the vicinity of, and parallel 
or nearly so, to the enemy's line, so that the marching 



106 

troops are liable to be attacked on the flank of the column. 
In spite of this maxim, flank marches have often been 
made in the past and will be made in the future. In the 
civil war there were numerous instances of flank marches 
made by able commanders on both sides. In order to 
reach the enemy's communications both Grant and 
Sherman were obliged to make flank marches in 1864 and 
1865. These marches were, however, usually protected by 
intrenching a corps between the marching column and 
the enemy. Before the battle of Chancellor sville, Jackson 
made his famous flank march from one flank to the other 
of the Union army, without taking any special precau- 
tions to protect himself from the enemy's attack. Such a 
movement would have been extremely dangerous had the 
Union army been more alert. Such a march was a favorite 
maneuver of Frederick the Great, and led either to a 
brilliant victory as Leuthen, or to a disastrous defeat as 
Kollin. As it is a dangerous maneuver, a flank march 
should be made with the greatest possible rapidity. 

XVII. ''When an army is drwe7ifrom a first position, the 
retreating columns should always rally sufficiently in the 
rear, to prevent any interruption from the enemy. The 
greatest disaster that can happen is the attack of the columns 
in detail before they are united.'^ 

In August, 1862, when it became evident to the Union 
authorities that they could no longer keep McClellan's 
army on the Peninsula, they decided to order it back by 
water and unite it with Pope's army on the Rappahan- 
nock. Pope's army was posted along this river in two 
groups; the larger comprised the corps of McDowell, 
Banks, and Sigel, and was near the crossing of the Orange 
and Alexandria railroad; the smaller, the corps of Burn- 
side, was at Fredericksburg. Lee took advantage of this 
exposed position of Pope's army to defeat it before it 



107 

could be satisfactorily reinforced by McClellan. A 
successful turning movement, by which Lee preceded by 
Jackson's corps moved through Thoroughfare gap, com- 
pelled Pope to retreat in disorder and caused him to fight 
the unsuccessful battle of Manassas before he could properly 
unite his forces. His reinforcements from the Army of the 
Potomac reached him when in retreat, and could not be 
thoroughly incorporated in his army. This defeat caused 
him to retreat to Washington and allowed Lee to cross the 
Potomac river into Maryland. Had Pope been at once 
ordered to fall back to Bull Run, he would have occupied a 
safe position in which the two armies could have been 
united without interruption. 

XVni. "Of all obstacles which cover the frontiers of 
empires, a desert is certainly the greatest; a chain of moun- 
tains like the Alps holds the second rank; rivers, the third.'' 

A line of operations across a desert should therefore be 
avoided if possible. Napoleon says of his ten days' march 
across the desert in 1799, from Egypt to Syria en route for 
St. Jean d'Acre; 

' ' To cross a desert in summer is a very f atuiging and 
dehcate operation on account of the heat of the sand, the 
scarcity of water, and the lack of shade. These are 
capable of destroying an army or of weakening and dis- 
couraging it more than one would imagine. In winter the 
hardships are slightly decreased. The difficulty of trans- 
porting the rations of an army are great at all times and 
are rarely satisfactorily overcome, yet these difficulties 
are multiplied twenty fold, when in addition, it is necessary 
to transport forage, wood, and water." 

Although the desert route from Suakim on the Red Sea 
to Berber on the Nile is only 280 miles, and the Nile 
route from Cairo to the same place is about 1250 miles, 
Wolseley in 1884 selected the latter route in going to the 
relief of Gordon at Khartoum, notwithstanding the fact 



108 

that the navigation of the Nile above the second cataract 
is exceedingly difficult on account of falls, rapids, and 
shoals. A fleet of special boats was constructed for this 
expedition which were manned by Canadian voyageurs. 
The delays incident to the preparation and to the slow 
progress of the river transports led to the failure of the 
expedition. Only a small party reached Khartoum by 
steamer, to learn that the city was in the possession of the 
Mahdi and Gordon was killed. 

Notwithstanding this failure, when Kitchener organized 
a later expedition to capture Khartoum, he followed the 
same route. He avoided the worst parts of the river by 
constructing a strategic railway, several hundred miles 
long, from the second cataract to Berber. 

A sparsely settled region without railways offers many 
of the disadvantages of a desert for operations of a large 
force. The Russian territory between the frontier and 
Moscow was of this character when Napoleon invaded it. 

*'A mountainous country in which the enemy is pre- 
pared to make a serious resistance is a difficult country 
to traverse, and if possible should be turned. A line of 
operations should not pass through a mountainous country 
since an army cannot live there by requisitions ; defiles are 
met at every step which are easily defended; the march is 
slow and difficult; colunms of trained troops may be 
stopped, conquered, and defeated by untrained peasants; 
and the line of retreat is difficult and uncertain. Some 
ranges must be crossed to reach certain theaters of opera- 
tions, as the Alps to reach Italy, but to unnecessarily 
encounter the dangers, difficulties, and fatigues of war- 
fare in a mountainous region is contrary to the teachings 
of the art of war." — Napoleon. 

In the Russian campaign against Austria in 1914, the 
Russians succeeded in capturing the crest of the Carpathian 
mountains from Rumania as far west as the Dunajec 
river. The Russians did not, however, dare to send more 
than raiding troops across the passes. 



109 

In the Austrian campaign against Serbia in 1914 the 
Austrian army was defeated due to the difficulties of 
operating in a mountainous country. 

A wide unfordable river is a serious obstacle, but Napo- 
leon says: 

'^It is difficult to prevent an army equipped with a 
good pontoon train from crossing a river." 

By fortifying all the permanent crossings a river like 
the Rhine becomes an obstacle almost as difficult as a 
mountain range. 

The Narew and Vistula rivers of Poland with their for- 
tifications proved a serious obstacle to the operations of 
the German armies in 1914 and 1915. 

Jomini* considered that the correct conduct of mili- 

* Jomini, Henry, Baron (1779-1869), was born in the canton of 
Vaud, Switzerland. He entered the French Service in 1801 as an aid 
and secretary of Marshal Ney and remained with him until 1808, 
becoming his Chief of Staff. On account of the Marshal's jealousy 
of his influence in shaping military operations, he resigned his com- 
mission and prepared to enter the service of Russia. Napoleon, 
however, compelled him to remain in the French Service, and gave 
him the rank of brigadier general. He dechned to take an active 
part in the campaign of 1812, and was made Governor of Wilna; but 
in 1813 he again resumed his position on Ney's staff. As further 
promotion was denied him in the French Service, he entered the 
Russian Service as lieutenant-general, but dechned to take part in 
the invasion of France. He returned to Paris in 1817, as a mihtary 
writer, but re-entered the Russian Service in 1826 and took part in 
the campaign of 1828. He afterwards organized the Military 
Academy of St. Petersburg, and superintended the military studies 
of the heir apparent. Among his military works are: 

''Traite des grandes operations militaries," 1804. 

"Principes de la strategie," 3 Vols., 1818. 

' 'Histoire critique et mijitaire des campagnes de la Revolution de 
1792 k 1801," 15 Vols., 1819-1824. 

"Vie politique et militaire de Napoleon," 1827. 

"Precis de I'art de la guerre." 

Most of his works have been translated into English. 



no 

tary operations might be embraced in the following 
maxims : 

XIX. ''Throw by strategic movements, the mass of your 
army, successively, on the decisive points of a theater of war, 
and also upon the communications of the enemy as much as 
possible without compromising your own^ 

By a decisive point, Jomini meant a strategic point, 
whose capture will have a very important effect upon the 
political or military situation. In our civil war, such 
points were Richmond, the capital of the Confederacy; 
Petersburg, whose capture carried with it the fall of Rich- 
mond; Vicksburg, the last stronghold of the Confederacy 
on the Mississippi river; and Nashville, Chattanooga, and 
Atlanta, the great civil centers on the Louisville-Chat- 
tanooga-Savannah railway, which bisected the territory 
east of the Mississippi, and was the principal line of 
invasion between the Mississippi river and the Appala- 
chian mountain system. 

Operations against an enemy's line of supply or retreat 
are the most common operations of warfare, as there if^ 
no surer method of effecting the destruction of a hostile 
army than that of placing a superior force on its line of 
supply and retreat and compelling it to assume the offen- 
sive to open this line. The difficulty lies in reaching this 
line without at the same time exposing the line of operatioii 
of the attacking army. The safest method is undoubtedlj^ 
to assume a line of operations if possible which intersects 
the enemy's line of supply well in rear of his army and is as 
nearly at right angles to his line of supply as possible. 

In 1800, the Austrian army of Italy was investing 
Massena in the fortress of Genoa, forcing the passes of 
the Apennines and Maritime Alps west of that place 
against Suchet, and guarding the main line of the Alps 
between France and Italy. Its lines of supply and retreat 



Ill 

were the roads following the Po valley to the Italian 
quadrilateral on the Mincio and Adige rivers. To relieve 
the French forces in Italy, Napoleon formed the Reserve 
Army in Switzerland about Lake Geneva and made his 
plan to cross the Alps rapidly, and seize the line of the 
Mincio river in the rear of the Austrians. He would thus 
compel the Austrians to fight for their communications. 
He succeeded in carrying out his plan and then from the 
line of the Mincio advanced to meet the Austrian army 
by moving on its own lines of retreat. The two armies 
met on the plains of Marengo near Alessandria, where the 
Austrian army was defeated, and, as a consequence, was 
forced to evacuate Italy as far eastward as the Mincio 
river. 

In 1805 in a similar manner Napoleon captured an 
Austrian army under Mack which had taken possession 
of Ulm in Bavaria. He concentrated a much superior 
force on the Rhine and Main hne of Strassburg, Mann- 
heim, Wurzburg, and then by rapid marches moved it to 
Augsberg, Donauwerth, and Ingolstadt in Bavaria. He 
thus placed himself on the Austrian lines of supply and 
retreat which followed the valley of the Danube and com- 
pelled Mack to surrender the greater part of his army. 

It is not often, however, that such a choice of lines of 
operation is available for a commander. Ordinarily he 
is obliged to work around the flank of the opposing army by 
making what are practically flank marches. It was thus 
that Grant worked his way around Lee^s right flank in 
the campaign of 1864-1865, that the German army suc- 
ceeded in investing Bazaine's army in Metz, and the 
Russians, Osman Pasha in Plevna. 

If not always successful in destroying the defender's 
army, operations threatening his lines of supply and 
retreat have the effect of compelling him to retreat and 



112 

vacate the lines he has been occupying. It was in this 
manner that Sherman in 1864 forced Johnston from the 
vicinity of Dalton, Georgia, to Atlanta; that Bragg forced 
Buell from the vicinity of Chattanooga to the Ohio 
river; and that Bragg was forced from the line of the 
Duck river in Tennessee to the field of Chickamauga, 
Georgia. 

XX. ^^ Maneuver to engage fractions of the hostile army 
with the hulk of your own forces." 

The second maxim is apphcable only when the enemy 
divides his force so as to operate on double or multiple 
lines; it also requires an offensive army which is exceed- 
ingly mobile as compared with that of the adversary. 
The army of Napoleon in his earlier campaigns and that 
of Frederick the Great fulfilled these conditions. When 
the strength of armies is expressed in hundreds of thou- 
sands, such mobility is no longer possible. The difficulty 
of supplying, camping and marching large masses is too 
great to admit of their being kept in a concentrated for- 
mation for any length of time. The plan of the Austrians 
in 1866 was to prevent the union of the Prussian First 
and Third armies moving from Saxony, with the Second 
moving from Silesia, and to defeat them in detail; they 
were unable to compass it on account of the difficulty of 
operating quickly with an army of 260,000 men. 

The plan of General Kuropatkin in the Russo-Japanese 
war was to operate from his central position of Liaoyang 
and prevent the union of the army of Kuroki with the 
combined armies of Oku and Nodzu; he was unable to 
accomphsh it because of the lack, of mobility in the 
Russian army 

As previously stated, the Tannenherg campaign by 
Hindenberg in East Prussia in 1914 was a successful cam- 
paign carried out on these lines. 



113 

The following extracts are from the writings of Field 
Marshal von Moltke between 1866 and 1870. 

XXI. "Simple maneuvers consistently carried out are 
the most certain to attain their end^ 

"To grasp with ready tact the ever-changing situation, 
and to execute the simplest and most natural course of 
action with firmness and circumspection, is what counts 
in war. In this manner war becomes an art, one which is 
served by many sciences. These sciences will by no means 
make a mihtary leader, but his deficiency in them must be 
supplied by the proficiency of other men. 

*'A too great concentration of troops is a serious error. 
The concentrated army is difficult to supply, and cannot 
be placed under cover; it can march and maneuver only 
with difficulty, cannot exist for prolonged periods of time, 
and is suitable only for battle. It is therefore a mistake 
to concentrate the army for any but a very definite pur- 
pose, and that purpose, to control the combined strength 
of the army for decisive battle. For this battle one can 
never he too strong, and therefore the very last battalion must 
he brought on the battle-field. 

"In moving forward, however, to attack the enemy, an 
army must not move on a single road or on a few roads in a 
concentrated formation. To preserve the separation of 
the columns as long as possible, and to concentrate at the 
right moment for decisive battle, is the great problem in 
conducting war with large armies. 

*'No calculation of space and time can guarantee 
results, where accidents, mistakes, and illusions form 
factors of the problem. Uncertainty and danger of mis- 
carriage of combinations attend every step to the objec- 
tive, and only when Fate is not wholly unfavorable can 
the goal be reached; in war everything is uncertain, noth- 
ing certain, and only with difficulty can great results be 
attained in any other way than by following the principles 
above described. 

"The character of modern warfare is marked by a striv- 
ing for a more rapid decision by force. The strength of 
armies, the difficulty of supply, the expense of a state of 



114 

war, the interference with trade, manufacture and agri- 
culture, the complete organization of armies and their 
ready mobilization, all press for a rapid ending of the war. 
Minor combats have therefore little effect except to pave 
the way and make possible the great decisive battles. 
The most powerful force in war is victory in decisive 
battle. Victory alone breaks the will of the enemy and 
compels him to submit himself to our will. Neither the 
occupation of a stretch of territory nor the capture of a 
fortified place, but only the destruction of his armed force 
is as a ride decisive. This therefore is the most important 
objective in war." 

The following extracts were written by him after the 
Franco-German war: 

''National poUcy makes use of war to attain its ends; its 
influence is especially great at the beginning and at the 
end of the war, but at any time during the progress of a 
war it may step in to increase or decrease the demands 
made upon the opposing belligerent state. Because of 
this uncertainty, strategy must always aim at the highest 
results which the means provided make possible. Strategy 
should work hand in hand with national policy for the aims 
of the latter, but otherwise should be entirely independent. 

''The first military task of strategy is the preparation of 
war power and the first concentration of the army. In 
these operations many varied political and geographic 
questions must be considered. An error in the primary 
concentration of the army can hardly be corrected during 
the progress of a campaign. But these matters, the prep- 
aration of the troops for war and the organization of 
the transport systems, can be considered long before the 
outbreak of war and should be conamensurate with the 
object of the military preparation." 

In the campaign of 1914, as a result of the error in their 
primary concentration, the French armies were obHged to 
fall back from the Meuse to the Marne. 

"The next task of strategy, the practical employment of 
the means provided in military operations, is a different 



115 

problem. Here our will soon meets with the independent 
will of the enemy. We can limit the free exercise of his 
will, if we are ready for and are resolved to take the offen- 
sive, but we can conquer his will only through the use of 
tactics, by means of battle. 

''The material and moral consequences of each great 
battle are so far reaching, that ordinarily an entirely 
modified situation results from it — a new basis for new 
measures. No plan of operations reaches with any 
certainty beyond the first engagement with the principal 
force of the enemy. Only a layman would expect to see 
in the execution of a campaign the consistent carrying 
out of a primary idea, entertained in advance, carefully 
considered in all its details, and steadily pursued to the 
end. Of course, the commander keeps his main objec- 
tive constantly in view, and steadily pursues it through all 
the varying circumstances of the campaign, but the path 
by which he hopes to attain the objective cannot be clearly 
seen far in advance. He is, in the course of a campaign, 
compelled to make many decisions because of situations 
which could not be foreseen. It is necessary in many 
instances to penetrate the fog of uncertainty surround- 
ing the commander-in-chief, to rightly estimate the 
known facts, guess at the unknown, make a prompt 
resolution, and carry it out with force and without hesi- 
tation. 

" In calculating with a known and an unknown quantity, 
our own and the enemy's will, other factors interfere which 
cannot be foreseen; weather, sickness, railway accidents, 
misunderstandings, illusions, in short all the influences 
which may be called chance, fate or Providence, but 
which either shape or control man's destiny. 

''And yet notwithstanding all this, the conduct of the 
war has not become mere chance. The theory of proba- 
bilities will show that all these casualties as often injure or 
profit the one side as the other, and that the commander 
who in every instance makes, if not the best, at least a 
sensible decision, has always a prospect of reaching his 
objective. It is evident that theoretical knowledge will 
not suffice, but the attributes of mind as well as the char- 
acter must be given free scope, restrained of course by 



116 

military education and guided by experience either derived 
from history or from hfe itself." 

General Remarks. — The principles of strategy are 
simple and are easily comprehended by any student of the 
art of war; the execution of these principles under the con- 
ditions and with the means employed in war are exceed- 
ingly difficult and require an educated and experienced 
commander of a strong character. 

To say that a bridge should be strong enough to safely 
carry the greatest load to which it is liable to be subjected, 
is the statement of an axiom. To design, construct, and 
erect such a bridge under all the var3dng conditions of 
site is no easy task even if the engineer has been well 
instructed in the principles of physics, and in the art of 
designing, has had extended mechanical experience in 
erection, and has the use of well-equipped workshops and a 
skilled force of workmen. It he is compelled to utilize 
inferior materials, tools, or workmen, the structure when 
completed may fail to fulfill the simple condition above 
stated. 

The theory and practice of the art of war are subject to 
similar conditions. To say that the commander should 
concentrate all of his available forces on the day of decisive 
battle, is also a statement of a self-evident fact, yet it has 
been emphasized as a principle of strategy by Napoleon, 
Moltke, and many other military leaders and writers. 
The difficulty, however, does not lie in understanding this 
principle, but in its execution. In Moltke's writings 
given above, he points out some of the difficulties met with 
in concentrating, at the proper moment, a large army for 
decisive battle. The most highly educated and experi- 
enced commander would find it a difficult operation with 
a large command even were the forces well organized, 
trained and equipped. In the actual operations of war, 



117 

the practical execution of this principle may be rendered 
still more difficult by the ignorance, inexperience, or want 
of moral force in some of his principal subordinates, by 
the lack of proper organization and training of his troops, 
by unfavorable conditions in the topography and in the 
weather. It is easy to conceive a combination of cir- 
cumstances which would baffle the most experienced com- 
mander. ■ Napoleon lost the battle of Waterloo because 
he failed to concentrate his whole force on the battle-field 
on the day of battle. For nearly a century military writers 
have been discussing this event and endeavoring to fix the 
responsibility for it. No definite satisfactory conclusion 
has ever been reached by anyone, and it can only be said 
that on this occasion the force of circumstances was too 
difficult to be overcome by the greatest commander in 
history. His own health and mental condition, the errors 
of his generals, the rawness of his troops and their lack of 
thorough training, the topography of the country and of 
the battle-field, and even the weather contributed to 
his defeat. 

What has been said of this one principle applies equally 
well to the others. They are only statements of nearly 
self-evident truths; as has been shown by historical exam- 
ples, they cannot be violated with indifference, and they 
can only be carried out with difficulty. Clausewitz* 
says on this point: 

* Clausewitz, General Carl von (1780-1831). Entered the Prus- 
sian Army in 1792 and served in the campaigns of 1793-4 on the 
Rhine. From 1801-1803 in the Mihtary School at Berlin. In the 
campaign of 1806, aid-de-camp of Prince Augustus of Prussia, 
wounded and taken to France as a military prisoner. On his return, 
on the staff of General Scharnhorst and military instructor of the 
heir apparent. In 1812, in the Russian Service aid-de-camp in 
Prince Wittgenstein's Army. In 1813, Russian officer at General 
Blucher's headquarters. In 1814, Chief of Staff of a Russo-German 



118 

''In strategy everything is very simple, but not on that 
account very easy. Once it is determined from the rela- 
tions of the state, what should or may be done by war, then 
the way to it is easy to find. To follow that way, however, 
in a straightforward manner, to carry out the plan without 
being obliged to deviate from it a thousand times by a 
thousand varying influences requires besides great strength 
of character, great steadiness of mind; out of a thousand 
who are remarkable, some for penetration, some for 
intellect, some for boldness and strength of character, 
perhaps not one will combine in himself all those qualities 
which are required to raise a man above mediocrity in 
the career of the general in command. 

''It may seem strange, but those who know will admit it 
is a fact beyond dispute that much more strength of will is 
required to make an important decision in strategy than 
in tactics. In the latter we are hurried on with the move- 
ment; a commander feels himself borne along by a strong 
current against which he dares not contend without the 
utmost destructive consequences, he suppresses the rising 
fears and boldly ventures further. In strategy, where all 
goes at a slower rate, there is more time allowed for our 
own apprehensions and for those of others, for objections, 
remonstrances and misgivings. Since we do not actually 
see things in strategy as we do at least half of them in 
tactics with the living eye, but everything must be con- 
jectured and assumed, it is difficult to form strong con- 
victions as a basis for strategic action. The consequence 
is that most generals when they should act remain stuck 
fast in bewildering doubts." 

For the solution of the manner in which strategic opera- 
tions should be executed, we must look largely to tactics, 

Army Corps. In 1815, Chief of Staff of Thielman's Corps at Water- 
loo. In 1818, Major General and Director of the Military School 
at Berlin. In 1830, Inspector of Artillery at Breslau and Chief of 
Staff of Army of Observation on Polish Frontier. His treatise on 
"War" in three volumes is considered in Germany the standard 
work on the subject, and is often quoted in the writings of Field- 
Marshal Von Moltke. 



119 

particularly to the tactics of an army on the march and in 
bivouac or camp. Here are developed the details which 
are essential to make a piece on the strategic chess-board 
an effective element in the game. Strategy and tactics 
are largely dependent on each other. The most that 
strategy alone can effect is to compel the enemy to evacu- 
ate a strong position or a portion of the theater of opera- 
tions. Either operation may be rendered valueless if the 
first succeeding battle is won by the enemy. Tactics 
alone can only win battles; if no strategic advantage 
follows, the fruits of victory may extend no further than 
the battle-field while the actual losses may exceed those 
of the enemy. It is only when the battles are won in 
carrying out a correct strategic plan that results are 
obtained by victory, important enough to offset the losses 
incurred. 

In the opening operations of the Franco-German war 
the First and Second German armies operated against 
the French Army of Metz; four successive battles were 
fought between the two belligerents, all of which were 
German victories. The first was Spicheren, in which the 
German losses were 4870 men, and the French 4080; 
its strategic effect was to open the road for the German 
advance. The second was Borny or Columbey-Nouilly; the 
German losses were 4910, the French 4190. It effected 
the strategic object of delaying the retreat of the French 
army. The third was Mars-la-Tour; the German losses 
were 15,800, and the French 16,930. It effected the stra- 
tegic object of cutting off the retreat of the French army 
under Marshal Bazaine towards Chalons, to effect a 
junction with that of Marshal MacMahon. The fourth 
was Gravelotte-St. Privat, in which the German losses were 
20,130, the French 12,270. It forced the French army to 
retreat into Metz, where it was invested and finally cap- 



120 

tured. In these four battles the German losses exceeded 
those of the French by about 8000 men; the success of 
-the strategic plan was, however, worth a much greater loss, 
as it led eventually to the destruction of the entire French 
army of nearly 175,000 men. Tactics may therefore be 
regarded as the powerful ally of strategy which, in the 
offensive, crushes the resistance that an enemy may oppose 
to the execution of a strategic plan, and which in the 
defensive, interposes its power, to defeat his strategic 
operations. 

Strategic operations are characterized by the great 
diversity of the plans and movements by which the same 
object has been accomplished in different campaigns. 
Operations for the purpose of turning the flank of an enemy 
and threatening his line of retreat have been repeated 
numberless times and yet no two commanders have had 
exactly the same problem to solve in two different cam- 
paigns. The differences in the composition of the oppos- 
ing armies, in the topographical features and in the lines 
of communication of the theater of operations, compel each 
commander to solve this problem in a special way in every 
new campaign. Strategy can therefore teach onl}^ general 
principles; the application of these principles to each 
specific case is the field of military talent and genius. 



CHAPTER V 
THE OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE STRATEGY 

The Offensive. — The offensive in strategy is usually 
resorted to by a commander because at the moment he has 
confidence in the superiority of his army in numbers, 
organization, or morale. The offensive in strategy does 
not necessarily imply either the offensive in war or in 
tactics, although as a rule the three go together. The 
Revolutionary war was a defensive war on the part of the 
colonies, which were simply resisting the power of the 
British Government to maintain its armies and enforce 
its will in the colonial territories. The Yorktown cam- 
paign, which terminated that war, however, was an offen- 
sive campaign on the part of Washington, who reUed on 
the power of the aUied Colonial and French armies to 
destroy the army of Cornwallis wherever it could be 
found. The Virginia campaign of 1864-1865 was an 
offensive one on the part of Grant, yet in its first battle, 
the Wilderness, he was compelled to defend himself from 
the attacks made by Lee. 

Advantages and Disadvantages of the Offensive in 
Strategy. — The advantages resulting from the offensive 
are: the morale of the army is improved, mobility of 
movement is secured, surprise is made possible, and the 
operations may be planned in advance. The confidence 
which the commander has in himself and his army, implied 
by his assuming the offensive, is communicated to his 
troops and improves the morale of the army. The soldier 
in ranks knows little more about the military movements 

121 



122 

of the army than the direction of march. If this is in the 
direction of the enemy or forward, he associates the move- 
ment with the defeat of the enemy, and is correspondingly 
elated ; if the movement is to the rear, he believes his own 
army has met with defeat and is correspondingly depressed. 
Only after a commander has proved himself a successful 
general in the field, will soldiers follow him with the same 
implicit confidence in a retrograde as in a forward move- 
ment. This improvement in the morale of the army 
reacts on its commander and gives him more confidence 
in his own judgment and plans. The army and its com- 
mander are further strengthened by the approval of public 
opinion and the press of the country, who naturally urge 
on and approve every offensive operation. 

The commander acting on the offensive makes the plan 
of campaign; this gives him the opportunity of calmly 
weighing the advantages of the various theaters, lines of 
operation and other strategic elements which may be 
utilized to reach his objective, and enables him to select 
the plan which offers the greatest advantages to himself or 
the least to his adversary. It is undoubtedly a great 
advantage to have a definite plan to work on, even if this 
plan is frequently modified by changes in the military 
situation. In 1864 Grant, having once decided to operate 
around Lee^s right flank as long as the latter remained in 
front of Richmond, was never in doubt as to what he 
should do next. From the Rapidan to the Wilderness, 
from the Wilderness to Spottsylvania, from Spottsylvania 
to North Anna, from North Anna to Cold Harbor, from 
Cold Harbor to Petersburg, and from Petersburg to Appo- 
mattox were only so many stages in the movement origi- 
nally planned. If the means are sufficient to carry on a 
rapid and progressive offensive campaign, the power of 
initiative may remain with the attacking army through- 



123 

out the campaign and give it a decided advantage. This 
was notably the case in the operations of the German 
army against the French in 1870, in the operations of the 
Japanese anny in Manchuria in 1904-1905, and in many 
of Napoleon's campaigns. 

An army on the offensive has greater mobility than 
an army on the defensive, since the latter is at the begin- 
ning of a campaign tied down to the defense of some 
special position or hne, while the army on the offensive 
can operate in any direction. This advantage enables 
the invader to surprise the defender by rapid and unex- 
pected movements which are difficult to meet. Such 
movements usually open every campaign as may be seen 
from an examination of any of the campaigns of our own or 
foreign wars. The advantages gained by initial surprise 
may be decisive as to the force attacked, as in Grant's 
Donelson campaign, in Napoleon's campaigns of 1800, 
1805 and 1806, and in Roberts' campaign against the 
Boer Army of General Cronje. 

The principal disadvantage of the offensive in campaign 
lies in the rapid reduction of the number of troops at the 
army front due to the wearing out of the men and to the 
detachments left behind to guard the communications; 
yet it is the troops at the front on whom the commander 
must rely for the tactical success that decides the cam- 
paign. This reduction is largely influenced by the char- 
acter of the troops, the condition of the roads and the 
weather, the character and length of the fines of com- 
munication, and the hostility of the country through 
which the army moves. The reduction of Napoleon's 
army in its march to Moscow has been given ; the Russians 
in their advance on Constantinople in 1877-78 fared no 
better. They crossed the Danube river with about 450,- 
000 men and reached Constantinople with only about 



124 

100,000; of these less than 50,000 were effective troops. 
These campaigns were conducted without the aid of rail- 
ways over difficult theaters of operations. 

The reduction is less if railways form the lines of com- 
munication. When Sherman reached Atlanta, the depart- 
ments of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Ohio, which 
formed his territorial division, contained 197,000 effective 
men present for duty; his effective force at Atlanta, how- 
ever, he states numbered 82,000 men. He considered 
this force too weak to extend the hnes of communications 
any further, and he therefore abandoned his communica- 
tions and lived on the country in his march from Atlanta 
to Savannah, where he opened a new base and a new line 
of operations for his Carolina campaign. 

The battle of the Marne, 1914, was lost by the Germans 
through the weakening of the German armies by the 
detachments left behind to occupy Belgium and northern 
France and to invest the fortified places. 

Another disadvantage of the offensive is that each 
advance of the army brings it into a country whose topo- 
graphical and military conditions may be more or less 
unknown. The commander is constantly called upon to 
plan strategic and tactical operations upon topographical 
and military data much of which is derived from incorrect 
maps, from fragmentary reports of scouts, and from 
the inhabitants of the country, who may purposely or 
through ignorance give false information. Under these 
circumstances, the best planned operations are liable to 
miscarry. 

This was one of the difficulties encountered by the 
Northern armies in the civil war, and the British armies 
in South Africa. Neither country had been accurately 
mapped, and it was difficult not only to plan marches, 
but also to determine where the enemy would probably 



A 



125 

make his defense. When McClellan planned his Penin- 
sula campaign, he made use of a map which showed no 
natural line of defense between Fortress Monroe and 
Richmond. He knew there were batteries commanding 
the river at Yorktown, but he assumed that this place 
could be easily invested on the land side. He was there- 
fore much surprised on April 5, 1862, when he learned 
from his corps commanders that the advance of the army 
was stopped by an unfordable stream commanded by 
Confederate batteries. It was the Warwick river, whose 
direction had been incorrectly shown on the map. In 
front of this river McClellan's army was delayed for nearly 
a month. 

Passage of Rivers. — A wide, unfordable river, which 
intersects the line of operations of an army, is always a 
matter of serious consideration to the commander, espec- 
cially if the hostile army is in the vicinity. If he crosses 
the river on permanent bridges, these become narrow 
defiles on his hnes of communication not easily traversed 
if compelled to retreat; if he crosses on mihtary bridges 
he exposes himself to the additional danger of having the 
bridges swept away or rendered useless by an unexpected 
flood. Even if the defender does not dispute the passage, 
it is unsafe for the invader to cross over and bivouac on 
the other side, so long as the defender occupies a strong 
position within striking distance of the point of crossing. 
The invader is safe only when he has moved far enough 
away from the river to have absolute freedom of move- 
ment, or occupies a position on the defender's flank and is 
prepared for a flank attack. The advantages which a 
river offers as a line of defense, and the number of such 
rivers in nearly every theater of operations, makes the 
passage of rivers one of the most common of offensive 
strategic maneuvers. 



126 

Unless the defender's army is demoralized by defeat or 
the offensive army is greatly superior in numerical 
strength, a commander will not ordinarily force a passage 
in the immediate front of the enemy. A field of battle 
between an intrenched enemy and an unfordable river 
offers no advantages and many serious defects. 

The Union army at Fredericksburg and the British forces 
on the Tugela and Modder suffered defeat in operating 
between a river and an intrenched army numerically 
weaker. If the defending force receives strong reinforce- 
ments during the battle so that its commander feels 
strong enough to assume the offensive, the assailant's 
army is in danger of practical annihilation; such was the 
fate of the Russian army at Friedland in 1807. The 
passage of a river in the immediate presence of the enemy 
in force is advisable only when he is demoraUzed by defeat, 
as the crossing of the Adda at Lodi by Napoleon in 1796, or 
when the defender attempts to cover too many points of 
crossing and thus distributes his army over a great length 
of river. The assailant may then find it advisable or 
even necessary to force a crossing at one of the points, 
by the employment of great numerical superiority. The 
advantage which the assailant gains by having a con- 
centrated force on the enemy's side to operate against his 
scattered detachments, would warrant the forcing of the 
crossing even at a considerable loss. 

The more common method is to effect the passage by 
surprise or by stratagem. A crossing by surprise is 
effected without a previous demonstration; a passage by 
stratagem is effected by threatening a passage at some 
other point than that selected for the real one. The 
former requires no division of the offensive army, the latter 
requires such division. The success of both movements 
depends upon the secrecy and celerity of the movement. 



127 

The crossing of the Rapidan by the Army of the Poto- 
mac under General Meade in 1864 was effected by sur- 
prise at Germanna and Ely fords on the Rapidan river, a 
short distance below the encampments of the Confederate 
army, which were around Orange Court House south of 
the Rapidan river. 

''On the 2d of May the order for the movement of the 
Army of the Potomac was issued. 

''The movement began promptly at midnight of the 
3d, Major-General Sheridan, with two of his cavalry 
divisions, leading the two infantry columns, one of his 
divisions, Torbert's, being left to cover the rear of the 
army. A canvas and a wooden pontoon bridge were 
laid at Germanna ford, the same at Ely ford, and a wooden 
pontoon bridge at Culpeper Mine ford, five bridges in all, 
the river being about two hundred feet wide. 

"The II corps, preceded by Gregg's cavalry division, 
crossed at Ely ford, and moved to Chancellorsville, 
followed by the reserve artillery. The V corps, preceded 
by Wilson's cavalry division, and followed by the VI corps 
crossed at Germanna ford, and moved to Wilderness Tavern 
at the intersection of the Germanna plank road, by the 
Orange Court House and Fredericksburg pike. The head 
of the VI corps halted three miles from Germanna ford, 
the rear at the ford. 

"The trains, except those known as the fighting trains 
which accompanied the troops, crossed at Culpeper Mine 
ford and Ely ford. They were covered by the cavalry, 
and had an infantry guard of 1200 men from each of the 
infantry corps. 

"Gregg's cavalry moved to the vicinity of Piney Branch 
Church, throwing out reconnoissances (to the east and 
south) on the Pamunkey road and towards Spottsylvania 
Court House, Fredericksburg and Hamilton's Crossing. 
Wilson's cavalry moved to Parker's store, on the Freder- 
icksburg and Orange Court House plank road, throwing 
out reconnoissances to the right (or west) on the Orange 
pike and plank roads, and on the Catharpin and Pamun- 
key roads. 



128 

''The head of the II corps arrived at Chancellorsville 
at 10 A. M. on the 4th, and the whole corps, with the 
trains moving with the troops, was at the halting place 
designated about one o'clock. The whole of the V corps 
was up to its position by two o'clock. Each of these 
corps had marched more than twenty miles, and both 
had assisted in laying the wooden pontoon bridges at 
their crossings of the Rapidan, and had improved the 
roads leading up the steep river banks. The VI corps 
had marched more than sixteen miles, but following the V 
corps was later in getting to its halting ground for the 
night. 

''The canvas bridges were taken up on the 4th, and 
joined the corps to which they belonged. The wooden 
bridges were left for the trains of the IX corps." 

Respecting this operation Grant says: 

"This I regarded as a great success, as it removed from 
my mind the most serious apprehensions I had entertained, 
that of crossing the river in the face of an active, large, 
well-appointed, and ably commanded army." — Hum- 
phreys.* 

The passage of the river was not disputed, as the fords 
were watched only by small cavalry pickets. 

The crossing of the Rapidan river at the same points 
was effected by stratagem by the Army of the Potomac 
under Hooker in 1863. 

"When the campaign of Chancellorsville commenced, 
the Army of the Potomac was posted on the left bank of 
the Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburg, among the 
Stafford Hills. At the period referred to, Hooker had 
under him a force of about 124,500 men of all arms, 11,500 
of which were cavalry. On the opposite side of the river, 
the Army af Northern Virginia, under Lee, numbered, 
according to their official reports, about 62,000 men, 3000 

* The Virginia campaign of '64 and '65.— Andrew A. Humphreys, 
Chief of Staff of the Army of the Potomac, Commander of lid 
Army Corps, Chief of Engineers U. S. Army, Brevet Major-General 
U. S. Army. 



129 

of whom were cavalry; but the difference was amply 
compensated by the wide river in front of the enemy, and 
the fact that every available point and f oi"d was well forti- 
fied and guarded. 

'' Hooker's plan of campaign was simple, efficacious, 
and should have been successful. The rebels occupied a 
long line and could not be strong everywhere. He resolved 
to make a pretense of crossing with three corps, under 
Sedgwick, below Fredericksburg, while the remaining 
four corps under Slocum made a detour and crossed the 
Rappahannock, twenty-seven miles above, at Kelly 
ford. The latter were then to march down the river 
against the left flank of the rebel army and re-open Banks 
ford a few miles above Fredericksburg; thus re-uniting the 
two wings of the army and giving a secure line of retreat 
in case of disaster. 

''When this was accomplished it was proposed to give 
battle in the open country near the ford, the position 
there being a commanding one and taking the whole line 
of rebel works on the heights of Fredericksburg in reverse. 
Owing to his great preponderance of force Hooker had 
little reason to doubt that the result would be favorable 
to our arms." — Douhleday.* 

''On the 27th of April the XI and XII corps were set 
in motion for Kelly ford, twenty-five miles up the Rappa- 
hannock, where they concentrated on the evening of the 
28th; the V, by reason of its shorter marching distance, 
moving on the 28th. The object of the expedition was 
unknown to the corps commanders until communicated 
to them, after their arrival at the ford, by the commanding 
general in person. The XI corps crossed the Rappa- 
hannock, followed in the morning by the XII and V corps, 
the two former striking for the Germanna ford crossing 
of the Rapidan, the latter for Ely ford lower down the 
same stream. Both columns, successfully effecting cross- 
ings with httle opposition from the enemy's pickets, 
arriving that evening, April 30, at the point of concen- 
tration, Chancellors ville. 

* Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. — Abner Doubleday, Brevet 
Major General IT. S. i\j'my. 



130 

"In order to confound Lee, orders were issued to 
assemble the VI, III, and I corps under Sedgwick, some 
three miles below Fredericksburg on the left, before day- 
Ught on the morning of the 29th, and throw two bridges 
across and hold them. This was done under a severe 
fire of sharpshooters. 

*Two divisions of the II corps marched on the 28th for 
Banks ford on the Rappahannock, four miles to the right; 
the other division. Gibbon's, occupying Falmouth, near 
the river bank, was directed to remain in its tents, as they 
were in full view of the enemy, who would readily observe 
their withdrawal. 

''On the 29th the two divisions of the II corps reached 
United States ford on the Rappahannock, ten miles from 
Fredericksburg and opposite Chancellorsville ; it was 
held by the enemy in force, but the advance of the right 
wing down the river uncovered it, whereupon a bridge of 
pontoons was thrown across and the corps reached Chan- 
cellorsville, where the commanding general arrived the 
same evening, establishing his headquarters at Chan- 
cellor House, which with the adjacent grounds is Chan- 
cellorsville. The III corps joined on the morning of May 
1. During the 29th and 30th the enemy lay at Fredericks- 
burg observing Sedgwick's demonstrations on the left, 
entirely unconscious of Hooker's successful crossing of the 
right wing until midday of the later date." — Couch* 

The point of concentration was in a thick woods and too 
near the river. Had the corps been pushed at once into 
the open country beyond the woods, the movement would 
have been entirely successful. As it was, the army was 
attacked in its cramped position on the evening of May 
2 and again on May 3, and suffered a tactical defeat which 
led to its withdrawal to the north bank of the Rappahan- 
nock. 

If the main river is parallel to the line of operations of 
the invader, and the defender takes up a position in rear 

* Battles and Leaders of Civil War, Vol. III. The Chancellors- 
ville Campaign. — Darius N. Couch, Major-General U. S. Volunteers. 



131 

of one of its perpendicular tributaries, he will probably 
rely on the main river to protect his flank. In this sit- 
uation the invader has the choice of two operations : he 
may either threaten a front attack and thus cover a move- 
ment to cross the main river in the defender's rear, or he 
may threaten to cross the main river in the defender's 
rear and after the latter has weakened his front, force a 
crossing there. The former method was employed by 
Napoleon against the Austrians who were defending the 
Ticino river in 1796; the latter was employed by the 
Austrians under Radetsky in 1849 against the Sardinians, 
who were also guarding the Ticino. He threatened to 
cross the Po above the junction, and when they had 
weakened their front forced a crossing at Pavia. 

Passage of Mountain Ranges. — The passage of a moun- 
tain range is a more difficult operation than the passage of 
a river, since with a pontoon train an army can cross a river 
at any point, while the mountain range can be crossed 
only at the passes. The actual operation of laying a 
pontoon bridge and crossing a river with a large force is a 
matter of hours, while an army may be days in traversing 
the passes of a mountain range. An army which de-. 
bouches from a mountain range also has difficult defiles in 
its rear, and if these are in a hostile country, its retreat 
after defeat is certain to be attained by heavy loss. It is 
fortunate for the army that must cross a range of moun- 
tains, that the defense of the range is attended by difficul- 
ties which makes the success of such an offensive operation 
more probable than the topographical features would 
seem to indicate. The method of effecting a passage 
through a range of mountains is similar to that of crossing 
a river. If the enemy is retreating and is dispirited, the 
assailant may follow on the heels of the retreating force as 
Napoleon followed the Archduke Charles through the 



132 

eastern Alps in 1797, from Italy to the vicinity of Vienna. 
Weak detachments may be brushed aside as Suwaroff 
brushed aside those of the French who were guarding the 
Saint Gothard pass in 1799. 

The passage may be effected by surprise. Napoleon 
thus crossed the Alps in 1800 and the Crown Prince of 
Prussia the Giant mountains between Silesia and Bohemia 
in 1866, before the Austrian forces were prepared to dis- 
pute the operation. 

The passage may be effected by stratagem. When the 
Russian armies crossed the Danube near Sistova in the war 
of 1877-78, a strong advance guard of about 12,000 men 
under Gourko was pushed at once to the front to seize the 
passes in the Balkans. The principal of these passes was 
Shipka pass held by 4000 to 5000 men. Having learned 
that there were other passes to the east not held in force, 
Gourko decided to leave one regiment at the northern 
end to watch the pass until relieved by the other troops, 
and with the remainder to cross the mountains by one of 
the minor passes and attack Shipka pass in rear, while the 
other forces attacked it in front. Through unexpected 
delays on the march, Gourko did not arrive in position on 
the day set for the attack, consequently the Turks were 
attacked on successive days from the north and south. 
Although they repulsed both attacks, they were so demor- 
alized by seeing their retreat cut off that the Turkish 
force evacuated the position and scattered through the 
mountains. After the fall of Plevna, in the dead of winter, 
Gourko also opened the Orkhanie pass, by demonstrating 
against the front and at the same time turning the flajik 
of each defensive position intrenched by the Turks. 

Diversions. — Diversions or detachments made from 
an army to effect minor results are of little use in offensive 
operations. The necessary detachments for the defense 



133 

of the communications, and for the masking or reduction 
of fortified places left in rear or on the flanks of the advanc- 
ing army, reduce its strength to such an extent that fur- 
ther subdivision is inadvisable. The principal army of 
the defense being the main objective of the attacking 
army the whole effort should be directed to its destruction. 
If the defender resorts to diversions it may be occasionally 
necessary to meet them, but as a rule it is better then to 
press the main attack while he is weakened by his detach- 
ments. 

Maritime Expeditions. — The special difficulties which 
must be overcome in maritime expeditions are the trans- 
port of the army to its theater of operations, the capture 
and intrenchment of a secondary base, the operation from 
a narrow base, and the protection of the maritime line of 
communications. These expeditions require the com- 
bined action of the land and sea forces of a nation. This 
introduces another difficulty, as the two services have no 
common head well versed in the art of war of both services, 
and do not always work in harmony. To convey the army 
safely to its new theater of operations and to protect the 
ocean lines of communications is the function of the navy, 
which also cooperates in the capture of the secondary 
base. These matters may be dismissed here with the 
observation that a maritime expedition over ocean lines 
of any considerable length is a hazardous operation unless 
the state assuming the offensive is vastly superior in sea- 
power. The British navy, the best in the world at that 
time, was unable to secure the retreat and prevent the 
surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown; and Napoleon, who 
was the most able mihtary commander in history, never 
felt quite strong enough to cross the English channel and 
invade the country which gave him most trouble and 
finally accomplished his ruin. 



134 

If the seapower of the enemy can be practically neglected 
as in our Mexican and civil wars, and in the Spanish- 
American war after the naval fight at Manila and the 
blockade of the Spanish squadron at Santiago, the stra- 
tegic problem is limited to the capture and intrenchment 
of the secondary base and the operations from it. 

The selection of the base is a matter of considerable 
importance, as it influences all military operations. It 
should be capable of being easily defended, have good lines 
of operation leading from it, be as near as possible to the 
main territorial objective, and have all the requisites of a 
good harbor. In our Mexican war the harbor of Vera 
Cruz, which was the base of General Scott's operations, 
very well fulfilled all the above conditions. In the Span- 
ish-American war it was impossible to find a satisfactory 
base from which to operate against Santiago. The base 
adopted, Sihoney, had none of the requisites of a good 
harbor, being an open roadstead with a very rocky shelv- 
ing coast and great depth of water, and connected with 
the objective by narrow trails. However, it had the great 
advantage of being only ten or twelve miles from San- 
tiago. It might easily have been organized for defense, 
had its protection by intrenchments been thought neces- 
sary by the commander of the American land forces. In 
the Philhpine Islands the naval harbor at Cavite, sl few miles 
from Manila, was the base of operations against that 
place. 

It is almost impossible for the defender to prevent the 
invader from making a landing upon some point of an 
extended coast line, since the invader has the advantage 
of surprise and it is impossible for the defender to occupy 
with a strong force every point along the coast. During 
the civil war the Union troops, assisted by the navy, had 
no great difficulty in landing at Hatteras, at Port Royal 



135 

and at New Orleans. To hold the landing place and to 
advance from it, the invader must be able to concentrate 
there a force superior to that of the enemy. The landing 
place need not be the port designated as the final base; 
this may be secured by subsequent land operations. 
When the final base is secured it should be thoroughly 
protected and supplied, so as to become a safe harbor of 
refuge in case the army meets defeat in its strategic 
operations. Wellington was protected by his lines of 
Torres Vedras in Portugal when defeated in the field and 
compelled to retreat, by the superior French army under 
Massena in 1810. The contracted base, which is always 
objectionable, may be increased as the operations progress 
by the occupation of other seaports besides the one first 
captured. 

The Defensive. — The defensive in strategy is resorted 
to by a commander because at the moment he lacks con- 
fidence in his army or in himself. The former may be 
due to the inferiority of his army, in numbers, organiza- 
tion, or morale. LiKe the offensive, the defensive in 
strategy does not necessarily imply the defensive in 
war or in tactics, although the three do usually go to- 
gether. 

The civil war was an offensive war on the part of the 
National Government to suppress a rebellion against its 
authority in the Confederate states. The campaign 
beginning after Chancellor sville and closing at Gettysburg 
was, however, a strictly defensive campaign on the part of 
the Army of the Potomac. The Chancellors ville and 
Peninsula campaigns were defensive campaigns on the 
part of the Confederates; the battle of Chancellor sville 
and all the battles fought around Richmond in these 
campaigns were, however, offensive battles on the part of 
the Army of Northern Virginia. 



136 

The Advantages and Disadvantages of the Defense.— 

The advantages of the commander who undertakes a 
defensive campaign are that he operates in his own coun- 
try, he can make use of a smaller force, he receives assist- 
ance from his fortified places, he undertakes a less difficult 
task, and has a greater chance of outside assistance. The 
advantages of operating in one's own country have already 
been set forth in the observation made by Frederick the 
Great. The population being friendly the informa- 
tion derived from them is certain to be intentionally 
truthful and may be exceedingly valuable. This attitude 
of the people and the presumably more accurate knowledge 
of the topography of the country makes the operations 
of the army less liable to miscarry, for even in an unknown 
region faithful guides can always be secured. The com- 
mander is able to select the positions where he proposes 
to resist invasion long in advance and to intrench them 
by employing the civil population or his least trained 
troops. 

In the minor operations of outpost, patrolling, and ad- 
vance guard movements, his knowledge of the country 
gives him a great advantage and enables him to resort to 
ambuscades and surprises. The defense requires less 
troops than the offense because it has no long lines of 
communications in a hostile country which, as has already 
been shown, absorb a large fraction of the army. The 
operations of the defender are aided by the permanent or 
temporary fortifications which have been constructed on 
or within the radius of influence of the principal fines of 
invasion, which he may use as temporary bases, pivots of 
maneuver, or simply as obstacles to delay the advance of 
the invader. 

r"" The defender also has a moral advantage in the fact 
that he only sets for himself the task of preserving his 



137 

fighting force or the decisive territorial objective, while 
the invader sets for himself the task of destroying the one 
and capturing the other. The invader must therefore 
bring the defender to decisive battle, force the defender 
into such a position that he can only escape by fighting a 
decisive battle in which the chances are all against him, 
or capture a territorial objective which will serve to im- 
press upon the defender the hopelessness of continued 
resistance. So long as the defender can avoid these 
decisive conditions, he is unconquered and can still hope for 
ultimate success. -"^ 

In 1812 the Russians preserved their army by refusing 
to fight a battle near the frontier and compelled Napoleon 
to invade their country. When in their estimation the 
reduction of his fighting force at the front gave them a 
reasonable chance of success, they accepted a defensive 
battle^/ Unsuccessful, however, in this battle of Borodino, 
they continued their retreat and abandoned the ancient 
capital of Moscow, which Napoleon had considered a 
decisive objective. Napoleon was unable to invade the 
country beyond Moscow, because of the reduction of his 
fighting force and the exhaustion of his means of trans- 
portation. His failure to achieve success raised a spirit 
of insurrection in his rear and he was finally compelled to 
begin the retreat which the combined action of the Russians 
and the early winter rendered disastrous. 

A similar disastrous campaign was that of Massena in 
Spain and Portugal in 1810. The French army in Spain 
numbered 400,000 men, yet he reached the lines of Torres 
Vedras near Lisbon via Salamanca too weak to even 
attempt their capture from Wellington's army of 35,000. 
He was afterwards compelled to retreat on account of the 
hostility of the inhabitants on the lines of communication 
which rendered the supply of the army an impossibility. 



138 

The obligation of making the first movement which the 
invader assumes often leads him into hasty and ill-con- 
sidered operations from which the defender is protected. 
Thus the impatience of the public and the press led the 
Union mihtary authorities in 1861 to undertake, against 
their better judgment, the ill-fated campaign of Bull Run. 
It led the French army commanders to undertake hasty 
offensive operations in 1870, from the effects of which they 
were unable to recover. Had the Spanish fleet not taken 
refuge in the harbor of Santiago, it is not at all improbable 
that another Bull Run in the vicinity of Havana might 
have been forced on the American military authorities. 

There is among the great nations of the world a strong 
feeling averse to any considerable increase in the power 
of any one individual state. Thi^ and the natural ten- 
dency of civilized man to pity the weak, raise at once in 
other nations a sympathy for the defender, which may 
ultimately lead to active intervention. The assistance 
rendered by France to our colonies during the Revolution, 
the alliance against the growing power of Napoleon, the 
intervention of the allies in the Crimean war, the inter- 
vention of the British in the Russo-Turkish war were all 
to prevent the military success of the stronger nation from 
unduly increasing its power. In the war of 1914, the 
desire to curb the military power of Germany was very 
evident. 

The disadvantage of the defensive in strategy lies in 
the fact that the commander must assume a waiting or 
hesitating pohcy. He rehes on defeating his adversary 
by decisive tactical battles, by exhausting his powers by 
skillful retreat or by taking refuge in fortified places, and 
by invoking the aid of foreign powers. Tactical success 
in a single battle or in a series of battles will rarely check 
a determined antagonist, as was shown in the operations of 



139 

the armies of the Potomac and of Northern Virginia in the 
civil war, yet on the other hand the decisive battle of 
Waterloo did terminate the offensive power of Napoleon 
and the battle of Saratoga ended British invasion from 
Canada during our Revolutionary war. 

The Russian campaign of 1812, and the Peninsula 
campaign of 1810, show how success may be attained under 
exceptional circumstances through the exhaustion of the 
invader. 

As a rule, the defensive persistently adhered to must 
lead to ultimate failure; it is only by the use of the defen- 
sive for the purpose of husbanding a weaker force until an 
opportunity comes to assume the offensive that ultimate 
success is secured. 

Defense of Rivers. — The rivers of a country that inter- 
sect the lines of invasion are the most common barriers 
upon which the defensive army is assembled to await and 
dispute the advance of an invader. The defense of a 
river may be passive or active and should be of a nature 
to meet the three methods utilized by the invader to secure 
a passage, by force, by surprise and by stratagem. A 
passive defense contemplates only the strengthening of 
the natural barrier by means of an armed force so that the 
enemy cannot safely advance beyond it. The first step 
in the defense is the destruction of all permanent means of 
crossing in the shape of bridges and ferries. Strategically 
to resist an attempt of the invader to secure the passage 
by force, a defender need only concentrate and intrench 
in the vicinity of the point of crossing as large a force as 
possible. 

At Fredericksburg J Virginia, where Lee successfully 
resisted the attempt of Burnside to effect a crossing, the 
former was enabled to concentrate his whole army at that 
point, because of the strategic errors made by the latter. 



140 

Burnside took command to the Army of the Potomac at 
Warrenton, Virginia, November 9, 1862, and at once 
made his plan to cross the Rappahannock by surprise at 
Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg. The plan would 
under ordinary circumstances have been a good one, for 
of Lee's two army corps, one was at Culpeper and the other 
was in the Shenandoah valley. Burnside's army, however, 
had no pontoon train or other means of crossing the river, 
and had he investigated the fact he would have found that 
the only available train was on the upper Potomac at or 
near Harpers Ferry. It was impossible to have this at 
Fredericksburg before November 27. Notwithstanding 
this, Burnside began to concentrate his army at the 
point of crossing on November 17, and thus exposed his 
entire plan to his able adversary and gave him time to 
defeat it. When Burnside finally did cross on December 
11, his entire force of 117,000 men was not sufficient to 
dislodge Lee's army from its intrenched position on the 
heights overlooking the river, although that army num- 
bered but 60,000 men. 

The attempts of the British to cross the Tugela in 
South Africa by force arose from the following circum- 
stances. At the outbreak of the war about 25,000 Boer 
forces operated by converging hnes on Lady smith, Natal, 
an important town, military station and railway junction 
on the Durban-Johannesburg railway. The British force 
in Natal, about half the strength of the Boers, after fight- 
ing several unimportant engagements retreated, and 
about 7000 men under White took refuge in Ladysmith 
and were there invested by the Boers. To protect the 
investing force from the attacks of any reheving force 
which might come from Durban, the Boers organized a 
covering force and posted it along the Tugela river about 
twelve miles south of Ladysmith. It was this covering 



141 

force which resisted three different attempts of Duller 
to dislodge it, so that he might relieve Ladysmith. The 
operations involved were entirely tactical and will not be 
considered here, the numbers alone being of strategic 
significance. In the first attempt or battle of ColensOy 
December 15, 1899, the covering force under Jouhert 
numbered 12,000 men and the reheving force under 
Buller, 19,000; in the second attempt January 10-27, ter- 
minating in the battle of Spion Kop, the covering force 
numbered 18,000, the relieving force 25,000; in the third 
attempt February 4-7, known as the battle of Vaal Kranz, 
the numbers were as before. A fourth attempt made 
February 17-27, in which occurred the battle of Pieters 
Hill, was finally successful. 

The operations on the Kimberley line were somewhat 
similar to the operations about Ladysmith; the covering 
force was under Cronje and the relieving force under 
Methuen. Cronje was at first posted at Belmont about 
sixty miles south of Kimberley with about 3000 men, and 
on November 23 was attacked and defeated by Methuen 
with 6000 men. He retreated along the railway a short 
distance to Graspan or Enslin,where he met a second defeat 
November 24-25 and retired to the Modder river, twenty 
miles south of Kimberley, where he hastily took up a 
position on both banks. Both generals had been rein- 
forced in the meantime, Cronje had a force of 8000 and 
Methuen 8500. Methuen attacked the position on the 
Modder on November 27 and though the battle was inde- 
cisive, the British succeeded in getting a foot-hold on the 
north bank. The Boers retired to a position on a ridge of 
hills at Magersfontein nearer Kimberley. Here Cronje 
intrenched his position, which he occupied with about 
8000 men. Methuen attacked him on December 9 with 
13,000 men, but was defeated and was compelled to retire 



142 

behind the river, intrench himself and wait for reinforce- 
ments; Croiije was now strongly reinforced, but remained 
on the defensive until finally dislodged by Roberts' turn- 
ing movement. 

It is a much more difficult task to defend a river against 
an attempt to effect a passage by surprise or stratagem; 
it may be said to be impossible except under exceptionally 
favorable conditions. The river must be very wide so 
that it will require a considerable time to construct the 
bridges and cross the troops; it must have good roads 
parallel to the river but beyond view and cannon range of 
its further bank, along which troops can be rapidly con- 
centrated; there must also be a good position in rear to 
which the army may retire, in case the defense fails. The 
army may be then divided into groups of divisions or 
army corps, each charged with the defense of a certain part 
of the river. The group headquarters should be con- 
nected by telegraph for rapid transmission of informa- 
tion and orders. The groups would be encamped on the 
parallel roads at the intersection of the cross roads, and 
would have pickets along the river bank and patrols on 
the further side. Further to the rear would be the strate- 
gic reserve to reinforce the cordon or cover its retreat. 

Ordinarily it is deemed better to hold the army in a 
concentrated position in some central position to move 
against the invader as soon as possible after he has begun 
his crossing. The stream itself is watched by cavalry 
patrols, who retard the enemy's movements and give 
warning of them. Sometimes, as at Fredericksburg, this 
enables the defender to reach the point of crossing before 
the invader is able to complete his movement. 

The active defense of a river is based on the supposition 
that a general will ordinaril}^ think more of his communica- 
tions than he will of his line of operations. If therefore the 



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143 

defender can threaten the communications of the invader, 
the latter will temporarily at least give up his idea of 
crossing the river. In order to carry out this scheme of 
defense, the defender should have possession of one or 
more permanent bridge-heads covering good bridges, by 
means of which he can quickly transfer his force in safety 
from one side of the river to the other. However, per- 
manent bridgeheads are unnecessary if the defender is a 
successful general whose movements are much to be feared. 
It was by crossing the Rappahannock and boldly advanc- 
ing into Maryland and Pennsylvania that Lee prevented 
Hooker from again crossing the Rappahannock after the 
battle of Chancellor sville. 

In the third campaign made by the Austrians for the 
relief of Mantua, Italy, Napoleon resorted to active defense 
to relieve himself of a force which was threatening to 
cross the Adige. The Austrian relieving army was mov- 
ing forward in two columns, the first of 15,000 men down 
the valley of the Adige river from Trent, and the second 
of 28,000 men from the Piave on Verona. Napoleon's 
covering army numbered only 33,000 men, of whom 
10,000 were defending the Adige valley in the vicinity of 
Trent while he himself with 18,000 was attempting to 
retard the second Austrian column in the vicinity of 
Vicenza; the remaining troops were held as a strategic 
reserve. The enemy's numerical superiority was, how- 
ever, too great for successful opposition and both wings of 
his army had to fall back ; the first retreated to the plateau 
of Rivoli on the upper Adige, and the second retreated to 
the vicinity of Verona. 

Unless one of the Austrian columns could be forced to 
retire, Napoleon himself would be compelled to retreat 
and then fight the united Austrian army. Under these 
circumstances he strengthened Verona with his reserve. 



144 

and with the second column he marched down the Adige 
from Verona, crossed the river a dozen miles below, at 
Ronco, and after a three days' fight at Arcole succeeded 
in outflanking the second Austrian column and com- 
pelling it to retreat. This enabled him to combine his 
forces against the ^first Austrian column and defeat that 
also. 

When the main river of a country is parallel to the line of 
invasion, as the Danube and Po, and only its tributaries 
are perpendicular to it, it offers better opportunities for 
defense than a river perpendicular to the line of invasion, 
unless the latter is an obstacle exceptionally strong, nat- 
urally and artificially, like the Rhine. An army posted 
behind one of the tributaries has one flank of its position 
protected by the main river if the bridges on this river 
have been destroyed, and has double lines of retreat if it 
controls a bridge over the main river in its rear. The 
enemy is compelled to attack in front or on the unsup- 
ported flank, in which case one or the other or both lines of 
retreat are available. If the defender retires to the other 
side of the main stream the invader will hardly dare to 
advance further and leave the defender on the flank of 
his communications. He must therefore also cross the 
main river to bring the defender to decisive battle. The 
defender may at once take a position on the side of the 
main stream opposite to the line of operations of the 
enemy, or may retreat there after first accepting battle 
elsewhere. It will be remembered that in Moltke's plan 
of operations for the defense of Berlin against an Austrian 
column moving through Saxony, he proposed that the 
defending army should, after making an effort to defend 
the mountain passes, retire behind the Elbe and from that 
position threaten the invader's communications. The 
numerous campaigns in the Danube and Po valleys 



145 

illustrate the use that may be made of such rivers in 
attack and defense. 

The failure of the defense of a river is usually due to the 
fact that the defender puts too much faith in the strength 
of the obstruction and either attempts to guard too long a 
line, or entirely fails to guard some part of it. The river 
should be regarded not as an impassable obstacle, but 
merely as an obstruction to the invader's free movement. 

Defense of Mountains. — The defense of a range of 
mountains is made up of two distinct operations, the 
defense of the passes and the defense of the outlets. On 
account of the rough character of mountain ranges, their 
innumerable ravines and chasms, cliffs and peaks, opera- 
tions in them on a grand scale are utterly impossible. 
The attack and the defense of the passes are therefore the 
work of the advance guard in attack and small detach- 
ments of the defense. The object of the detachments in 
the passes is not to actually stop the invader, for that is 
impossible, but to delay him. To this operation the 
rough character of the country lends itself with great 
effect. With the assistance of field fortification, a moun- 
tain pass becomes the strongest possible field of operations 
for a small defensive force, the only danger to which the 
detachments are exposed is that of being cut off by turning 
movements. These must be guarded against by outposts 
and patrols connecting the principal detachments, and 
by reserves posted at the intersections of the valleys and 
ridges which are defended. In crossing a range of moun- 
tains the invading army is usually divided into several 
columns each utilizing a different pass. If the detach- 
ments can so retard the columns that they will not debouch 
from the range in the order planned by the invader they 
have fulfilled all the functions that can be expected of 
them. 



146 

The main defense must be in the open country in rear of 
the mountain range, and the object must be to destroy the 
columns in detail as they debouch from the passes. This 
requires a strong resisting force at the exit of each pass and 
a strong central reserve to be moved to the pass where the 
enemy first attempts to force back the retaining force. 
The central reserve must be in communication with each 
detaining force, and each force with its detachments in the 
mountains. Circumstances may occur where the defend- 
ing army may make an active defense and destroy one or 
more of the columns in the mountains themselves. 

In the first campaign of Napoleon in 1796, he was 
guarding the Apennines and the Maritime Alps of Italy 
against the combined Austrian and Sardinian armies. 
These mountains, which separate the valley of the Po 
from the Mediterranean coast, are parallel and so near to 
the coast that in many places the Corniche road running 
from Nice to Genoa follows the steep sides of the moun- 
tains. At the mouths of the valleys through which small 
streams flow from the mountains, and along the road from 
Savona to Genoa, the mountains recede slightly from the 
coast. 

In 1796 there were four principal passes or rather roads 
winding over the range between Nice and Genoa. From 
Vintimiglia a road led to Coni; from Albenga a road led to 
Ceva; from Finale and Savona roads led to Cairo on the 
Bormida, from which place roads ran westward to 
Millesimo and Ceva, and eastward down the Bormida 
valley to Acqui and Alessandria; from Genoa a road led 
to Novi and Alessandria. Napoleon had a field force of 
about 40,000 men to hold the passes from Albenga east- 
ward. He posted one force of 5000 in rear of the Albenga 
or Ormea Pass, his main body of 32,000 at a central posi- 
tion near Savona, and 3000 at Voltri on the road between 



147 

Savona and Genoa. The roads on the crest of the moun- 
tain were held by detachments; that on the crest of Mon- 
tenotte opposite Savona nmnbered 1200 men and was 
protected by field works. In this position Napoleon was 
able to support or be supported by each of his detached 
divisions. 

The Austrians had a force of 30,000 based upon the 
fortified depot of Alessandria, while the Sardinians held 
Ceva and Millesimo with a force of 10,000. The Aus- 
trians decided to assume the offensive, and cross the 
mountains and move on Savona in two columns; one of 
8000 via the road leading to Genoa, thence along the sea- 
coast, and the other of 5000 over the mountains via Mon- 
tenotte. The left wing of the Sardinians was to co-operate 
with the second Austrian column. 

On the same day, the Austrian column from Genoa was 
checked by the detaining column at Voltri, and the other 
from Acqui by the detachments in the field works on 
Montenotte; this disclosed the Austrian plan of campaign. 
Although the first column might overcome the detaining 
force and threaten his communications, Napoleon decided 
to attack the second column and threaten the communica- 
tions of the Austrians. He therefore moved his troops 
from Savona over the mountains, attacked and defeated 
the second column and drove it back towards Alessandria; 
this caused the first Austrian column to retreat back 
through Genoa as he had anticipated. This closed the 
defensive stage of the campaign. 

As in the case of rivers, defensive operations may also 
be based on a range of mountains, parallel to the invader's 
line. In the theater of operations between the Appala- 
chian system and the Mississippi river, the Cumberland 
and Walden range of mountains formed the eastern 
boundary of the field of operations in Kentucky and 



148 

Tennessee, while the Louisville-Nashville-Chattanooga 
railroad, which traversed these States, was the principal 
Union line of invasion. In rear of the mountains was the 
Chattanooga-Richmond railway, which afforded the means 
of transferring men and supplies from one pass to another. 
This range played an important part in the operations in 
Kentucky and Tennessee in 1862. 

In May, 1862, Morgan with his mounted raiders de- 
bouched from the passes of the Cumberland mountains 
near Knoxville, and raided the railway near Cave City. 
Returning from this raid and reorganizing, he again de- 
bouched from the same passes early in July and during 
that month executed an extensive raid along the line of 
the railway and in eastern Kentucky. He destroyed 
numerous railway bridges and captured several important 
depots of supplies. 

It was from Walden's range near Chattanooga that the 
Confederate general, Forrest, in the same month made his 
raid and captured the Union depot of suppHes at Mur- 
freesboro. 

In the latter part of August, while the Union army of 
the Cumberland was encamped on the line of McMinn- 
ville-Huntsville, two Confederate armies emerged from 
these mountains to operate against the communications 
and base of the Union army. Bragg^s Army of Tennessee 
debouched east of McMinnville, and Kirhy Smith's 
Army of Kentucky near Knoxville. These operations 
compelled Buell, who commanded the Army of the Cum- 
berland, to retreat to the Ohio river. The Army of the 
Cumberland did not again reach the line of McMinnville- 
Huntsville thus abandoned until July 1, 1863, nearly a 
year later. 

Diversion. — A diversion in defensive strategy is any 
operation made by a detachment of the main army for the 



149 

purpose of diverting the attention of the invader, or some 
of the forces, from the main objective. When the defender 
occupies a strong position which he can hold with a 
reduced force, or he is opposed by a hesitating adversary, 
a diversion may be extremely useful. It has already 
been shown how valuable to the Confederate operations in 
Virginia in 1862, was the diversion made by Jackson in 
the Shenandoah valley. 

The commander of a detachment sent to make a diver- 
sion should keep in mind that the object of the movement 
is to produce as much confusion as possible in the plans of 
the adversary with as little loss as possible to himself. 
Jackson^ s diversion was carried out on these lines; he 
attacked only detachments much weaker than his own 
and took no risk of becoming involved in operations with 
superior forces which might materially affect the fighting 
strength or the morale of his force. He realized that 
the decisive tactical field for the employment of his corps 
was on the battle-fields near Richmond where the prin- 
cipal Union army was concentrated. 

In 1864 Lee ordered another diversion in the same valley, 
but it was not carried out in the same manner. In June, 
when Grant's army was crossing the James river, one of 
Lee^s three corps, EwelVs II corps, then under command of 
Early, was sent from the intrenched lines of Cold Harbor 
into the Shenandoah valley to operate against Hunter, 
who was advancing on Lynchburg; after disposing of 
Hunter, if he thought it advisable. Early was to make a 
diversion down the Shenandoah valley against the Union 
base and even its capital. 

Having driven Hunter in retreat into the mountains of 
West Virginia, Early moved down the Shenandoah valley, 
crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown, moved through 
Frederick, Maryland, where he fought an unimportant 



150 

battle and on July 11 was in front of the defenses of 
Washington. 

This movement alarmed the authorities at the national 
capital and in the border States, and Grant sent to Wash- 
ington from his own front the VI corps, and also the XIX 
corps which was on its way to join him from New Orleans. 
Early was unable to take the fortified capital, whose gar- 
rison was strengthened by the timely arrival of the VI 
corps, and retreated to the Shenandoah valley via Lees- 
burg to Strasburg. He was pursued to Leesburg by the 
VI corps. 

Assuming that this was merely a diversion, Grant 
directed that the VI and XIX corps be returned to him, 
and that Early be pursued by the Union troops of the 
Department of the Shenandoah and West Virginia. These 
troops numbered about 22,000 men and were under Hunter, 
who had escaped through West Virginia and had returned 
to the vicinity of Harpers Ferry with his commnad. 

As soon as the VI corps returned to Washington, Early 
assumed the offensive against the scattered Union troops 
in his vicinity and decisively defeated a small force under 
Crook at Kernstown, July 24, and followed him to the Poto- 
mac river. From this point he sent his cavalry force to 
raid the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania. In these 
raids Chambersburg, Pa., was captured and burned. 

These operations so alarmed the Northern States that 
at the request of the authorities. Grant directed not only 
the VI and the XIX corps to act against Early, but also 
sent two of the three divisions of his cavalry corps to 
Washington. These troops with Hunter's command be- 
came the Army of the Shenandoah and Sheridan was 
assigned to supreme command. This army was organ- 
ized and assumed the offensive in the Shenandoah valley 
in the first days of August. 



151 

The success which had attended Early^s movement? 
until this time led both Lee and Early to convert the 
diversion into a serious campaign. For this purpose 
Kershaio^s division was sent to Early from LongstreeVs 
corps, but even with these troops Early had but 20,000 
troops to operate against Sheridan, who had a field force of 
43,000 men and a reserve of 13,000 on his lines of com- 
munication. The resulting campaign was, as might 
have been expected, disastrous to the morale as well as 
to the strength of the Confederate forces engaged. 

Had Early retired up the valley without offering serious 
opposition to Sheridan, he would have accomplished all 
he originally set out to do, and could have returned to 
Richmond with a force whose morale was improved and 
whose strength was unimapired. He might thus have 
reinforced Lee while Grant was still deprived of the assist- 
ance of Sheridan's two cavalry divisions, and the VI 
and XIX corps. The resulting situation would have been 
similar to that in August, 1862; one Union army would 
have been south of Richmond, and the other in the Shen- 
andoah valley, with the united Confederate army in its 
intrenched capital between them. 



1 




Wiley Special Subject Catalogues 

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are arranged in groups — each catalogue having a key 
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the key symbols of the Catalogues desired. 



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